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 Abstract 
 
 
This research studies how attitudes to gender (in)equality, heteronormativity 
and various types of violence are related to each other. Specific attention is 
given to the relations between patriarchal attitudes and violent conflict, next 
to the more often studied relations between patriarchy and violence against 
women and gay men. It also investigates possibilities to change patriarchal 
attitudes towards gender, heteronormativity and violence, making them more 
egalitarian. The results of the research are presented in three separate (journal) 
articles, each focusing on a specific theme: the first addresses relations be-
tween attitudes to gender (in)equality and violent conflict; the second ad-
dresses relations between homophobia and various types of violence, includ-
ing armed conflict, and the third explores how attitudes to gender equality, 
homosexuality and various types of violence are related.  
The first article, “Gender equality, attitudes to gender equality, and con-
flict”, builds on earlier research that found correlations between levels of gen-
der equality and armed conflict by adding individuals’ attitudes to gender 
equality to the puzzle. The article thus looks at the relationships between at-
titudes to gender equality on the one hand, and the levels of gender equality 
in the political and socio-economic sphere, the presence or absence of (inter-
nal) armed conflict and general levels of violence, on the other. Data on atti-
tudes to gender equality come from the World Values Surveys, the Global 
Gender Gap Index (on political and socio-economic gender equality), the 
Uppsala Conflict Data Base (on armed conflict) and the Global Peace Index 
(on general peacefulness).   
The results show a significant association between attitudes toward gender 
equality and levels of political and socio-economic gender equality, absence 
or presence of armed conflict and general levels of violence. This means that 
in countries where the population is largely positive to gender equality there 
are also rather high levels of gender equality, low levels of armed conflict and 
generally low levels of other types of violence. It also means that in countries 
where the population’s attitudes are generally negative to gender equality there 
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are low levels of gender equality, high levels of armed conflict and high general 
levels of violence.  
The second article, “Don’t be gay: homophobia, violence and conflict”, 
builds on two bodies of research: on the relations between interpersonal vio-
lence and intolerance of homosexuality, and between different types of vio-
lence and gender inequality. This research suggests that such violence has the 
same roots: patriarchal norms and attitudes. Given this assumption the ques-
tion here is whether intolerance of homosexuality could also be linked to 
other types of violence – for example armed conflict - just like gender ine-
quality. I investigate it using a variety of sources: the World Values Survey, 
the Gay Happiness Index, the State Sponsored Homophobia report, the 
Global Peace Index, the Uppsala Conflict Data Base, the Human Develop-
ment Index and the Global Gender Gap Index. The findings indicate that 
countries with low levels of tolerance of homosexuality tend to have high 
general levels of violence and high levels of armed conflict on their own ter-
ritory, while countries with high levels of tolerance of homosexuality tend to 
have low levels of violence at home but intervene militarily abroad. These 
results show, on the one hand, the need to reflect on intolerance of homo-
sexuality – and not just gender inequality - in policies addressing peace and 
violent conflict. On the other hand, they show a need for broader avenues of 
research on patriarchal attitudes, gender, sexualities and violent conflict in the 
context of geo-political power relations and military interventions.  
The third article, “Young men and gender trainings: What happens to at-
titudes to violence when attitudes to patriarchal norms on masculinity 
change?”, builds on the previous two articles by examining how attitudes to 
gender norms, including sexuality, and various types of violence are related 
to each other. In short: if attitudes to gender and sexuality change, do attitudes 
to violence change in the same direction? These relationships are investigated 
using a quasi-experimental setting, namely a gender training. Many organiza-
tions around the world today provide gender trainings in different settings 
with the aim to increase gender equality and sometimes also to reduce vio-
lence against women. Increasingly these trainings are targeting men. The 
quasi-experiment aims to provide a small piece to the complex puzzle of how 
attitudes to patriarchal norms on gender, sexuality and violence are related to 
each other by studying a gender training for young men in Mumbai, India, 
performed by a local NGO. It finds that the young men who had a training 
on gender/masculinities and sexuality changed a number of their attitudes to 
gender equality, gender based violence and homosexuality from more patri-
archal to more egalitarian ones. Following the training, the participants also 
became less approving of both violence against women and violence against 
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homosexuals. The most important finding, however, was that there also was 
a positive change of attitudes towards the types of violence that were not dis-
cussed during the training: that is, rejection of torture as well as collective and 
military violence. This indicates that attitudes to gender and sexuality are re-
lated to attitudes to violence, including both state violence and interpersonal 
violence. However, anecdotal evidence suggests that the changes might be 
sustainable only for those participants whose new, non-patriarchal attitudes 
were supported by family and friends, showing the limits of gender trainings 
as method for change. 
Three findings of these articles should be highlighted: first, they show in-
terconnectedness of gender, sexuality and violence and in doing so they con-
tribute to the deeper understanding of their relationships. Second, they indi-
cate that attitudes towards gender, sexuality and violence are related to levels of 
gender equality, sexual rights and violence in societies. The levels of, and the 
attitudes to those phenomena have not been often compared (i.e researchers 
compared, for example, levels of gender equality to levels of gendered vio-
lence, but not levels of equality to attitudes to violence, and vice versa). Fi-
nally, it is crucial to take patriarchal norms and attitudes towards gender, sex-
uality and violence in a society into account when addressing violent conflict. 
As noted earlier in reference to the second article, the relationship between 
the three is complicated by geo-political dynamics. On the one hand, govern-
ments, aid agencies, NGOs and others working on preventing conflict and 
building peace need to focus on improving gender equality and increasing 
tolerance of homosexuality in order to achieve a sustainable decrease in inter-
nal conflict levels and an improvement in general levels of violence in socie-
ties. On the other hand, there is a need to understand relationships between 
gender, sexuality, military interventions and geo-political domination. Studies 
going in that direction will also be important for critically rethinking meanings 
and practices of liberal peace and democracy.  
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Gender-ongelijkheid, homofobie en geweld: de drie pijlers 
van patriarchale normen en attitudes en hun onderlinge re-
laties 
 Samenvatting 
 
 
 
Dit onderzoek bestudeert hoe attitudes ten aanzien van gender-(on)gelijk-
heid, heteronormativiteit en verschillende soorten geweld met elkaar ver-
band houden. Naast aandacht voor de reeds vaker bestudeerde relaties 
tussen patriarchaat en geweld tegen vrouwen en homomannen, wordt spe-
cifieke aandacht besteed aan de relaties tussen patriarchale attitudes en ge-
welddadige conflicten. Het onderzoek bestudeert ook de mogelijkheden 
om patriarchale attitudes ten aanzien van gender, heteronormativiteit en 
geweld te veranderen, waardoor ze meer egalitair worden. De resultaten 
van het onderzoek worden gepresenteerd in drie afzonderlijke weten-
schappelijke artikelen, elk gericht op een specifiek thema: het eerste be-
handelt de relaties tussen attitudes ten aanzien van gender-(on)gelijkheid 
en gewelddadige conflicten; het tweede bestudeert de relatie tussen homo-
fobie en verschillende soorten geweld, waaronder gewapende conflicten; 
en het derde artikel onderzoekt hoe attitudes ten aanzien van genderge-
lijkheid, homoseksualiteit en verschillende soorten geweld met elkaar ver-
band houden. 
Het eerste artikel, “Gendergelijkheid, attitudes ten aanzien van gender-
gelijkheid en conflicten”, bouwt voort op eerder onderzoek dat correlaties 
aantoonde tussen niveaus van gendergelijkheid en gewapende conflicten, 
meer bepaald door de attituden van individuen over gendergelijkheid aan 
de puzzel toe te voegen. Het artikel kijkt dus naar de relaties tussen attitu-
des ten aanzien van gendergelijkheid aan de ene kant, en de niveaus van 
gendergelijkheid in de politieke en sociaaleconomische sfeer, de aanwezig-
heid of afwezigheid van (interne) gewapende conflicten en algemene ge-
weldsniveaus, aan de andere kant. Gegevens over attitudes ten aanzien van 
gendergelijkheid komen uit de World Values Surveys, de Global Gender 
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Gap Index (politieke en sociaaleconomische gendergelijkheid), de Uppsala 
Conflict Data Base (gewapende conflicten) en de Global Peace Index (al-
gemene vreedzaamheid). 
De resultaten tonen een significant verband aan tussen attitudes ten 
aanzien van gendergelijkheid en niveaus van politieke en sociaaleconomi-
sche gendergelijkheid, afwezigheid of aanwezigheid van gewapende con-
flicten en algemene niveaus van geweld. Dit betekent dat in landen waar 
de bevolking grotendeels positief staat tegenover gendergelijkheid, er ook 
vrij hoge niveaus van gendergelijkheid zijn, lage niveaus van gewapende 
conflicten en over het algemeen lage niveaus van andere soorten geweld. 
Het betekent ook dat in landen waar de attitudes met betrekking tot gen-
dergelijkheid onder de bevolking over het algemeen negatief is, er sprake 
is van lage niveaus van gendergelijkheid, hoge niveaus van gewapend con-
flict en hoge niveaus van geweld in het algemeen. 
Het tweede artikel, “Wees niet homo: homofobie, geweld en conflic-
ten”, bouwt voort op twee onderzoeksdomeinen: over de relaties tussen 
interpersoonlijk geweld en onverdraagzaamheid ten opzichte van homo-
seksualiteit, enerzijds, en tussen verschillende soorten geweld en gender-
ongelijkheid, anderzijds. Dit onderzoek suggereert dat deze vormen van 
geweld allen dezelfde wortels hebben: patriarchale normen en attitudes. 
Gegeven deze veronderstelling is de vraag hier of intolerantie van homo-
seksualiteit ook gekoppeld kan worden aan andere soorten van geweld - 
bijvoorbeeld gewapende conflicten – analoog aan de wijze waarop dit het 
geval is met betrekking tot genderongelijkheid. Het onderzoek maakt ge-
bruik van verschillende bronnen: de World Values Survey, de Gay Happi-
ness Index, het State Sponsored Homophobia Report, de Global Peace 
Index, de Uppsala Conflict Data Base, de Human Development Index en 
de Global Gender Gap Index. De bevindingen tonen aan dat landen met 
een lage mate van tolerantie voor homoseksualiteit over het algemeen een 
hoog algemeen niveau van geweld kennen en een hoog niveau van gewa-
pende conflicten op hun eigen grondgebied hebben, terwijl landen met 
een hoge mate van tolerantie voor homoseksualiteit over het algemeen 
lage niveaus van geweld in eigen land kennen, maar wel militair optreden 
in het buitenland. Deze resultaten tonen aan de ene kant de noodzaak om 
na te denken over intolerantie ten opzichte van homoseksualiteit - en niet 
alleen intolerantie ten opzichte van genderongelijkheid - in beleid dat zich 
richt op vrede en gewelddadige conflicten. Anderzijds tonen ze aan dat er 
behoefte is aan breder georiënteerd onderzoek naar patriarchale attitudes, 
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gender, seksualiteit en gewelddadige conflicten in de context van geopoli-
tieke machtsverhoudingen en militaire interventies. 
Het derde artikel, “Jonge mannen en gendertrainingen: wat gebeurt er 
met attituden ten opzichte van geweld als de attituden ten opzichte van 
patriarchale normen over mannelijkheid veranderen?”, bouwt voort op de 
twee vorige artikelen door na te gaan hoe attitudes ten aanzien van gen-
dernormen, waaronder seksualiteit, en verschillende soorten geweld met 
elkaar verband houden. Kort samengevat: veranderen houdingen ten op-
zichte van geweld in dezelfde richting als de houding ten opzichte van 
gender en seksualiteit? Deze relaties worden onderzocht in een quasi-ex-
perimentele setting, namelijk een gendertraining. Organisaties over de hele 
wereld bieden tegenwoordig gendertraining in verschillende omgevingen 
om alzo de gendergelijkheid te vergroten en soms ook om geweld tegen 
vrouwen te doen afnemen. Steeds vaker zijn deze trainingen gericht op 
mannen. Het quasi-experiment heeft als doel om een klein stukje toe te 
voegen aan de complexe puzzel van hoe attitudes ten aanzien van patriar-
chale normen met betrekking tot gender, seksualiteit en geweld met elkaar 
verband houden door een gendertraining, verzorgd door een lokale ngo, 
voor jonge mannen in Mumbai, India, te bestuderen. Het onderzoek komt 
tot de bevinding dat de jonge mannen die een training in gender / man-
nelijkheid en seksualiteit hebben gekregen een aantal van hun opvattingen 
over gendergelijkheid, gender-gerelateerd geweld en homoseksualiteit ver-
anderden van meer patriarchale naar meer egalitaire. Na de training ston-
den de deelnemers ook minder goedkeurend tegenover zowel geweld te-
gen vrouwen als geweld tegen homoseksuelen. De belangrijkste bevinding 
was echter dat er ook een positieve verandering was in de houding ten 
opzichte van de soorten geweld, ook al maakten die geen onderdeel van 
de cursus uit. Zo wezen ze marteling, collectief evenals militair geweld af. 
Dit toont aan dat de attitudes ten opzichte van gender en seksualiteit ge-
relateerd zijn aan de attitudes ten opzichte van geweld, waaronder zowel 
staatsgeweld als interpersoonlijk geweld. Anekdotisch bewijs suggereert 
echter dat de veranderingen alleen duurzaam kunnen zijn bij die deelne-
mers wier nieuwe, niet-patriarchale attitudes werden ondersteund door fa-
milie en vrienden, wat weerom de grenzen van gendertrainingen als me-
thode voor verandering aantoonde. 
Drie bevindingen van deze artikelen moeten worden benadrukt: ten 
eerste, ze laten een onderling verband zien tussen gender, seksualiteit en 
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geweld en dragen zo bij aan het dieper inzicht in hun onderlinge samen-
hang. Ten tweede geven ze aan dat de attitudes ten opzichte van gender, 
seksualiteit en geweld gerelateerd zijn aan maatschappelijke niveaus van 
gendergelijkheid, seksuele rechten en geweld. De niveaus van en de attitu-
des ten opzichte van deze fenomenen zijn nog niet vaak vergeleken (dat 
wil zeggen, onderzoekers vergeleken bijvoorbeeld niveaus van genderge-
lijkheid met niveaus van seksueel geweld, maar niet niveaus van gelijkheid 
met attitudes ten opzichte va geweld, en vice versa). Ten slotte is het cru-
ciaal om patriarchale normen en attitudes ten aanzien van gender, seksua-
liteit en geweld in een samenleving in aanmerking te nemen bij het aan-
pakken van gewelddadige conflicten. Zoals eerder opgemerkt met 
betrekking tot het tweede artikel, wordt de relatie tussen de drie gecom-
pliceerd door geopolitieke dynamiek. Aan de ene kant moeten regeringen, 
hulporganisaties, ngo's en andere actoren die werken aan het voorkomen 
van conflicten en het opbouwen van vrede gericht zijn op het verbeteren 
van gendergelijkheid en het vergroten van tolerantie voor homoseksuali-
teit om tot een duurzame afname van de interne conflictniveaus en een 
verbetering van de algemene niveaus van geweld in samenlevingen te ko-
men. Anderzijds is er behoefte aan een beter begrip van de verhoudingen 
tussen gender, seksualiteit, militaire interventies en geopolitieke overheer-
sing. Studies die in die richting gaan, zullen ook belangrijk zijn voor het 
kritisch herdenken van betekenissen en praktijken van liberale vrede en 
democratie. 
 
  
1 
  
1 Introduction 
 
 
This research studies how attitudes to gender (in)equality, heteronorma-
tivity and various types of violence are related to each other. Specific at-
tention is given to the relation between patriarchal attitudes and violent 
conflict, next to the more often studied relations between patriarchy and 
violence against women and gay men. It also investigates possibilities to 
change patriarchal attitudes towards gender, heteronormativity and vio-
lence, making them more egalitarian. The results of the research are pre-
sented in three separate (journal) articles, each focusing on a specific 
theme: the first addresses the relations between attitudes to gender 
(in)equality and violent conflict; the second addresses the relations be-
tween homophobia and various types of violence, including armed con-
flict; and the third explores how attitudes to gender equality, homosexual-
ity and various types of violence could change.  
A number of questions – stemming from my many years of work in 
countries in conflict and post-conflict situation – have triggered this re-
search: How are gender inequality, oppression of women and homosexu-
als and violence against them related to various other forms of violence, 
including armed conflict? Is it really so that the countries with higher ac-
ceptance of patriarchal norms and attitudes have more armed conflict, and 
countries where there are armed conflicts have high levels of violence 
against and oppression of women and homosexuals? If this is so, would 
gender equality and acceptance of homosexuality result in lowering overall 
levels of violence, including armed conflict? 
 Finding answers to these questions would not only advance our theo-
retical understanding of causes of various forms of violence and their re-
lation to gender inequality and heteronormativity; it would also be incred-
ibly useful for all practitioners, policy makers and donors working to 
reduce levels of various forms of violence around the world.  
2 CHAPTER 1 
 
1.1 The Starting Points and the Research Questions 
The main starting point of this research is Hudson et al’s (2012) assertion 
that high levels of violence against women in a society is the best predictor 
of violent conflict. The second and third best predictors of violent conflict 
are also indicators of gender inequality, namely unequal family law and 
polygyny (Hudson et al, 2012, p. 112-113). According to Hudson et al, 
these three indicators of gender inequality are all better predicators of vi-
olent conflict than more traditional, mainstream explanations such as eco-
nomic development, GDP per capita, democratization and presence / ab-
sence of Islam. Hudson and her colleagues also found that “if a state is 
indifferent about enforcing laws that protect women in its society, it is less 
likely to be compliant with international norms to which it has committed” 
(2012, p. 113). So they argue that there is a clear link between oppression 
of women and gender inequality on the one hand, and violent conflict, on 
the other.  
While being interested in testing this argument, I was also interested to 
see whether similar arguments could be made about relations between vi-
olent conflict, masculinities and heteronormativity. According to Connell 
(1995) men’s domination over women and the gender inequality that en-
sue are one of the most prominent features of patriarchy, together with 
heteronormativity. The fact that heteronormativity, and its ensuing intol-
erance and oppression of homosexuals, is one of the base ingredients of 
patriarchy leads to the question whether intolerance of homosexuality can 
be linked to violent conflict in the similar way gender inequality is linked. 
Earlier studies on intolerance of homosexuality and violence have focused 
on interpersonal violence, mainly violence against homosexual men 
(Keiller 2010) and violence committed by men wanting to prove that they 
are not homosexuals (Kimmel 2008). Kimmel (2008) further argues that, 
within patriarchal norms, the use of violence is the preferred means to 
settle disputes and conflicts among men and to (re)gain respect and honor.   
Thus, it seems vital to study the interconnectedness of gender, includ-
ing masculinities, heteronormativity and various forms of violence if we 
want to fully understand how they are related to each other, and if and 
how these relationships might be relevant for our understanding of violent 
conflict.   
The main question of this research is: How are gender (in)equality, het-
eronormativity and various forms of violence related to each other, and 
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specifically, how are patriarchal attitudes to gender and sexuality related to 
violent conflict? This main question is supported by three sub-questions, 
each of which is addressing a specific set of relationships, and is tackled in 
a separate (journal) article: 
1.1.1 The first article - “Gender Equality, Attitudes to Gender 
Equality, and Conflict”1  
This article asks what the relationships are between attitudes to gender 
equality, levels of gender equality, presence of armed conflicts, and general 
levels of peacefulness. In addressing this question, the article first re-tests 
the hypotheses of the earlier studies: H1, the higher the level of political 
and socioeconomic gender equality in a country, the less likely it is that it 
will experience an intrastate armed conflict; and H2, the higher the level 
of political and socioeconomic gender equality in a country, the more 
peaceful the country is in general. By re-testing these hypotheses with dif-
ferent data sets than those used in the earlier studies the validity of the 
results would be proved stronger. The study then moves on to examine if 
attitudes to gender equality relate to violence and conflict in the same way 
the levels of political and socioeconomic gender equality do, by testing the 
hypotheses H3, the more people approve of gender equality in a country, 
the less likely it is that there will be an armed conflict; and H4, the more 
people approve of gender equality in a country, the more peaceful it will 
be in general. Finally, as a control, the study investigates the relationship 
between levels of political and socioeconomic gender equality and attitudes 
to gender equality, testing the hypothesis H5, the more people approve of 
gender equality in a country, the higher the level of political and socioec-
onomic equality.  
Investigating how attitudes to gender equality relate to various forms 
of violence, including violent conflict, contributes to discussions about the 
need to incorporate gender analysis in mainstream research on violence 
and conflict. The study also contributes to research on the causal mecha-
nisms of the relationship between gender (in)equality and violence. Finally, 
the study motivates further research on how to change attitudes to, and 
                                                 
1 Published in Marcia Texler Segal, Vasilikie Demos (ed.) Gendered Perspectives on 
Conflict and Violence (Advances in Gender Research, Volume 18a), Emerald Group 
Publishing Limited, pp.273-295. 2013. 
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norms on, gender equality in a more egalitarian way, especially in contexts 
of high levels of violence. Insights into relationships between attitudes to 
gender equality and violence are also useful for policymakers, donors and 
practitioners, both those working on reducing violence and conflict and 
those working on increasing gender equality, showing how their work is 
linked.2  
1.1.2 The second article, “Don’t be Gay: Homophobia, Violence 
and Conflict”3 
This paper poses the question whether intolerance of male homosexuality 
can be linked to other types of violence than interpersonal violence, spe-
cifically to armed conflict. The hypotheses are: H6, societies with more 
acceptance of homosexuality will have less violence of any type, including 
less involvement in armed conflict; and H7, countries involved in violent 
conflicts and with high general levels of violence will also have high levels 
of intolerance towards homosexuality. The study first examines the rela-
tions between male homosexuality and different types of violence. It then 
adds control variables such as gender equality, economic development, 
human development, democracy and general peacefulness to examine dif-
ferences between countries with armed conflict on their territory; coun-
tries waging wars on others’ territories, and countries not involved in any 
armed conflict. It then tests which among the traditional control variables 
has the strongest correlations with violence, in order to use the results for 
the last analysis which tests if human development, as control variable, has 
a moderating influence on attitudes to male homosexuality in relation to 
different types of violence.  
Investigating attitudes to male homosexuality specifically, in relation to 
different types of violence, permits us to pursue broader avenues for re-
search both into the causal mechanisms between patriarchal gender and 
sexuality norms and different types of violence, and into research aimed 
at reducing violence. This study is also useful for policymakers, donors 
and practitioners as it points out the need to include attitudes to sexuality 
                                                 
2 This article was written early on in my PhD trajectory which is why its data 
sets are older than the ones used in the more recent articles.  
3 Submitted to SAGE Open. 
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to existing work on gender and gender equality as well as work on reducing 
violence.  
1.1.3 The third article, “Young Men and Gender Trainings: What 
Happens to Attitudes to Violence when Attitudes to 
Patriarchal Masculinities Change?”4  
This paper connects gender - including masculinities, heteronormativity 
and violence asking whether attitudes to specific types of violence change 
when attitudes to gender equality and male homosexuality change.  More 
specifically, it investigated what happened when a group of young male 
students attended a gender training in India performed by a local NGO. 
The study measured the students’ attitudes to gender equality, homosexu-
ality and various types of violence before and after their attendance of a 
training on patriarchal norms, masculinities and gender equality. The ob-
jective of the study was to see if and how attitudes to gender equality and 
homosexuality co-vary with attitudes to different types of violence. The 
study contributes with yet another piece to the puzzle of gender, sexuality 
and violence, further disentangling the interconnectedness of gender ine-
quality, intolerance of homosexuality and various forms of violence. Im-
portantly, the study noted that changes in attitudes to gender and sexuality 
correlate with changes in attitudes to even those types of violence which 
were not at all addressed in the training: specifically, state based violence 
(torture, military violence) and collective violence. The results, however, 
question the efficiency of gender trainings - the current favorite tool of 
the international community - to produce sustainable change of norms 
and attitudes to gender. Thus the research is contributing to the literature 
on norms change and methods thereof, as well as to the literature linking 
male homosexuality, masculinities, gender and violence. Finally, it is also 
useful for policy makers and practitioners engaged in work on gender, sex-
uality and violence.  
                                                 
4 Following a request to review and resubmit a reviewed version has been sub-
mitted to NORMA, the Nordic Journal for Masculinities Studies. 
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1.2 The state of the academic field and theoretical 
approach of this research 
Each of the three journal articles delves in detail into the current debates 
addressing relations between gender, heteronormativity, masculinity and 
various forms of violence, with a special attention to violent conflict. Thus 
here I address only the main concepts and the ways they have been em-
ployed in this research. 
1.2.1 Gender norms and attitudes to norms 
Norms are formal and informal rules for behavior in a society, telling us 
what’s “right” and “normal” (Scott and Marshall, 2009). Norms are thus 
crucial for all human interaction (Bicchieri, 2006; Hechter and Opp, 2001; 
Posner, 2000). Norms on gender, thus, are what our societies and cultures 
tell us is “right” and “normal” behavior for men and women and what is 
“masculine” and “feminine” (Reeser, 2010). Norms on gender inequality, 
heteronormativity / homophobia and masculinities (as well as violence, 
the dependent variable in the three studies) influence human interaction 
in all societies. This research follows Whitehead’s (2002) clustering of gen-
der norms in two opposing groups: patriarchal and egalitarian. Patriarchal 
norms are traditional gender norms, stipulating that men should dominate 
women, that men have more value than women and are more fit to make 
decisions and exercise power than women. These patriarchal gender 
norms exist all over the world albeit to different extents and in different 
shapes and there are “both costs and benefits for conforming or not to 
them” (Parent and Moradi, 2009, p. 176). Not only men adhere to patriar-
chal norms, women do so too (Ahmad, Riaz, Barata and Stewart, 2004), 
which makes it both possible and important to look at society-wide norms 
and the levels of approving attitudes thereof.5  
 Attitudes are individual positions towards norms, ideas or behaviors 
(Eagly and Chaiken, 1998). They tell us if individuals approve of a norm 
or not, and their attitude to norms will have an influence on how they 
react and behave towards other people (Myers, 2008). This is why there is 
                                                 
5 See sections 2.2.1, 3.3 and 4.3. 
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a focus on attitudes in my studies, with focus on attitudes towards patri-
archal norms on gender and sexuality, and specifically on gender (in)equal-
ity, hegemonic masculinities and heteronormativity.6 
1.2.2 Gender equality  
The definition of gender equality used in this research is a combination of 
the definitions of Htun and Weldon (2010) and UN Women (2012).  
According to Htun and Weldon “Gender equality is an ideal condition 
in which men and women have similar opportunities to participate in pol-
itics, the economy and social activities; their roles and status are equally 
valued; neither suffers from gender based disadvantage or discrimination; 
and both are considered free autonomous beings with dignity and rights” 
(2010: p. 213). 
UN Women has much more elaborate, and descriptive, definition: 
“Equality between women and men (gender equality) refer to the equal 
rights, responsibilities and opportunities of women and men and girls and 
boys. Equality does not mean that women and men will become the same 
but that women’s and men’s rights, responsibilities and opportunities will 
not depend on whether they are born male or female. Gender equality 
implies that the interests, needs and priorities of both women and men are 
taken into consideration, recognizing the diversity of different groups of 
men and women. Gender equality is not a women’s issue but should con-
cern and fully engage men as well as women. Equality between women 
and men is seen both as a human rights issue and as a precondition for, 
and indicator of, sustainable people-centered development“(UN Women, 
2012: n.p.).7 
 
 These two definitions are selected because combining academic and 
policy-based concerns with gender equality allowed me a broader perspec-
tive. For example, while the UN Women definition is more detailed it does 
not mention discriminations, which Htun and Weldon do. As the opposite 
of gender equality – gender inequality – leads to discrimination, and thus 
opens the path to addressing violence, it was deemed important for this 
                                                 
6 See sections 2.1 and 4.2. 
7 See sections 2.2.2, 3.3 and 4.3. 
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research. Equally important, practitioners addressing gender (in)equality 
often rely on the UN Women’s concepts because they are practice ori-
ented and offer the convenience of operationalization of social, economic 
and political indicators. As those indicators have also been recorded in the 
large data sets used in this research, it made methodological sense to in-
clude the UN Women definition.  
1.2.3 Masculinities  
Following Connell (2005) I talk about masculinities in plural. Connell’s 
theorizing of hegemonic masculinity proposes a system of power hierar-
chies between different masculinities in society, with the hegemonic mas-
culinity, offered as an ideal, at the top. Patriarchal masculinities are often 
hegemonic, meaning that they are seen as the ideal masculinities, some-
thing men should strive for, in a given time and space (Connell, 2005). 
While it is theoretically possible to imagine a society with dominant mas-
culinity that is egalitarian, Connell’s definition of hegemonic masculinity 
stresses that it “ideologically legitimate[s] the global subordination of 
women to men” (Connell and Messerschmidt, 2005: p. 832). Theorizing 
of hegemonic masculinity also indicates that some men can dominate 
other men based on their social status, on the notions and practices related 
to their masculinity, and on how “manly” they are perceived to be, with 
the homosexual men at the bottom of the hierarchical ladder. Hegemonic 
masculinity, even though it looks different in different societies and at dif-
ferent times, is thus part of a normative system built upon patriarchal 
norms where all men should dominate all women, and some men should 
dominate other men, with a specific subjugation of homosexual men who 
are not considered “real men” (Connell, 2005).8  
 
1.2.4 Heteronormativity  
Heteronormativity and its ensuing intolerance of homosexuals is consid-
ered to be one of the pillars of patriarchal norms, the second being gender 
inequality and the third a prescribed use of violence (Connell, 1995; Kim-
                                                 
8 See sections 2.2.1, 3.3 and 4.3. 
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mel, 2008).  Homosexuality is perceived to defy the norms on “appropri-
ate” sexual desires, leading homosexuals to be viewed as “gender deviants” 
(Murphy, 2006, p. 211). Connell (1995) notes that negative attitudes to 
homosexuality are related to underlying sexism. The need for men, includ-
ing teenage boys, to show that they are “real” men and not gay has been 
studied by a number of scholars including Kimmel (2008), Kimmel and 
Mahler (2003), David and Brannon (1976) and Kah (2009). These studies 
indicate that the need to prove manliness - and its consequent marginali-
zation and rejection of gay men - is rooted in the rejection of all things 
perceived as feminine and as threatening to the masculine gender role. 
Weaver et al. (2010) further argue that the normative idea of what it means 
to be a “real man” is in a precarious state, meaning that it needs constant 
revalidation and proof. A man must prove his heterosexuality all the time 
to be considered a “real man”. Ways to prove a heterosexual masculinity 
include the use of violence (Bossom and Vandello, 2011) and the harbor-
ing of anti-gay attitudes (Barron et al., 2008). Considering the links be-
tween heteronormativity, sexism and the use of violence it is important to 
include heteronormativity in the research on gender and violence. In this 
particular research my focus has been on male homosexuality, both for 
theoretical reasons (the link between patriarchal masculinities and heter-
onormativity) and the lack of data on discrimination regarding female ho-
mosexuality.9   
 
1.2.5 Violence 
The three studies outlined here use the concept of violence encompassing 
direct physical and sexual violence, between individuals, between groups 
and between states. The purpose is to show interconnectedness of differ-
ent types of violence as well as to increase the number of types of violence 
that are studied in relation to gender and sexuality. The studies start from 
an assumption that most violence is based on patriarchal norms and atti-
tudes; that patriarchal (and often hegemonic) norms prescribe, accept, or 
condone the use of violence to gain or re-gain power, respect and honor 
and as the preferred method to right a wrong (Kimmel, 2008), thus making 
                                                 
9 See section 3.3. 
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it the third pillar of patriarchal norms addressed here, next to gender ine-
quality and heteronormativity.10  
1.3  Methodological strategies, methods of data generation, 
collection and analysis 
Most feminist research, including research on gender norms, violence 
against women, patriarchal attitudes, gender inequality and various types 
of violence has been conducted using qualitative methods. The current 
research project is an attempt to make the epistemological picture fuller 
by using another approach: quantitative and, to a certain extent, positivist. 
Instead of focusing on local particularities and cultural differences in spe-
cific contexts, the aim of this study is to find common structures and 
tendencies.  
 Many international agencies and organizations have gathered large 
amounts of data addressing specific aspects of gender, sexuality and vio-
lence, collecting and organizing them in large data sets. Next to addressing 
various issues pertaining to gender, these data sets also cover topics related 
to attitudes to homosexuality; discrimination and violence against homo-
sexual men; as well as political and military violence. As these data sets 
cover many culturally, socially, politically and geographically different so-
cieties, using them in this research allows for insights on relationships be-
tween gender, sexuality and violence that would not have easily resulted 
from qualitative methods. While these data sets provide a large amount of 
interesting data they also lead to epistemological problems due to their 
wide geographical, political and cultural spread as well as to the variety of 
ways the data is collected. For instance, existing data sets use different 
indicators and weigh them differently. The solution to this problem in this 
research was to use many data sets, and to use them in various ways, ap-
plying different statistical models. The assumption being that, if the results 
of the different analyses with the different data sets all point in the same 
direction, they indicate high validity of data.  
 
 Nevertheless, some methodological caution is necessary. For example,  
measuring peacefulness is difficult and there are many possible indicators 
                                                 
10 See sections 2.2, 2.2.1, 3.4 and 4.4. 
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depending on whether the starting point is the concept of “negative 
peace” or of “positive peace” (Galtung, 1969). “Negative peace refers to 
the absence of direct violence but the continuation of indirect forms of 
violence such as discrimination, patriarchy, poverty, and preventable dis-
ease. Positive peace envisages a situation in which these indirect harms are 
dealt with, allowing people to reach their potential” (Firchow and Mac 
Ginty, 2017, p. 8). Choosing which data sets to use is hence a matter of 
where one starts from and what one wants to show. The Global Peace 
Index measures peacefulness using indicators about violence, hence fo-
cusing on negative peace, while the Human Development Index can be 
said to measure positive peace. However, while the economic and social 
development that is measured in the Human Development Index is often 
taken as proxy for indicators of peace (Firchow and Mac Ginty, 2017, p. 
20) it does not prove peace alone. An example is Sri Lanka, which kept 
relatively high Human Development Index scores throughout the conflict 
(Holt, 2013). This makes the Global Peace Index a somewhat more ade-
quate measure of peacefulness although what might be an accurate Global 
Peace Index measure of peace for one country might not work for an-
other. For instance, the Global Peace Index category “Security officers & 
police” can show many different things. A high number of police officers 
might be seen as a sign of safety in (and by) some communities but may 
also be seen as an indicator of a repressive state by other communities. 
Still, the Global Peace Index, with its many subcategories, is currently con-
sidered (by many researchers and national and international agencies and 
organizations) the best tool in measuring levels (and patterns) of peaceful-
ness and violence in a society.   
 Another problem with the data sets used in this research is that some 
of them overlap. The Global Peace Index uses data from the Uppsala 
Conflict Data Base, while the Human Development Index includes 
GDP/capita and the Gini Index. The other data sets do not overlap ex-
plicitly. However there can very well be other types of overlaps. For in-
stance, during a conflict it can be hard to distinguish homicides from ci-
vilian casualties. Countries sending troops to other countries can also get 
an economic boost from their participation in the conflict if they are pro-
ducing arms. Countries without arms industries tend to get poorer from 
participating in conflicts. It is difficult to address these overlaps and as 
stated above, I have chosen to do so by using many different sources of 
data, estimating that if the results from the different data sets and analysis 
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all point in the same direction the results are valid without taking the exact 
numbers in the statistical analyses’ results at face value, seeing them as 
indications of structures and directions. The reason why I still use the 
Uppsala Conflict Data Base is that the Global Peace Index not only uses 
the presence or absence of armed conflict but also weighs in the duration 
of the conflict and, in the case of external conflicts, also the role in the 
external conflict (primary party, supporting the primary party or part of a 
force operating within the frames of a United Nations Security Council 
Resolution). Each of these indicators gets a score from one to five and the 
scores are then added to make up the two Global Peace Index categories 
“internal conflicts fought” and “external conflicts fought”. Countries ar-
guably can participate in military operations sanctioned by the UN Security 
Council and still have their own interests to do so, while the duration of 
participation in a conflict might cloud the nature of their participation 
(number of troops and weapons, whether offensive or defensive, troops 
taking part in combat or not etc.). Thus, I have chosen to use the simple 
presence or absence of armed conflict in order to add a dimension to the 
conflict variables. I also chose to use the Human Development Index as 
well as GDP/capita and the Gini Index despite the latter two being part 
of the Human Development Index. This choice was made because the 
GDP/capita and the Gini Index are common control variables in conflict 
studies while the Human Development Index, having more components 
than the economic ones (including education and health), is not. Using 
both the composite variable that is the Human Development Index and 
the separate variables of GDP/capita and the Gini Index allows me to 
broaden the picture.  
 Using established data sets comes with challenges. Indexes like the 
GPI, the GGGI and the HDI are based on aggregated secondary data, 
often coming from national statistics authorities, which might not always 
be reliable. These indexes still deserve to be used as they constitute our 
current best way to do comparative research and investigate social struc-
tures and patterns. While we should be careful to not put too much weight 
on each number in the results, these numbers still allowed me to study 
tendencies and patterns of violence  
The data and method used in each of the three studies is presented in 
detail in the respective articles and I will only present the main points here.  
The first article, “Gender Equality, Attitudes to Gender Equality, and 
Conflict”, uses data from the World Values Survey (2009), the Global 
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Gender Gap Index (Ricardo Hausmann, Tyson, and Zahidi, 2007), the 
Uppsala Conflict Data Base (Harbom and Wallensteen, 2009) and the 
Global Peace Index (Institute for Economics & Peace, 2012). The data is 
analyzed by a linear regression. The second article, “Don’t be Gay: Atti-
tudes to Gender, Homosexuality and Violence” uses data from the World 
Values Survey (World Values Survey Association, 2015), the Gay Happi-
ness Index (Planet Romeo, 2015), the State Sponsored Homophobia re-
port (Carroll and Itaborahy, 2015), the Global Peace Index (Institute for 
Economics & Peace, 2014), the Uppsala Conflict Data Base (Pettersson 
and Wallensteen, 2015), the Human Development Index (United Nations 
Development Program, 2015), the Democracy Index (The Economist In-
telligence Unit, 2014), the World Bank’s GDP per capita report (2014a), 
the Gini Index (World Bank, 2014b) and the Global Gender Gap Index 
(World Economic Forum, 2014). The data is analyzed both with a linear 
regression, a descriptive analysis and a moderating analysis. 
The third article, “Young Men and Gender Trainings: What Happens 
to Attitudes to Violence when Attitudes to Patriarchal Masculinities 
Change?” used a quasi-experimental setting of a gender training for young 
men conducted by a non-governmental organization in India in order to 
see if and how changes in attitudes to norms on gender equality, homo-
sexuality and different types of violence are related to each other. As these 
kinds of changes are near impossible to isolate in society, using a gender 
training gave me an opportunity to see how changes in attitudes to gender 
equality and homosexuality affected attitudes to different types of vio-
lence. The training covered patriarchal norms on masculinity and feminin-
ity, gender inequality and homophobia. Violence against women, including 
sexual violence, was discussed but other types of violence – such as com-
munal and state violence - were not part of the training. Due to the small 
number of participants a different methodological approach was used in 
this study compared to the other two. The participants filled out a survey 
measuring their attitudes to gender equality, homosexuality and different 
types of violence before, right after and six months after the training. I 
developed a survey based on existing scales and surveys, such as the Con-
formity to Masculinity Norms Inventory (Mahalik et al., 2003); norms and 
belief assessments by the World Health Organization (2009); the Center 
for Disease Control and Prevention’s compendium of assessment tools 
(Dahlberg et al., 2005); and the Gender-Equitable Men Scale (Men and 
Gender Equality Policy Project, 2011). Next to the survey demographical 
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data on the participants was also collected and short interviews were held 
with the participants just before the training on their motivation to partic-
ipate in the training. 
 
1.4  My original contribution 
The three studies presented here aim at expanding the important theoret-
ical discussions on gender, sexuality and violence, by testing hypotheses 
related to gender and sexuality to specific forms of violence, including 
armed conflict, that have not been much studied before. Theoretically I 
am pursuing the hypotheses that there are important relations between 
patriarchal attitudes to gender, sexuality and various types of violence, in-
cluding armed conflict. While some of these relations have already been 
pointed to by various scholars working on gender and violence, hege-
monic masculinities and violence, and sexuality – especially male homo-
sexuality – and violence, focused attention to attitudes on gender and sex-
uality in relation to armed conflict has been missing. In addition, using 
attitudes to gender equality - instead of levels of gender equality, as previ-
ous studies have done - to study relations between gender and armed con-
flict as well as other forms of violence, advances our understanding of 
these relations and their possible causation.  
Combining the three specific patriarchal norms (gender inequality, 
non-acceptance of homosexuality and the use of violence as the preferred 
means of solving disputes and conflicts and gaining and regaining respect 
and honor), has not been done before. Thus this research aims at contrib-
uting to the theorizing on patriarchal norms as well as to the understand-
ing of the mechanisms that links those norms to specific forms of vio-
lence, with the focus on violent conflict.  
Methodologically, I have been using a combination of data sets and 
statistical models that have not been used before, establishing statistically 
significant relationships where previously there were only theoretical as-
sumptions. I have also gathered new data for the third study, thus allowing 
for new analyses and insights into attitudinal change. 
The data from the Global Gender Gap Index, the World Values Sur-
vey, the State Sponsored Homophobia Survey and the Planet Romeo have 
not been previously used in studies on patriarchal norms and violence as 
indicators of patriarchal norms on gender and sexuality. Using these new 
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data sets and data strengthens the findings of previous research on gender 
(in)equality, sexuality and armed conflict (Hudson et al., 2012). New data 
have also lead to new findings, as they allowed a look at the relation be-
tween attitudes to gender equality and levels of gender equality as well as 
attitudes towards homosexual men and levels of homophobia, and their 
relations to violence.  
The use of the Global Peace Index (GPI) to measure violence in com-
bination with attitudes to gender and sexuality is a new approach which 
allowed me to study whether certain attitudes had stronger correlations 
with certain types of violence (among the 23 GPI sub categories).   
Using the Human Development Index as one of the control variables, 
accompanied with more established control variables such as the Democ-
racy Index, GDP/capita and the Gini Index is also new. It lead to the 
finding that low levels of human development are more strongly corre-
lated to violence, including armed conflict, than democracy levels, thus 
potentially contributing to the literature on the “liberal and democratic 
peace” (Hegre, 2014).  
While evaluations of interventions, including gender trainings, aimed at 
changing attitudes to gender, have been done before, using a gender train-
ing to see how attitudes to gender, homosexuality and violence change and 
whether changes to some attitudes go hand in hand with changes to other 
attitudes, is an innovative quasi-experimental approach that allowed me to 
document and analyze specific changes, opening new and interesting ques-
tions about gender, sexuality and violence, as well as about gender train-
ings.   
1.5  Justification, scope and limitations of the study 
A multitude of governments, international organizations and activists 
work to decrease discrimination and inequalities based on gender and sex-
ual orientation as well as to reduce violence of all kinds in their own soci-
eties as well as in others. Much of this work is based on research conducted 
by academics and independent researchers who constantly advance the 
theory and the knowledge about the mechanisms underlying inequalities 
based on gender and sexuality, as well as different types of violence.  
My work aims at contributing to this important body of literature in 
that it hopes to further the understanding on how patriarchal norms on 
gender, homosexuality and violence, and attitudes thereof, are linked to 
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each other, how they change, and how they relate to violent conflict. 
Providing some answers to those questions remains important to me as a 
practitioner engaged in the struggle for more justice, equality and peace in 
the world. 
This research started in my living room, when after ten years of work-
ing in the field I decided that I wanted to test, through research, the ob-
servation that there are links between how people perceive gender 
(in)equality and homosexuality on the one hand, and what are the levels 
of violence in the conflict ridden, or post-conflict societies. I had made 
that observation while I working on women’s empowerment and against 
gender-based violence in many countries. While I eventually found uni-
versities and supervisors willing to work with me I could not obtain a paid 
PhD position and have thus financed this research mainly by myself, on a 
shoe-string budget. This has of course had an impact on the methodolog-
ical approach, as it restricted me to the use of existing data sets, rather than 
conducting ethnographic fieldwork research. A financial backing would 
have allowed me to have broader and more varied methods and data. Thus 
the quality of the data and the epistemological limits of the data sets I used 
constitute an important limitation to the research.  
The existing data sets did not always provide the best data needed, and 
– as indicated above - it was also problematic to compare them as they 
weighed some indicators more than others. Some data remain incomplete. 
There is for instance only comparative data on oppression of and violence 
against homosexual men in different countries, but not on homosexual 
women. I looked at all data sets on gender equality that I could find, choos-
ing to use the Global Gender Gap Index (GGGI). There simply are not 
that many big world-wide data sets covering gender equality and none of 
them is perfect, but the GGGI is arguable the most used and is giving a 
picture of the levels of gender inequality in the indexed countries regard-
less of their level of socio-economic development. There are even less data 
sets regarding sexuality, heteronormativity and the acceptance of homo-
sexuality, so I used all data sets I could find.  
The reliance on existing data sets in the first two studies also led to a 
limitation in terms of methods in that only statistical analyses were used. 
While the statistical analyses based on the big data sets are very useful to 
see overall levels and trends, additional in-depth case studies could have 
contributed to give a more nuanced and detailed picture of the general 
levels and trends. Such case studies were not possible within the scope of 
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this thesis though, mainly for financial reasons. Nevertheless, I have indi-
cated, in the chapters, some of the differences that matter. I noted, for 
example, how very different countries find themselves in the same group 
when acceptance of homosexuality is reduced to laws (of prohibiting ho-
mosexual relationships, or of allowing same-sex marriage, for example; see 
chapter 2)   
As already noted, these limitations have been addressed by using many 
different models and data sets that had not been previously used in the 
type of study done here.  
The last study, sponsored by the ISS, which is survey-based, has a very 
small number of participants, a limited time frame and is geographically 
and culturally limited to first year male students in the Mumbai region in 
India. This prevents a generalization of the findings even though its find-
ings provide both another piece of the puzzle of patriarchal attitudes and 
reasons to make more extensive research on the same topic. When it 
comes to this study I was driven by the idea that gender trainings were 
important to research and that they could be crucial in providing insights 
in how attitudes to patriarchal norms could change in more egalitarian 
ways I would like to help promote by this research.  
Unlike other two studies entirely based on data sets, the third study was 
actually done among specific demographic group (young, male students 
doing their first year of bachelor) and was embedded in specific socio-
cultural context: contemporary, urban India. That particular context is rel-
evant for the results of the first survey – the attitudes towards gender, 
sexuality and violence. However, the focus of the study was not on the 
actual attitudes, but on the links between attitude changes. I investigated whether 
change in one set of attitudes (towards gender and sexuality) leads to 
changes in other set of attitudes (towards violence). For that reason, nei-
ther the demographic information about participants nor the socio-cul-
tural context within which the gender training was conducted have been 
investigated further for this particular research. In addition, the small num-
ber of participants in the training and the high diversity of their demo-
graphic information would prevent me from drawing any general conclu-
sions as to the links between the context, the demographic background 
and the attitudes. Nevertheless, it is certainly worth exploring those links 
with a larger sample of participants. But that would have to be done is 
some other research. 
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1.6  Ethical and political choices and personal involvements 
I never wanted to do a PhD for the sake of doing a PhD. I wanted to 
investigate how patriarchal norms and attitudes and gender inequality are 
related to both armed conflict and other types of violence. As someone 
who has worked with women’s rights issues in conflict and post-conflict 
contexts for many years I experienced a lack of scientific arguments for 
the work of increasing gender equality in volatile situations. Most local 
politicians and military leaders as well as leaders of international organiza-
tions and military forces in the places where I worked considered increased 
gender equality to be a “soft issue” that could be worked on once there 
was peace. Most of my colleagues and fellow activists, be they local or 
international, thought like me, that increasing gender equality was crucial 
to the peace processes; that peaceful societies with low levels of violence 
only could be attained if the whole population was treated with respect, 
included in the effort and represented among the decision-makers. We 
were often dismissed with the argument that there was no reliable evi-
dence, and especially no ‘hard data’ that gender equality would contribute 
to peace. My PhD is thus based on the hope to provide some evidence of 
the importance of gender and sexuality for interventions into violence and 
violent conflicts, and on a will to extend the knowledge on links between 
gender, sexuality and violence.  
It is of course impossible to stay neutral when it comes to complex and 
important issues such as inequalities and violence and I am perfectly aware 
of many of my own biases, ideals and activism. The use of a quantitative 
method was thus a good way for me to remain as neutral as possible as I 
could “let the numbers talk”. This does not mean that I have not been 
biased in analyzing the data, but I think that the risks of me over-inter-
preting information would have been much greater with a qualitative ap-
proach.  
I do hope that my research will be read by other academics and inspire 
more research in order to understand, in more detail, the mechanisms be-
tween gender, sexuality and violence in general, and gender inequality, 
homophobia and violent conflict specifically. I also hope that this study 
will be read and used by policy-makers as well as by activists and practi-
tioners who, by referring to this and similar research, will build a stronger 
argument when asking for policy changes and funding.  
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This PhD is based on three journal articles as explained above. The  
articles are thus presented here as three independent chapters each with 
their own reference list. They have all already been submitted to the rele-
vant journals, and at the time of the submission of this thesis to the com-
mittee, one of the articles was already published, one was under revision 
after the comments of the reviewers were received, and the third was un-
der initial review process.  
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2 Gender equality and conflict 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
In its “Statement on Women’s Contribution to a Culture of Peace” pre-
sented at the Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing, UNESCO 
(1995) concluded that inequality between men and women is an impedi-
ment to sustainable peace. Many national and international NGO’s share 
this idea that there is a correlation between the level of gender equality in 
a society and the risk that that society will use violence to settle conflicts. 
For instance, International Alert, a British based organization working on 
peace building states in a report that cultures which limit women’s access 
to resources and decision-making power, and which characterize women 
as inferior to men, treat women as property and accept domestic violence 
as norm, are more prone to repression and violent conflict in the public 
arena (Schmeidl and Piza-Lopez, 2002).   
What has been argued for in the field for years has now also been 
shown by academic research. Based on the WomanStats data base (Wom-
anStats Project, 2012), which includes over 320 variables measuring gen-
der equality for 175 states, Hudson, Ballif-Spanvill, Caprioli and Emmett 
(2012) have found robust and highly significant evidence that the physical 
security of women (including the prevalence of domestic violence, rape, 
marital rape, and murder of women) is the best predictor of state security, 
measured through the Global Peace Index (Institute  for Economics & 
Peace, 2012a), the States of Concern to the International Community Scale 
(Brinton, 2011) and the Relations with Neighboring Countries Index (In-
stitute for Economics & Peace, 2012b), far ahead of traditional explana-
tory variables such as democracy, GDP per capita and prevalence of Islam. 
They further found that inequalities in family law and the presence or ab-
sence of polygyny by far outperformed these traditional explanatory vari-
ables in explaining the variance of the levels of conflict. Finally, they also 
24 CHAPTER 2 
 
found that if a state is indifferent about enforcing laws that protect the 
women in its society it is also less likely to be compliant with international 
norms to which it has committed. They conclude that international secu-
rity cannot be attained without gender equality, as gender equality is char-
acterized by norms of violence that permeate the society. This is consistent 
with the findings of Sobek, Abouharb and Ingram (2006, in Hudson et al., 
2012, p. 102) that “domestic norms centered on equality and respect for 
human rights reduce international conflict”.   
Scholars have also found correlations between different aspects of gen-
der equality (mainly political and economic) and the presence or absence 
of armed conflict, both intrastate and inter-state, human rights abuses, the 
likelihood of becoming involved in militarized intrastate disputes and the 
likelihood of using violence first during militarized interstate disputes and 
that an increase in gender equality lead to a decrease in conflict levels (Cap-
rioli, 2000, 2003, 2005; Caprioli and Boyer, 2001; Fish, 2002; Caprioli and 
Trumbore, 2003a, 2003b, 2005, 2006a, 2006b; Sobek et al., 2006; Me-
lander, 2005a, 2005b; Francis, 2004; Schmeidl & Piza-Lopez, 2002). Other 
scholars have found correlations between so-called honor cultures, which 
are focusing on controlling women, their bodies and sexuality and restrict-
ing their freedom of movement, on the one hand and high levels of inter-
personal violence on the other (Pinker, 2011; Brown, Osterman and 
Barnes, 2009; Baller, Zevenbergen and Messner, 2009; Somech and Elizur, 
2009; Lee, 2011; Lee and Ousey, 2011; Begikhani , 2011; Inglis and 
MacKeogh, 2012; Ijzerman and Cohen, 2011).  
Research has also shown that gender inequality is correlated with a 
number of state-level indicators including indices of corruption, child sur-
vival/mortality and malnutrition, GDP per capita, global competitiveness 
ranking and economic growth rates (Kaufman, 1998; Esteve-Volart, 2000; 
King and Mason, 2001; Hausmann, Tyson and Zahidi, 2007; World Bank, 
2001). Fish (2002) further found that indicators related to the subordina-
tion of women, including literacy rate gaps and sex ratio, account for a 
substantial proportion of the relationship between Islam and authoritari-
anism. He hypothesizes that the oppression of females provides the tem-
plate for other types of oppression, including authoritarianism.  
The correlation between the levels of gender equality and general 
peacefulness and prosperity in a state thus seems fairly robust. But why is 
that? As seen above it is hypothesized that the norms on gender (in)equal-
ity and violence are connected. Could norms be part of the explanation? 
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Social norms are defined as customary rules of behavior that coordinate 
interactions between individuals (Young, 2008). Hume was the first to call 
attention to the central role that norms play in the construction of social 
order, and it is hard to think of a form of interaction between citizens that 
is not governed to some degree by social norms (Posner, 2000; Hechter 
and Opp, 2001; Bicchieri, 2006). Thus norms also play a crucial role in 
both gender (in)equality and the use of violence in that these norms tell us 
what is “right” and “normal” and what is not.   
This study will look at the relationship between the norms on gender 
equality on the one hand and actual, measurable levels of both political 
and socio-economic gender equality and peacefulness (or lack thereof) on 
the other. Ideally, I would also have wanted to measure the connection 
between norms on gender equality with norms on and attitudes toward 
the use of violence, but as there is no data base available with norms on 
violence I will here limit myself to the connection between norms on gen-
der equality and actual levels of violence and armed conflict. Further, while 
a certain correlation between the level of gender equality and norms on 
gender equality can be assumed, this study is innovative in that it measures 
this correlation. Also, as the data set used to measure gender equality in 
this study, the Global Gender Gap Index, has not been used in the previ-
ous studies mentioned above it will be used in an attempt to reproduce 
the results of these studies, testing the possible correlation between the 
level of gender equality on the one hand and armed conflict and peaceful-
ness on the other.  
The study first discusses the relation the literature reports between 
(norms on) gender equality and the use of violence. Secondly the methods 
and data used in this study are shortly presented, to be followed by the 
actual findings in a third section. Finally the study discusses these findings 
in the light of the importance to be attached to promoting gender equality 
as a means to lower the use of violence in armed intra-state violence as 
well as in society in general, thereby containing not only a scientific but 
also a societal aim. 
2.2 Theoretical links between gender equality, norms on 
gender equality and the use of violence  
As seen in the introduction there is a strong correlation between the levels 
of gender equality (at least the measurable political and socio-economic 
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dimensions of gender equality) and the use of violence at all levels in so-
ciety.  
Figure 2.1 
Levels of gender equality and levels of violence  
 
 
The literature presented hereafter suggests that underlying norms and val-
ues promoting gender inequality are connected to both actual levels of 
gender equality and to the acceptance/approval and use of violence.  
 
So what is the literature telling us?  
2.2.1 Norms on gender equality and the acceptance of violence 
At the heart of the matter are patriarchal values and norms on masculinity. 
First, patriarchal norms, that is, traditional gender role norms focusing on 
differences between men and women and on men’s supremacy, have been 
found to be associated with violence. The Conformity to Masculine 
Norms Inventory (CMNI) (Mahalik, Locke, Ludlow, Diemer, Scott, Gott-
fried et al., 2003) has proven to be an important tool in advancing the 
study of masculinity. The CMNI assesses levels of conformity to mascu-
line norms in eleven categories: Winning, Emotional Control, Risk-Tak-
ing, Violence, Dominance, Playboy, Self-Reliance, Primacy of Work, 
Power Over Women, Disdain for Homosexuals, and Pursuit of Status. 
The CMNI is grounded in Mahalik’s “gender role norms model”, which 
posits that socially dominant groups shape the gender role norms that are 
communicated to individuals in a society. Individuals’ experiences of these 
gender role norms and their level of conformity to such norms are shaped 
by individual and group factors (e.g. personality, race/ethnicity), and there 
are costs and benefits for conforming and not conforming to gender role 
norms” (Parent and Morandi, 2009, p. 176). 
Studies using the CMNI found that intimate partner abuse and the spe-
cific masculine norms of dominance, emotional control, and self-reliance 
Levels of violence Levels of gender equality 
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are associated and that adherence to an anti-femininity norm showed both 
direct and indirect effects on aggression toward gay men and lesbians 
(Tager, Good and Brammer, 2010; Vincent, Parrott and Peterson, 2011). 
Women also adhere to these norms. It has been found that higher 
agreement with patriarchal social norms among women predicted a de-
creased likelihood of identifying an abused woman as a victim of spousal 
abuse (Ahmad, Riaz, Barata and Steward, 2004). Furthermore, women that 
witness physical violence are more likely to have tolerant attitudes towards 
violence against women and an increasing proportion of women in the 
community with tolerant attitudes is significantly positively associated with 
spousal sexual and emotional abuse (Uthman, Moradi and Lavoko, 2011). 
This corresponds to the theory of reciprocal determinism (Bandura, Wil-
son, Kunkel, Neale and Liebert, 1977, in Ahmad et al., 2004, p. 265) which 
“refers to continual interactions between environmental influences, per-
sonal factors, and behavior”. Thus women (and men) may normalize and 
justify the use of violence and not perceive it as abuse.  
For young men, adolescence is the time for them to prove themselves 
to be men, and if they fail they are often thought to be homosexual. The 
taunt of calling a young man gay is thought to be the worst insult a young 
man can face. Kimmel (2008) describes the “Guy Code,” part of which 
entails proving one’s masculinity, and indeed, one’s heterosexuality, on a 
daily basis. To live up to these ideals, young men aged 16–24 must be 
popular, athletic, and in no way associated with anything seen as feminine. 
And the Guy Code encourages the use of violence to avenge any perceived 
slight or wrong. In this context it is not surprising to hear of school vio-
lence. Studies of school shootings tell us that almost all perpetrators have 
been teased and ridiculed as gay or called a ”fag” (Kimmel, 2008; Kimmel 
and Mahler, 2003; Klein and Chancer, 2000; Kalish and Kimmel, 2010; 
Katz, 2006). 
Further, beliefs supporting the use of violence have been found to be 
closely associated to normative masculine activities, aggressive behavior, 
normative masculine attitudes and aggressive and homophobic behavior 
among adolescent boys. In addition, significant associations between ad-
herence to traditional masculine beliefs and aggression toward heterosex-
ual men and women have been reported. Research on gender roles has 
indicated that men who strongly adhere to traditional masculine norms are 
more aggressive than their less traditional counterparts (Reidy, Shirk, 
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Sloan and Zeichner, 2009; Poteat, Kimmel and Wilchins, 2010; Cohn and 
Zeichner, 2006; Parrott and Zeichner, 2003; Franklin, 2000). 
Another concept that is closely related to patriarchal values and mas-
culinity is the so-called honor cultures. Following the logic of Sev'er (2005) 
who points out that what unites all patriarchies is the obsessive control 
over women's freedom, sexuality and reproduction, studies on so-called 
honor cultures show links between control over women’s bodies, sexuality 
and freedom of movement and high levels of interpersonal violence 
(Pinker, 2011; Begikhani, 2011; Inglis and MacKeogh, 2012; Ijzerman and 
Cohen, 2011; Korteweg and Yurdakul, 2010).  
So-called honor cultures are not only condoning and using violence 
against women but violence in general although it’s usually not called 
honor-related violence when not directed against women. The many stud-
ies of the American South show that several mechanisms keep this culture 
in place. At the macro level, there are collective representations, social pol-
icies, and institutional practices that condone violence in response to insult 
or threat. These range from formal laws allowing citizens greater freedom 
to kill in self-defense to informal norms acted out by people and institu-
tions, which fail to stigmatize those who kill to uphold their honor (Cohen, 
Nisbett, Bowdle, and Schwarz, 1996). Further there are the forces of social 
organization. Normally these are regarded as restraining people's violent 
tendencies, but tight family structures, stable communities, and strong re-
ligious institutions actually may promote certain forms of violence, as 
shown in attitude surveys, homicide rates, and preferences for violent en-
tertainment and pastimes. At the micro level, norms are enforced inter-
personally. That is, Southern men fear that if they do not respond to an 
insult, others will view them as less manly (Cohen, Vandello and Rantilla, 
1998; Cohen and Nisbett, 1997).  
As we have seen the normalization and acceptance of the use of vio-
lence is highly influenced by patriarchal values normalizing gender ine-
quality. There are several other mechanisms involved as well. For instance, 
violence is generally considered to be against social norms. However, 
when someone (or his/her reputation and/or honor) has been physically 
or psychologically attacked or threatened in any way, “it is often acceptable 
and sometimes even socially prescribed to retaliate in kind” (Feld and Fel-
son, 2008, p. 692) and not only in extreme honor cultures.  
Cultural and subculture theories of violence and aggression focus on 
the role of social values and norms in producing violent and aggressive 
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behavior. The subculture of violence perspective (Wolfgang and Ferracuti, 
1967) argues that “social groups exhibit high rates of violent behavior be-
cause of widespread adherence of group members to values and norms 
that support, legitimize, and encourage violent behavior in situations of 
interpersonal conflict. Such values and norms often involve an ideal of 
masculinity emphasizing aggression as the expression of toughness, cour-
age, and independence” (Bernburg and Thorlindsson, 2005, p. 457).  
The subculture of violence theory suggests that group adherence to 
values that encourage violence may influence violent behavior in two 
ways. First, “subcultural values may produce violent behavior through so-
cialization; social actors internalize the values that support violence and 
act accordingly. Second, subcultures of violence may operate through dif-
fuse social control; widespread commitment of group members to values 
that support aggression may place pressure on all members to be aggres-
sive, regardless of personal commitment to the values” (Bernburg and 
Thorlindsson, 2005, p. 459). This is confirmed by research from the 
United States showing a connection between aggression and adherence to 
values and attitudes that favors violent behavior (Baron, Kennedy and 
Forde, 2001; Ousey and Wilcox, 2007).  
Further, groups take on an identity of their own in people’s minds, and 
the individual’s desire to be accepted in the group can override better judg-
ment (Pinker, 2011). Individuals also have a need to promote their own 
group in comparison to other groups. People also often take their cues on 
how to behave from other people and may assume that if no one else is 
doing anything it can’t be that bad. Following this logic, Zimbardo (2007) 
states that when a group of people is given authority over another group 
of people it can lead to barbaric actions.  
Classical sociology hypothesizes that “collective ideas contextualize hu-
man action, influencing behavior through internalization of social values 
as well as through the threat of social sanctions” (Parsons, 1937 in Bern-
burg and Thorlindsson, 2005, p. 457). Studies on genocides and other 
forms of mass violence confirms that one reason people adhere to group 
norms that endorse violence is fear (Bhavnani, 2006). Both in Rwanda, 
Cambodia, Guatemala and former Yugoslavia it has been documented 
that those who refused to participate in the killings were labeled as traitor 
or defectors and were often tortured and/or killed. As a result many peo-
ple participated in the violence by fear of being victims of it themselves. 
In each instance, conformity and participation increased as a result of 
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compulsion, with grave consequences for those who failed to comply. 
These norms and threats linked to ethnic violence are structurally similar 
to the norms on so-called honor related violence, where those who fail to 
comply with the community’s norms are punished. Fear of being ridiculed 
and not considered a “real” man if not conforming to certain aggressive 
and violent behavior as seen above is most probably related to these phe-
nomena as well.  
Further, there are studies showing that violence breeds violence. Lans-
ford and Dodge (2008) found that cultural norms for adult corporal pun-
ishment of children are correlated to societal rates of endorsement and use 
of violence. In other words, societal levels of corporal punishment of chil-
dren predict societal levels of violence. More corporal punishment is 
linked to teaching children aggression, warfare, and interpersonal violence. 
It is not farfetched to think that high levels of gender-based violence also 
influence societal levels of violence.  
The way armed conflict increases gender inequalities by reinforcing tra-
ditional norms on masculinity and femininity, reducing women’s possibil-
ities for decision-making, women’s freedom of movement and increasing 
levels of gender-based violence, leading to the possible normalization of 
higher levels of violence and gender inequality in the society has been thor-
oughly documented both in UN reports and by NGOs working in conflict 
zones as well as by academics (Enloe, 2000; Rehn and Johnson Sirleaf, 
2002; Lithander, 2000; Cullberg Weston, 2002; Thomasson, 2006; Gold-
stein, 2001). It thus seems that the causal link can go both ways, violence 
can impact the levels of gender equality and normalize more unequal 
norms which in turn can lead to more violence, creating a vicious circle. 
However, in this study we want to investigate if the norms on gender 
(in)equality affects the absence or presence of armed conflict, not what 
happens once the conflict has started, which is why the norms on gender 
equality are kept as the independent variable and the level of violence as 
the dependent. 
2.2.2 Norms on gender equality and levels of gender equality 
What is gender equality then? Different UN organs formulate their defi-
nition of gender equality differently but they are all similar to the one used 
by UN Women (2012): “Equality between women and men (gender equal-
ity) refers to the equal rights, responsibilities and opportunities of women 
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and men and girls and boys. Equality does not mean that women and men 
will become the same but that women’s and men’s rights, responsibilities 
and opportunities will not depend on whether they are born male or fe-
male. Gender equality implies that the interests, needs and priorities of 
both women and men are taken into consideration, recognizing the diver-
sity of different groups of women and men. Gender equality is not a 
women’s issue but should concern and fully engage men as well as women. 
Equality between women and men is seen both as a human rights issue 
and as a precondition for, and indicator of, sustainable people-centered 
development.” However, this definition does not mention gender-based 
violence which is one of the worst types of discrimination against women. 
In the academic world the definitions are relatively similar. Htun and Wel-
don (2010) defines gender equality as “an ideal condition in which men 
and women have similar opportunities to participate in politics, the econ-
omy and social activities; their roles and status are equally valued; neither 
suffers from gender based disadvantage or discrimination; and both are 
considered free autonomous beings with dignity and rights.”  
Patriarchal norms are closely interrelated with the concept of hege-
monic masculinities which has been used to analyze relationships between 
men and between men and women (Messerschmidt, 2012). It is defined as 
the form of masculinity in a given historical and societal setting that struc-
tures and legitimates hierarchical gender relations between men and 
women, between masculinity and femininity, and among men.  
Hegemonic masculinity theorizes masculinity as a “system of power” 
(Morris, 2008, p. 730), one in which various practices of masculinity exist, 
each differing in status. The hegemonic model of masculinity can be de-
fined as a contextually specific pattern of gender practice that "ideologi-
cally legitimate[s] the global subordination of women to men" (Connell 
and Messerschmidt, 2005, p. 832). While few men fully embody this set of 
practices, it is accepted as an ideal, and other masculinities are stratified in 
relation to it. Men construct masculinity differently based on their race, 
class, or sexual orientation (along with other factors) – making studies on 
masculinities intersectional - and such constructions position them differ-
entially in the overall masculine hierarchy. “Positions within this hierarchy 
also differ according to the particular version of masculinity constructed. 
Some men, particularly white, middle-class, heterosexual men, may exer-
cise power both over women and over other men. Other men, such as 
those who are disadvantaged by race or social class, may not enjoy as much 
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power” (Morris, 2008, p. 731). Nonetheless, these disadvantaged men can 
still benefit from the system by “expressing masculine qualities that display 
overt dominance over women such as aggression, physicality, and control” 
(Pyke, 1996, in Morris, 2008, p. 731). Thus, men who are marginalized in 
other ways can be complicit in accepting and expressing many hegemonic 
characteristics associated with "being a man." Further, a clear link between 
socialization into stereotypical norms of hegemonic masculinity and an 
increased risk of experiencing violence has been documented (Hong, 
2000), linking hegemonic masculinities to both gender inequality and vio-
lence. 
As we can see, hegemonic masculinities are closely related to patriarchal 
values and also to gender inequality and violence, especially what Galtung 
(1969, 1990) defines as structural and cultural violence through norms and 
values. For example, as seen in the previous section tolerant attitudes to-
wards violence against women is significantly correlated to the levels of 
spousal abuse.  
So-called honor cultures are not only linked to high levels of aggression 
and inter-personal violence as seen in the previous section but also, and 
perhaps more notoriously, to control over and violence against women 
(Pinker, 2011; Brown et al., 2009; Baller et al., 2009; Somech and Elizur, 
2009; Lee, 2011; Begikhani, 2011; Inglis and MacKeogh, 2012; Ijzerman 
and Cohen, 2011; Korteweg and Yurdakul, 2010). The control is mainly 
carried out by the men in the family, but the women also take part in this 
control and in the maintaining of the practice. In many cases women who 
do not take part in the control of the other women in the family and the 
perpetuating of the practice will also be subject to violence. The correction 
of “mistakes” through violence and sometimes even murder is crucial for 
this practice to survive. When the honor of a man, and by extension his 
whole family, is threatened, the woman perceived to be responsible for 
trespassing the limits of accepted behavior is punished. The punishable 
behavior could be interaction with unrelated men, and sometimes just ru-
mors of contact. The control of women’s sexuality is of great importance 
for a man’s honor, which means that women’s behavior must be con-
trolled for this honor to be kept intact. This means for instance, that “a 
woman’s possibility to have contacts outside the family and the home is 
very limited. The woman’s role is to stay virgin until married off, then 
breed children and take care of the household. Therefore her virginity is 
of utmost importance to keep intact before marriage” (Kvinnoforum, 
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2005, p. 16). Securing the purity of the bride is one reason for the early 
marriages within the communities obsessed with honor. Within the com-
munity a man’s honor is an asset for him and for all his extended family. 
A girl’s virginity is an asset for her family that is necessary to be able to 
marry her off (Kvinnoforum, 2005; Sev’er and Yurdakul, 2001; van Eck, 
2003; Mojab, 2004; Korteweg and Yurdakul, 2010). 
So called honor cultures can be found all over the world, including the 
West. However, the presence of honor cultures is more common in certain 
parts of the world, such as India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and countries in 
the Middle East. The concept honor related violence includes sequestra-
tion, physical violence, forced marriage, and all forms of control of 
women’s bodies and behavior including murder in extreme cases. With 
female genital mutilation included in the definition many parts of Africa 
are included as honor cultures as well. Due to immigration the problem 
has been identified as extensive in many parts of Europe as well in the last 
few years (Kvinnoforum, 2005). Although many people associate so-called 
honor related violence including so-called honor killings with Islam they 
predate Islam and are not consistent with the Qur’an (Sev’er and Yurdakul, 
2001). Many feminists argue that all fundamentalist religious movements 
are deeply patriarchal, whether they are Muslim, Christian, Jewish, Hindu 
or other, and “use the control of women's bodies symbolically to assert a 
broad agenda of authoritarian political and cultural control” (Gill, 
Begikhani and Hague, 2012, p. 76; Werbner, 2007; Yuval-Davis, 2009; Bar-
zilai, 2004). 
In communities with so called honor cultures what is seen as normal 
or not, and what is seen as good and bad, is different for men and women. 
In some honor-based societies, male honor is linked to “respect, virtue, 
merit, social rank, caste/class, or public reputation: thus, it may be deter-
mined by achievements and courage as well as one's family background. 
By contrast, female honor is almost universally viewed as determined by a 
woman's sexual behavior: specifically, by their adherence to cultural de-
mands that they remain chaste and “pure” until their marriage and faithful 
thereafter. Thus, while male honor can be acquired, accumulated and lost, 
women cannot acquire or achieve honor but only maintain or injure it 
through their actions” (Gill et al, 2012, p. 81).  
Honor cultures, patriarchal and hierarchical in nature, are thus linked 
to both gender inequalities and the use of violence. 
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This literature therefore adds another component to Figure 2.1: 
Figure 2.2. 
Norms on gender equality, levels of gender equality and levels of violence 
 
 
2.3 Method and data 
This article will study the relationship between the norms on gender equal-
ity on the one hand and the levels of gender equality and violence on the 
other. Based on the literature discussed above five hypotheses have been 
developed. First we will test the relationship between the level of gender 
equality in a country and the level of violence in an attempt to reproduce 
the findings accounted for in the introduction. This will also test the va-
lidity of the data bases used in the study. 
 H1: The higher the level of political and socio-economic gender 
equality in a country, the less likely it is that it will experience an 
intrastate armed conflict.  
 H2: The higher the level of political and socio-economic gender 
equality in a country, the more peaceful the country is in general.  
These hypotheses will be tested using data from the Global Gender Gap 
Index 2008, the Uppsala Conflict Data Base 2008 and the Global Peace 
Index 2008. 
Furthermore, we have seen that the normalization of the use of vio-
lence is being influenced by patriarchal norms and also through threats of 
either social or violent sanctions and punishments; the so-called sub-cul-
ture of violence approach; group dynamics and exposure to violence (re-
ciprocal determinism). From this material I derive the following two hy-
potheses: 
Norms on gender  
equality 
Levels of gender equality Levels of violence 
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 H3: The more people approve of gender equality in a country, the 
less likely it is that there will be an armed conflict. 
 H4: The more people approve of gender equality in a country, the 
more peaceful it will be in general.  
These hypotheses will be investigated with data from the World Values 
Survey 1981-2008, the Uppsala Conflict Data Base 2008 and the Global 
Peace Index 2008. 
Finally, patriarchal norms on gender inequality are seemingly related to 
control over and violence toward women which leads us to set up a con-
trol hypothesis:  
 H5: The more people approve of gender equality in a country, the 
higher the level of political and socio-economic equality.  
This hypothesis will be investigated using data from the World Values Sur-
vey 1981-2008 and the Global Gender Gap Index 2008. 
The data of norms on gender equality comes from the World Values 
Survey (WVS) (World Values Survey, 1981-2008), data on measurable gen-
der equality in the political, economic, educational and health spheres on 
the state level from the Global Gender Gap Index (GGGI) (Hausmann, 
Tyson and Zahidi , 2008), data on the presence or absence of armed intra-
state conflict from the Uppsala Conflict Data Base (UCDB) (Harbom and 
Wallensteen, 2009) and data on a more inclusive and general peacefulness 
from the Global Peace Index (GPI) (Institute for Economics & Peace, 
2012a). The article includes all countries that are both in the WVS and the 
GGGI. 
The WVS is a worldwide network of social scientists studying changing 
values and their impact on social and political life. The WVS carried out 
representative national surveys in 97 societies containing almost 90 per-
cent of the world's population. These surveys show pervasive changes in 
what people want out of life and what they believe. In order to monitor 
these changes, the WVS has executed five waves of surveys, starting in 
1981. In this study aggregated data from the five surveys (1981-2008) will 
be used in order to cover as many countries and as many survey questions 
as possible. 
The WVS has hundreds of questions or variables divided into the cat-
egories a) perceptions of life; b) environment; c) work; d) family; e) politics 
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and society; f) religion and morale; g) national identity, and x) socio-de-
mographics, most of which have nothing to do with gender equality. Thus 
the first step consisted of the establishment of a list of variables pertinent 
to gender equality. Then variables that were only measured in one or a few 
countries were eliminated from the list as the limited data would not have 
been significant in the analysis. A more thorough study of other variables 
eliminated a few more. Some variables had answers coded as “no” “yes” 
and “other,” with a prevalence of “other/neither” responses in some 
countries. An example is the WVS variable D024 “If someone said that 
individuals should have the chance to enjoy complete sexual freedom 
without being restricted, would you tend to agree or disagree?” Initially 
one might think that a high number of people agreeing would indicate a 
country with a high level of gender equality. However, a cross tabulation 
showed that the results were greatly mixed. Sweden, a country known for 
high levels of sexual freedom had about half of the surveyed population 
disagreeing. Other Scandinavian countries had high levels of people an-
swering “neither.” Considering the high levels of sexual education and de-
bate around sexual abuse in the Scandinavian countries it is possible that 
respondents have thought that the “no restriction” meant possibility for 
abuse. Meanwhile several Muslim countries also scored high on the “nei-
ther,” There is a possibility that these respondents thought that sexual 
freedom was acceptable for men but not for women. Thus the question is 
too open for interpretation, with a non-negligible possibility that the re-
plies do not mean the same thing in different countries, making it impos-
sible to infer a value behind these opinions. This variable and others 
equally problematic have been removed from the list.    
The value variables that have been retained are the following: 
a. Can divorce be justifiable? 
b. University is more important for a boy than for a girl. 
c. Men make better business executives than women. 
d. Men make better political leaders than women. 
e. An essential characteristic of a democracy is that women have the 
same rights as men. 
f. Women as single parents (this variable had the possible replies “ap-
prove,” “disapprove” and “neither” which made for data that were 
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quite difficult to interpret, which is why it is the % disapproving of 
women as single mothers that is used here). 
g. In times of job scarcity men have more right to a job than women 
(this variable is also problematic in that it has the responses “agree,” 
“disagree” and “neither,” which is why the % agreeing that men 
have more right to a job than women is used). 
The GGGI is to be found in the Global Gender Gap Report, published 
annually by the World Economic Forum since 2006. The Index bench-
marks national gender gaps (and not general achievement levels) on eco-
nomic, political, education- and health-based criteria, and provides coun-
try rankings that allow for effective comparisons across regions and 
income groups, and over time. The variables used to measure gender gaps 
in the category Economic Participation and Opportunity are the ratio of 
female labor force participation over male; wage equality between women 
and men for similar work; the ratio of estimated female earned income 
over male; the ratio of female legislators, senior officials and managers 
over male and the ratio of female professional and technical workers over 
male. The educational attainment category is measured through the ratio 
of the female literacy rate over male; the female net primary level enrol-
ment over male; the female net secondary level enrolment over male and 
the female gross tertiary level enrolment over male. The political empow-
erment category is measured by the ratio of females with seats in parlia-
ment over male; the ratio of females at ministerial level over male and the 
number of years of a female head of state (last 50 years) over male value. 
Finally, the health and survival category is measured by the variables ratio 
of female healthy life expectancy over male value and sex ratio at birth. As 
it only exists since 2006 it cannot cover the whole period of the WVS 
(1981-2008), which is why the end year of the WVS, 2008, has been cho-
sen.  
The UCDB is produced by the Uppsala Conflict Data Program at Upp-
sala University and it collects information on a large number of aspects of 
armed violence since 1946. Since the 1970s, the Uppsala Conflict Data 
Program (UCDP) has recorded on-going violent conflicts. The UCDP 
data is one of the most accurate and well-used data-sources on global 
armed conflicts and its definition of armed conflict is becoming a standard 
in how conflicts are systematically defined and studied. Armed conflicts 
are defined as a contested incompatibility that concerns government or 
territory or both where the use of armed force between two parties results 
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in at least 25 battle-related deaths in a year. Of these two parties at least 
one has to be the government of the state. Data on armed conflicts have 
been published yearly in the report series States in Armed Conflict since 
1987, in the SIPRI Yearbook since 1988, the Journal of Peace Research 
since 1993, and in the Human Security Reports since 2005. This study uses 
data on absence and presence of armed conflict from the years 1981 to 
2008 in order to cover the same period as the WVS. 
The GPI, produced by the Institute for Economics and Peace since 
2007, is one of the world’s leading measures of global peacefulness. It 
gauges on-going domestic and international conflict, safety and security in 
society and militarization in 153 countries by taking into account 23 sepa-
rate indicators. These indicators are: perceived criminality in society; secu-
rity officers & police; homicides; jailed population; access to weapons; or-
ganized conflict (internal); violent demonstrations; violent crimes; political 
instability; political terror; weapons imports; terrorist acts; deaths from 
conflict (internal); military expenditure; armed services personnel; UN 
peacekeeping funding; heavy weapons; weapons exports; military capabil-
ity; displaced people; neighboring country relations; conflicts fought and, 
deaths from conflict (external). As with the GGGI the data from 2008 is 
used.  
As the WVS variables initially were coded on different scales all were 
re-coded to the most prevalent scale of the WVS, 1-4, with 1 being the 
least approving of gender equality and 4 the most. The GGGI was not 
recoded and also has its lowest score as the least egalitarian and the highest 
as the most egalitarian. In order to get positive t-values the GPI, which 
initially had its lowest scores being the most peaceful, was transformed to 
negative (that is a score of 2.356 was transformed to -2.356 etc.), thus the 
highest scores became the most peaceful ones. Following the same logic, 
using the UCDB, every country was coded -1 for having had an armed 
conflict during the period and 0 for not having had one.  
2.4 Findings 
An initial factor analysis of the seven value variables shows parsimony, 
that is, they are all connected, and to such degree that only one component 
is extracted in the matrix. This component explains a full 68% of the total 
variance. This result allows us to merge, or aggregate, the seven variables 
into one factor, that is, a new variable, called “Aggregated gender equality 
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values.” The sampling adequacy of the factor analysis was tested with the 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure and found to be within the excellent range 
at .787. The Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity, which examines whether the ma-
trix is different from the identity matrix, was significant at .000 indicating 
that the matrix does not resemble an identity matrix, further supporting 
the existence of one factor within the data.  
In order to further test the reliability, or the internal consistency, of the 
aggregation of the seven value variables a Cronbach’s alpha test was car-
ried out, giving a score of .861, thus validating the choice to aggregate the 
data.  
A bivariate correlation was carried out, using the Spearman’s correla-
tion coefficient, in order to see the relationship between the aggregated 
gender equality value variable, the GGGI, the UCDB and the GPI.  
Table 2.1 
Correlation between the Aggregated Gender Equality Values, the Global 
Gender Gap Index, Armed Conflicts and the Global Peace Index 
Test 1 2 3 4 
Aggregated Gender 
Equality Values 
1    
Global Gender Gap In-
dex 
.643 1   
Armed Conflicts  .563 .403 1  
Global Peace Index .420 .278 .576 1 
Source: World Value Survey 1981-2008, Global Gender Gap Index 2008, States in Armed 
Conflict 2008, Global Peace Index 2008. 
ͣ All correlations are significant to the .001 level (two-tailed). 
 
As can be seen in Table 2.1, all correlations are positive, strong and highly 
significant, confirming all five hypotheses. The only correlation that is 
slightly less strong than the others, albeit still significant, is between the 
levels of political and socio-economic gender equality (GGGI) and the 
levels of general peacefulness (GPI).  
This means that  we have reproduced the findings of  previous studies 
mentioned in the introduction, showing that the higher the level of polit-
ical and socio-economic gender equality in a country, the less likely it is 
that it will experience an armed conflict and the more peaceful it is in gen-
eral (hypotheses 1 and 2). Further, a possible explanatory factor of this 
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correlation has been found in that both hypotheses 3 and 4 were con-
firmed, telling us that the more people approve of gender equality in a 
country, the less likely it is that there will be an armed conflict and the 
more peaceful it will be in general. Finally, the test hypothesis (H5) also 
turned out to be confirmed, showing a strong correlation between norms 
on and levels of gender equality, that is the more people approve of gender 
equality in a country the higher the level of political and socio-economic 
gender equality as measured by the GGGI.  
A causal link cannot be proven for any of the five hypotheses. As indi-
cated by the literature the relationships can go both ways. The strong and 
significant relationships found between our norms and values on gender 
equality and actual levels of gender equality, conflict and general peaceful-
ness show that there is a need to think about prevention of violence and 
conflict in a new way, not reducing gender equality to “women’s issues” 
that can be dealt with later when the “hard” issues have been solved.  
2.5 Conclusion 
I wanted to see if the correlation between gender equality and the levels 
of violence, including armed conflict, that has been found in previous 
studies could be reproduced and if I could find a similar correlation for 
the relationship between norms on gender equality and the levels of vio-
lence. A statistical analysis of the different data sets used has both recon-
firmed the previous findings by other scholars and confirmed the strong 
correlation between norms on gender equality and levels of violence I hy-
pothesized. The implications of these findings are twofold.  
First they promote further research into the causal mechanisms of the 
relationship between (norms on) gender inequality and violence. While the 
literature suggests the causality might go two ways, this is not confirmed 
and if it should be it is possible that the different directions carry different 
strengths. Further research on how to influence norms on gender equality 
is also called for, especially in contexts of high levels of violence and armed 
conflict.  
Second, the findings are crucial for the development of policies on con-
flict management, peace building and sustainable development. While top-
down policies and measures, such as new legislations and law enforcement 
can have a positive impact on both the levels of gender equality and norms 
on and attitudes toward gender equality it appears crucial in the light of 
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these findings to also focus on a bottom-up approach. Making people 
think differently about gender relations will most certainly also change 
how they think about the use of violence. Governments, development 
agencies and NGOs working on conflict prevention and/or peace build-
ing all of whom are focusing on changing patriarchal mentalities and struc-
tures, visible in attitudes to and levels of gender equality, should achieve a 
much larger success than those ignoring the situation of women.  
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3 Don’t Be Gay: Homophobia, Violence And Conflict 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Feminist research has pointed out that adherence to patriarchal norms and 
attitudes that sustain gender inequality, in society and by individuals, cor-
relates with violence against women and other forms of violence, includ-
ing armed conflict (Beyer, 2014). The more people in a society are positive 
to gender equality, the less violence there is and vice versa (Ekvall, 2013). 
Hudson et al.’s (2012) study, the largest to date, demonstrates that gender 
inequality – defined as women’s physical insecurity, unequal family law 
and polygyny – is a stronger predictor of armed conflict than traditional 
explanatory variables such as economic development, democratization or 
Islam. Melander’s (2005) research also found that an increase in levels of 
gender equality is correlated with a decrease of levels of armed conflict. 
A growing body of literature focuses on violence against homosexuals 
(Keiller, 2010), as well as violence committed by men wanting to prove 
that they are not homosexuals (Kimmel, 2008). A few studies have looked 
at norms on masculinity in relation to military masculinities (Belkin and 
Bateman, 2003; Higate, 2012) and the added vulnerability and threat to 
sexual minorities in times of armed conflict (Myrttinen and Daigle, 2017). 
Yet there are no studies relating intolerance of homosexuality to levels of 
violence in the way that gender inequality has been related to levels of 
violence. As heteronormativity and gender inequality are the two most 
prominent features of patriarchy (Connell, 1995), and as gender inequality 
is strongly correlated to several forms of violence including armed conflict, 
this contribution investigates whether patriarchal attitudes to homosexu-
ality can be linked to forms of violence beyond individual violence against 
gay men, in a similar way that gender inequality and violence against 
women relate to various other forms of violence.  
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While acceptance of homosexuality is increasing in some countries, in-
tolerance of homosexuality is also on the rise in many parts of the world 
(Currier, 2010; Ratele, 2014). Homosexuality can lead to life imprison-
ment, such as in Uganda (Thoreson, 2015) and to the death penalty, such 
as in Iran, Mauretania, Saudi Arabia, Sudan and Yemen as well as in some 
provinces of Nigeria, Somalia and the UAE (Carroll and Itaborahy, 2015). 
Understanding whether, and how, the sometimes violent, homophobic at-
titudes relate to different types of violence in contemporary societies is 
thus relevant, both theoretically and politically: understanding correlations 
between homophobia and different types of violence would broaden our 
understanding of violent conflicts and help policy actors in their attempts 
to prevent or reduce violence.  
Considering the relation between gender inequality and violence and 
that gender inequality and intolerance of homosexuality are the two main 
pillars of patriarchal norms we first discuss the literature addressing gen-
der, sexuality and violence and the relations between them. Then we ad-
dress the relationship between intolerance of homosexuality and several 
types of violence, in four steps, using quantitative analysis. The use of 
quantitative analysis is an attempt to test what have so far mostly been 
theoretical assumptions about relationships between gender, heteronor-
mativity and violence. 
Previous studies have mainly focused on male homosexuality. This 
study also focus on male homosexuality, both because of the interest in 
patriarchal norms on masculinity and because of the absence of data on 
discrimination of and violence against female homosexuals. 
3.2 Patriarchal attitudes to gender and sexuality 
Feminist scholars argue that an incontestable relationship exists between 
homophobia and sexism. Such arguments are based on “the assumption 
that both homophobia and sexism play crucial roles in preserving patriar-
chal gender ideologies and maintaining the polarization of the masculine 
and feminine” (Murphy, 2006, p. 209). Connell’s work on hegemonic mas-
culinities is the case in point (Connell, 1995). Hegemonic masculinities are 
marked by both a disdain of women and femininity, and by adhering to 
heteronormativity – a heterosexuality institutionalized as the normative 
sexuality. Homosexuality defies the conventional norms that enforce “ap-
propriate sexual desires for men and women”, leading homosexuals – and 
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especially homosexual men - to be viewed as “gender deviants”, indicating 
that notions of heterosexuality are dependent on the notions of gender 
(Murphy, 2006, p. 211). 
Connell argued that “harboring negative views toward gay men may be 
related to underlying sexism” (Connell,  1995, p. 78). Around the world 
there are dominant ideals of what “real men” are or should be. Definitions 
most often include power and heterosexuality, meaning that without either 
power or heterosexual virility, men are not seen as “real men” (Zarkov, 
2011). This compulsory heterosexuality and its accompanying intolerance 
of homosexuality was theorized already in 1976 by David and Brannon in 
their “The Blueprint for Manhood” model. Their gender-role model pro-
poses four major masculine “themes” or benchmarks against which all 
men are measured (Kimmel, 2003)11. Intolerance of gay men is an example 
of the “No Sissy Stuff” theme, the marginalization of gay men being 
rooted in the rejection of all things perceived as feminine and thus threat-
ening to the masculine gender role (Kahn, 2009; Kimmel, 2003).  
While many studies have shown correlations between strong adherence 
to patriarchal gender norms and attitudes and homophobia (Herz and Jo-
hansson, 2015), most of them concern male homosexuality. Weaver et al. 
(2009) argue that the normative idea of a “real man” is in a precarious state 
requiring continuous social proof and validation. A man must prove his 
heterosexual masculinity all the time to be seen as a “real man”. Actions 
proving this manhood the best include embracing danger or risk and dis-
playing physical toughness. Bossom and Vandello (2011, p. 84) propose 
that cultural scripts for manhood prescribe physical aggression to demon-
strate masculine status, particularly to restore threatened manhood. An-
other way to be “sufficiently masculine” would be to “harbor and com-
municate antigay attitudes” (Barron et al. 2008, p.  154). Hence 
homosexuality becomes a matter of ridicule and a symbol of “what not to 
be” as a male. Given this cultural system, “situations may arise in which 
one must harbor negative attitudes toward male homosexuality in order to 
conform to dominant patriarchal conceptualizations of masculinity” (Bar-
ron et al. 2008, p. 154). Where then does violence come into this equation?  
                                                 
11 1) No Sissy Stuff; 2) Be a Big Wheel; 3) The Sturdy Oak and 4) Give’em Hell 
(Kahn 2009). 
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3.3 Violence and patriarchal attitudes to gender inequality 
and homosexuality 
When thinking about patriarchal norms and attitudes on gender and sex-
uality and their relationship to violence what comes first to mind is phys-
ical violence: men’s violence against women; men’s violence to prove that 
they are not gay and violence against homosexuals. The links between 
these types of violence and patriarchal norms are well researched. Re-
search finds strong correlations between patriarchal norms on masculinity, 
dominance over women and men’s violence against women (Flood and 
Pease, 2009) showing that the more a man adheres to patriarchal norms 
the more likely he is to both find violence against women justified and 
perpetrate it himself. Women also adhere to patriarchal norms, which may 
lead them to not identify spousal abuse as violence, or even to condone it 
(Ahmad et al., 2004).  
Regarding the relationship between homosexuality and violence, Kim-
mel (2008) shows how being called gay is thought to be the worst insult 
for young American men. Kimmel’s work draws on studies in the USA, 
but homophobia and violence against homosexuals is a global phenome-
non (Planet Romeo, 2015). Kimmel (2008) suggests there is a “Guy 
Code”, a regime of peer-influenced and enforced behaviors encouraging 
young men to use violence as a reaction to insults, violence being the ulti-
mate way to prove heterosexual masculinity. Other scholars have found 
that the fear of appearing feminine and hence not heterosexual enough is 
common reason for anti-gay behavior, including aggression (Kilianski, 
2003; McCreary, 1994; Wilkinson, 2004). Studies of school shootings for 
instance show that most perpetrators have been bullied and taunted as gay 
(Kalish and Kimmel, 2010). Meanwhile, men who hold more patriarchal 
norms are more likely to be violent towards homosexuals (Stotzer and 
Shih, 2012). The failure to follow patriarchal norms on masculinity is the 
base of differentiation and hierarchy among men and of the punishment 
of those who do not conform (Jones, 2006, p. 453).  
When searching for links between patriarchal norms and attitudes on 
gender inequality, intolerance of homosexuality and violence, military in-
stitutions are unavoidable. Military institutions have historically been the 
most ardent spaces of heteronormativity and military masculinity was until 
recently viewed as exclusively heterosexual (Jones, 2006). In some militar-
ies this is changing, as the USA and European countries begin to allow 
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openly gay men to serve. Nevertheless, in many countries around the 
world soldiering is still synonymous with heterosexual masculinity.  
Thus, norms and attitudes to gender and sexuality are not a side issue 
to militaries and armed conflicts, but indispensable to their being. These 
norms and attitudes are also strongly correlated to interpersonal violence. 
This leads us to take a closer look at patriarchal attitudes to homosexuality 
and ask whether adhering to those attitudes can be related to many differ-
ent types of violence in similar ways as gender inequality is.    
 The main hypotheses informing all analyses are 1) that societies with 
more acceptance of homosexuality will have less violence of any type, in-
cluding less involvement in armed conflict and 2) that countries involved 
in violent conflicts and with high general levels of violence will also have 
high levels of intolerance towards homosexuality. 
 
3.4 Data and methods 
To investigate the relationship between attitudes to homosexuality and vi-
olence four analyses were performed. The first examines bivariate corre-
lations between attitudes to homosexuality and different types of violence. 
The second analysis relates a broader set of indicators (such as acceptance 
of homosexuality, gender equality, economic development, human devel-
opment, democracy, peacefulness) to violent conflict, examining differ-
ences between countries i) with armed conflict on their territory, ii) waging 
war on others territories, iii) not involved in armed conflict. The third 
analysis tests which among the traditional control variables has the strong-
est correlations with violence, in order to use the result for the fourth anal-
ysis which tests if human development, the most important control varia-
ble, has a moderating influence on norms on homosexuality in relation to 
different types of violence.  
  
All four analyses rely on existing data bases. Data on attitudes to ho-
mosexuality and gender (in)equality come from the World Values Survey 
(WVS) (2009-2014). A WVS survey question on homosexuality (V203: 
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Can homosexuality be justifiable?) is used12. The responses were clustered 
(answers one to four form the category “never justifiable”, five and six are 
forming the group “neutral”, and seven to ten “always justifiable”) to 
make them comparable to the question on attitudes to gender (in)equality: 
V47 (If a woman earns more money than her husband, it is almost certain 
to cause problems) with answers scaled at “Agree”, “Neither” and “Disa-
gree”. The question on homosexuality was asked in 58 countries, the one 
on gender equality in 60. The analysis was based on the percentage of re-
spondents in each country. 
Data on violence come from the 2014 Global Peace Index (GPI) (In-
stitute for Economics & Peace, 2014). The GPI gauges domestic and in-
ternational conflict, safety and security in society and militarization in 162 
countries, using 23 indicators. These indicators have been grouped into 
five categories: 1) Interpersonal violence (perceived criminality; homicides 
per capita; violent crimes per capita); 2) State and societal violence (ratio 
of security officers and police per capita; incarceration rates and political 
terror; access to weapons; violent demonstrations; political instability); 3) 
Internal conflict (conflicts fought; intensity of conflicts; deaths from con-
flicts; displaced people; impact of terrorist acts); 4) Militarization (weapon 
import; weapon export; military expenditure as % of GDP; armed services 
personnel per capita; ownership of nuclear and heavy weapons); 5) Exter-
nal conflict (neighboring country relations; external conflicts fought; 
deaths from these conflicts). The higher the score, the less peaceful the 
country. Both aggregate and sub-scores are used. The indicator “funding 
of UN peacekeeping” was not used as it is not directly related to levels of 
violence. 
The other data are retrieved from the following sources: 
 countries in conflict: Uppsala Conflict Data Base (UCDB) (Petters-
son & Wallensteen, 2015); 
                                                 
12 The WVS has one more question on homosexuality, A124-09: “On 
this list are various groups of people. Could you please sort out any that 
you would not like to have as neighbors? Homosexuals.” As this ques-
tion only had “yes” and “no” as possible answers and the selected ques-
tion had a scale it was considered a less useful variable than the selected 
question. 
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 LGBT legislation: International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and 
Intersex Association (ILGA) (Carroll and Itaborahy, 2015) 1 = 
same-sex marriage exists; 2 = foreign same-sex marriages recog-
nized but marriages not legalized in the country; 3 = same-sex civil 
unions accepted; 4 = same-sex relationships legal; 5 = laws restrict-
ing freedom of expression and association of LGBT people; 6 = 
unenforced penalty against LGBT; 7 = imprisonment of LGBT of 
various length; 8 = life in prison for LGBT; 9 = death penalty for 
LGBT; 
 public behavior/violence against homosexuals: Gay Happiness In-
dex (GHI) (Planet Romeo, 2015); 
 level of gender equality: Global Gender Gap Index (GGGI) (World 
Economic Forum, 2014); 
 GDP per capita: World Bank (2014a); 
 Gini Index: World Bank (2014b); 
 democracy levels: Democracy Index (DI) (The Economist Intelli-
gence Unit, 2014); 
 level of human development: inequality adjusted Human Develop-
ment Index (HDI) (UNDP, 2015). 
3.5 Findings 
3.5.1 Relating Homosexuality to Violence: Mixed Results 
The first analysis, a bivariate correlation between the percentage of popu-
lation in a country thinking that homosexuality is (not) justifiable and in-
dicators from the Global Peace Index, shows mixed results (see Table 3.1).  
 
Table 3.1 
Attitudes to homosexuality and violence 
 Homosexuality 
is justifiable –
never 
Homosexuality 
is justifiable -
neutral 
Homosexuality 
is justifiable -al-
ways 
Aggregated index 
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GPI 2014 ,561*** -,338* -,576*** 
Interpersonal violence 
Perception of criminality ,333* -,153 -,383** 
Homicide ,237 ,011 -,255 
Violent crime ,352** -,210 -,353** 
State and societal  violence 
Security officers and police ,235 -,088 -,222 
Incarceration rates ,053 ,178 -,118 
Political terror ,495*** -,259 -,531*** 
Access to weapons ,373** -,301* -,358** 
Violent demonstrations ,395** -,251 -,420** 
Political instability ,757*** -,631*** -,709*** 
Internal conflict 
Intensity of internal conflict ,511*** -,399** -,503*** 
Deaths from internal conflict ,172 -,118 -,217 
Internal conflicts fought ,152 -,056 -,151 
Displaced people ,131 -,030 -,127 
Terrorism impact ,177 -,162 -,141 
Militarization 
Weapons import ,073 ,052 -,068 
Weapons export -,376** ,067 ,480*** 
Military expenditure ,302* -,299* -,324* 
Armed service personnel ,139 ,025 -,139 
Nuclear and heavy weapons -,034 ,116 -,045 
External conflict 
Neighboring countries relations 
,533*** -,340* -,548*** 
External conflicts fought -,107 ,029 ,180 
Deaths from external conflict -,032 ,095 ,038 
p<0,05=*; p<0,01=**; p<0,001=*** 
 
The short answer to the question whether attitudes to homosexuality 
are linked to various types of violence is: yes and no. Results are not only 
mixed but also surprising. I will first present expected results – meaning 
those where attitudes to homosexuality are correlated to different types of 
violence in a way that follows theoretical assumptions discussed above, 
and then those that surprise.  
The first expected result is that attitudes to homosexuality are corre-
lated to levels of violence in general. Thinking that homosexuality is never 
justifiable is strongly correlated to high levels of violence; thinking that 
homosexuality is always justifiable is strongly correlated to low levels of 
violence and being neutral about homosexuality is correlated to low levels 
of violence, although not as strongly as thinking that homosexuality is al-
ways justifiable, meaning that societies with high levels of intolerance of 
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homosexuality tend to have higher levels of violence in general and vice 
versa.  
The second expected result concerns interpersonal violence. When 
many people think that homosexuality is always justified there are also low 
levels of violent crime and people perceive the level of criminality in their 
society to be low. When many people think that homosexuality is never 
justified there are high levels of violent crime and people perceive the level 
of criminality to be high. The neutral homosexuality variable is not corre-
lated to interpersonal violence, showing the need for high levels of toler-
ance of homosexuality in a society in order to reduce interpersonal vio-
lence.   
The third expected result is that norms on homosexuality are correlated 
to a number of variables in the category of state and societal related vio-
lence. Two of these variables, access to weapons and political instability, 
are not only correlated to (not) accepting homosexuality, but also to the 
neutral category, showing that accepting and sometimes even just neutral 
attitudes towards homosexuality are associated with lower levels of politi-
cal instability and access to weapons. High levels of intolerance of homo-
sexuals go hand in hand with high levels of political instability and access 
to weapons both of which are decreasing already when the attitudes to 
homosexuality become neutral, decreasing even more when attitudes be-
come accepting.  
The fourth rather expected result is that attitudes to homosexuality are 
correlated to militarization. Military expenditure, as percentage of the 
GDP, correlates with all homosexuality variables. Countries with high lev-
els of intolerance of homosexuality spend a larger percentage of their 
GDP on their military than countries with neutral and accepting norms on 
homosexuality. As democracies tend to spend a smaller percentage of their 
GDP (not necessarily a smaller amount) on their military than non-de-
mocracies and it is in the democracies we find the most acceptance of 
homosexuality this is not surprising.  
That nuclear and heavy weapons are not correlated to attitudes to ho-
mosexuality is not so surprising considering that only a few countries, dif-
fering in their acceptance of homosexuality, have nuclear weapons. The 
same could be said for other heavy weapons (sophisticated air force, air-
craft carriers, warships and combat helicopters) as only a few countries 
own them. In addition, some of these weapons were acquired prior to 
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measuring levels of (in)tolerance of homosexuality (2014), and might 
therefore not be related. 
The other results are surprising and some raise concerns. Homicide was 
not found to be correlated with the attitudes to homosexuality despite the 
other types of interpersonal violence being correlated. Why violent crime 
is correlated to attitudes to homosexuality and not homicide, which is a 
type of violent crime, is unknown. The number of security officers, police 
and incarceration rates is also not correlated to attitudes to homosexuality. 
Why it is so is unclear but it is possible that these items rather depend 
more on the regime type and its policies than on attitudes. Weapons im-
port and numbers of armed service personnel are also not correlated to 
(in)tolerance of homosexuality. This is unexpected as military expenditure 
correlates with the homosexuality variables. One possible explanation is 
that there are multiple ways to spend a military budget and that personnel 
is only a part of it. Absence of correlation regarding weapons import could 
be related to the fact that most countries import weapons of some kind at 
some stage. But it was the correlation of weapons export with norms of 
homosexuality that came as a surprise: a high level of weapon export goes 
hand in hand with the acceptance of homosexuality. While this might seem 
counterintuitive it is probably a result of the fact that it is the most indus-
trialized countries that export arms, and it is also they that tend to have 
the highest levels of acceptance of homosexuality (and of gender equality). 
Regarding the relation between internal violent conflicts and ac-
ceptance of homosexuality correlation appears only for the intensity of 
internal conflict. Deaths from internal conflict, number of internal con-
flicts, number of displaced people and impact of terrorism are not statis-
tically relevant. Previous research shows links between hate crimes and 
terrorism (Mills et al., 2017); toxic masculinities and terrorism (Haider, 
2016); sexism and islamophobia (Hopkins, 2016). As these different types 
of violence can be related to patriarchal behaviors it is possible that soci-
eties with high levels of intolerance of people who do not conform to 
norms on sexuality may also be less tolerant of people that differ in other 
ways. Such assumptions do however require further investigation. 
Equally selective results come from the correlation of acceptance of 
homosexuality and external conflicts: only the relations with neighboring 
countries matter. Bad relations with neighboring countries is correlated to 
high levels of intolerance of homosexuality, good relations with neutral 
attitudes to and high levels of acceptance of homosexuality.  However, 
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external conflicts fought, and deaths from external conflicts do not show 
any significant correlations.   
In sum, attitudes to homosexuality correlate to a variety of types of 
violence in the GPI although not to all. While it would be dangerous to 
attach too much importance to the exact numbers produced by the biva-
riate correlation considering the problems associated with using big aggre-
gated data sets based on secondary data such as the GPI, the results of the 
analysis still show very specific tendencies. Confirming these tendencies 
requires the use of other data sets, to see if the data point in the same 
direction.  
3.5.2 Does Bringing In More Variables Clear The Picture?  
The second analysis combines several sets of variables. The first set per-
tains to the conflict situation: countries with conflicts on their own terri-
tories, countries participating in armed conflicts on other countries’ terri-
tories and countries not participating in any conflicts, using the UCDB. 
The second set of variables is made of indicators of patriarchal norms and 
attitudes on homosexuality pertaining to the legal status of the same-sex 
relations and attitudes to homosexuality. Finally, a set of control variables 
for the same year, 2014, is used: attitudes to gender equality; the Gini In-
dex; GDP per capita; the inequality adjusted HDI; the DI and the GPI.  
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Table 3.2. 
Median measures for countries in function of conflict situations per 2014 
 Countries with 
fighting on own 
territory 
Countries fighting 
on other’s territory 
Countries not 
fighting 
 
LGBT legislation 
score: 
2) Israel. 3) Colombia. 
4) Azerbaijan, DRC, 
Lebanon, Mali, Philip-
pines, Thailand, 
Ukraine. 5) Russia. 6) 
Myanmar, Syria. 7) 
Afghanistan, Algeria, 
Egypt, Ethiopia, India, 
Libya, Palestine, South 
Sudan. 8) Pakistan, 
Uganda. 9) Nigeria, So-
malia, Sudan, Yemen. 
1) Belgium, Canada, 
Denmark, France, Ice-
land, Netherlands, New 
Zealand, Norway, Portu-
gal, Spain, Sweden, UK, 
USA. 2) Estonia. 3) Alba-
nia, Australia, Austria, 
Croatia, Czech Rep., 
Finland, Germany, Hun-
gary, Ireland, Slovenia, 
Luxemburg.4) Armenia, 
Bahrain, Benin, BiH, 
Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, 
Cambodia, Djibouti, El 
Salvador, Georgia, 
Greece, Guinea-Bissau, 
Italy, Ivory Coast, Jor-
dan, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Macedonia, Mongolia, 
Montenegro, Nepal, Ni-
ger, Poland, Romania, 
Rwanda, Slovakia, South 
Korea, Tajikistan, Tur-
key. 5) China. 6) Chad, 
Sierra Leone, Tonga. 7) 
Bangladesh, Burundi, 
Cameroon, Ghana, 
Guinea, Kenya, Liberia, 
Malaysia, Senegal, 
Togo. 9) Mauretania, 
Saudi Arabia, UAE. 
1) Argentina, Brazil, 
Mexico, Uruguay. 3) Ec-
uador, Malta, Switzer-
land, Taiwan. 4) Baha-
mas, Belarus, Belize, 
Bolivia, Cape Verde, 
CAR, Chile, Costa Rica, 
Cuba, Cyprus, Domini-
can Rep., East Timor, 
Equatorial Guinea, Fiji, 
Gabon, Guatemala, 
Haiti, Honduras, Indone-
sia, Japan, Kazakhstan, 
Kosovo, Kyrgyzstan, 
Laos, Lesotho, Madagas-
car, Marshall Islands, 
Micronesia, Moldova, 
Nicaragua, North Korea, 
Palau, Panama, Para-
guay, Peru, Rep. of 
Congo,  São Tomé 
&Príncipe, Serbia, RSA, 
Surinam, Vanuatu, Ven-
ezuela, Viet Nam. 6) An-
gola, Antigua, Barbados, 
Bhutan, Botswana, Dom-
inica, Guyana, Jamaica, 
Malawi, Mozambique, 
Namibia, Nauru, Oman, 
Papua New Guinea, St 
Kitts & Nevis, Samoa, 
Seychelles, Singapore, 
Sri Lanka, Swaziland, 
Trinidad & Tobago, Tu-
valu, Zimbabwe. 7) 
Comoros, Eritrea, Gre-
nada, Kiribati, Kuwait, 
Maldives, Mauritius, Mo-
rocco, St Lucia, St Vin-
cent & The Grenadines, 
Solomon Islands, Tuni-
sia, Turkmenistan, Uz-
bekistan, Zambia. 8) 
Gambia, Tanzania. 9) 
Brunei, Iran, Qatar. n/a) 
Cook Island. 
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Table 3.2. 
Median measures for countries in function of conflict situations per 2014 
 Countries with 
fighting on own 
territory 
Countries fighting 
on other’s territory 
Countries not 
fighting 
LGBT legislation 
median13 
7 4 4 
GHI: public be-
havior median14 
45 56 55 
GHI: physical as-
sault median15 
45 31 40 
%  thinking homo-
sexuality is never 
justifiable me-
dian16 
74 65 64 
%  thinking that it 
is a problem if a 
woman earns 
more than her 
husband median17 
38 20 32 
GGGI median18 0,64 0,70 0,70 
GINI median19 38 34 43 
GDP/capita in 
USD median20 
2 865 485 10 482 140 5 227 945 
Inequality ad-
justed HDI me-
dian21 
0,50 0,71 0,53 
DI median22 3,82 6,51 5,81 
GPI median23 2,62 1,86 1,99 
 
                                                 
13 See Data and Methods section for scale. Data available for all countries ex-
cept one who did not participate in any conflict. 
14 Includes all forms of discrimination + violence. The higher the number the 
less discrimination. Data available for 77 of the 97 countries that experienced 
conflict of any kind and for 47 of the 95 countries not participating in any con-
flict.  
15 The higher the number the more violence against gay men. Data available for 
77 of the countries that experienced conflict of any kind and for 47 of the  
countries not participating.  
16 World Values Survey. Data available for 35 of the 97 countries participating 
in armed conflict and for 21 of the countries not participating.  
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In 2014, of the 97 countries involved in armed conflicts, 12 had con-
flicts on their own territories, 14 had both conflicts on their own territories 
and sent troops to other countries’ territories, and 71 had troops only on 
other countries’ territories. As the countries with conflict on their own 
territory and those with both conflict on their own territory and troops in 
other countries had very similar scores on the different variables they have 
been grouped together.  
As seen in Table 3.2 the 26 countries with conflict on their own terri-
tory scored a median of 7 on the LGBT legislation scale, meaning that 
they tended to have a very restrictive legislation. These countries also had 
a median of 45 on both the public behavior and the violence towards ho-
mosexuals scales and of 74 on the percentage of population thinking ho-
mosexuality is never justified.   
The 71 countries without conflict on their own territory but sending 
out troops scored a median of 4 on the LGBT legislation scale. This is 
considerably lower than the countries with conflict on their own territory. 
They furthermore had a median of 56 on public behavior, 31 on violence 
against homosexuals and 65 on percentage thinking homosexuality is 
never justified. The data seem to indicate that countries with LGBT rights, 
lower levels of discrimination and violence against homosexuals and 
                                                 
17 World Values Survey. Data available for 35 of the 97 countries participating 
in armed conflict and for 22 of the countries not participating in armed conflict.  
18 Scale from 0 to 1. The higher the number the lower the gender gap. Data was 
available for 80 of the 97 countries participating in armed conflicts and for 62 
of those not participating.  
19 World Bank socio-economic inequality scale from 1 to 100. The higher the 
number the more inequality. Data available for 82 of the countries participating 
in armed conflict and for 63 of those not participating. 
20 In USD. Data available for 94 of the countries participating in armed conflict 
and 90 of those not participating. 
21 Scale 0-1, the higher the number the higher the human development. Data 
available for 84 countries participating in armed conflict and 67 not participat-
ing. 
22 The higher the number the higher the level of democracy. Data available for 
94 countries participating in armed conflict and 71 not participating.  
23 The lower the number the more peaceful. Data available for 94 countries par-
ticipating in armed conflict and 67 not participating.  
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higher levels of acceptance of homosexuality are much more likely to in-
tervene in conflicts abroad than having them on their own soil.   
The remaining 95 countries were not participating in any armed con-
flict. Their median score on the LGBT legislation was 4, similar to coun-
tries only fighting on other countries’ territories. These non-fighting coun-
tries score close to the countries intervening abroad on levels of 
discrimination and attitudes towards homosexuals but have more violence 
against homosexuals.  
The general finding from these data is that the more discriminatory 
legislation against LGBT people, the more discrimination and violence 
against LGBT people; and the more people think that homosexuality can 
never be justified, the more likely this country experiences violent conflict 
on its own territory. Moreover, the less LGBT discriminating legislation 
there is; the less violence, and the fewer people thinking that homosexu-
ality can never be justified, the more likely the country intervenes militarily 
abroad. Countries not involved in any armed conflict are scoring very sim-
ilarly to countries intervening abroad except for their level of violence 
against gay men where they score in between countries with fighting at 
home and countries intervening abroad.  
The scores on gender inequality are similar to those on homosexuality. 
Countries with the highest levels of gender unequal attitudes are the ones 
with conflict at home and vice versa. Countries that don’t participate in 
any conflict score in between. However, the data from the WVS cover 
fewer countries than the other data bases and thus have to be read with 
caution. Nevertheless, it is the best data set we have on attitudes to homo-
sexuality and gender equality. Therefore, they are a good proxy to use.  
To analyze these relations further additional data are used to probe spe-
cific features of the societies covered by our data. Two commonly used 
control variables are the Gini Index and GDP per capita. The Gini Index 
shows that the countries with lowest internal socio-economic inequalities 
are the ones sending troops abroad, while the non-fighting countries are 
the most unequal. The GDP per capita average shows that the richest 
countries send troops abroad and the poorest countries have conflict at 
home, while the medium rich countries are mostly non-fighting. As GDP 
per capita does not show the development level of a country, I add the DI 
and the inequality adjusted HDI - a composite of GDP, life expectancy, ed-
ucation levels and inequality levels within the country. As table 2 shows, 
the countries with the highest HDI and DI levels are sending troops 
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abroad; the countries with the lowest HDI and DI levels have armed con-
flict at home and the non-fighting countries are in between. Finally, the 
aggregate GPI gives a picture of general levels of violence across society. 
Countries that intervene militarily abroad without having conflicts at 
home are the ones with the highest levels of peacefulness despite their 
military interventions. To obtain such a score the levels of violence in their 
own countries must be very low. Not surprisingly, countries that have 
armed conflicts at home have the lowest levels of peacefulness. Notable is 
that the countries that didn’t experience any armed conflict in 2014 had a 
lower level of peacefulness than the ones sending troops abroad. This 
means they have high levels of violence at home, even though they are not 
at war.  
The pattern emerging is clear: countries with conflicts at home are 
among the poorest, the least democratic, with the lowest levels of human 
development, the lowest levels of gender equality and lowest acceptance 
of homosexuality and gender equality. The countries that have no conflicts 
at home but send out troops are among the richest, the most democratic, 
with the highest levels of human development, gender equality and ac-
ceptance of homosexuals and gender equality. These countries are also 
among those with the lowest levels of violence in their own societies. The 
countries that experience no conflict at home and participate in no conflict 
abroad have in-between average values.  
These findings fit with the literature on “liberal and democratic peace” 
(Hegre, 2014) showing that democracies are the least likely to have conflict 
at home and do not wage war on each other, but do get involved in armed 
conflict with non-democracies. However, further linear regressions with 
the composite GPI as dependent variable and the above used control var-
iables as the independent ones only partly confirm the conviction that de-
mocracy is the most important variable.  
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Table 3.3. 
Significant Beta / standard error for control variables 
 GDP/Capita Gini DI HDI 
Composite GPI   -,101***/,022  
Perception of criminality  ,033***/,009 -,123*/,049  
Security officers    2,129**/,620 
Homicide  ,058***/,012  -3,935***/,795 
Incarceration -1,662E-8**/,000 ,040***/,008  3,714***/,559 
Access weapons  ,022**/,008 -,148**/,047 -1,278*/,568 
Intensity internal conflict   -,195**/,056 -1,387*/,684 
Violent demonstrations -2,051E-8***/,000  -,105*/,051  
Violent crime -1,669E-8**/,000 ,028**/,010  -1,458*/,678 
Political instability   -,336***/,034  
Political terror   -,152**/,052  
Military expenditure   -,046*/,021  
Armed service personnel    ,550*/,261 
Weapons export 3,013E-8***/,000  -,089*/,044  
Neighboring countries rela-
tions 
-1,351E-8**/,000  -,317***/,053 1,819**/,636 
External conflicts fought    1,740**/,592 
Weapons import 9,926E-9***/,000    
p<0,05=*; p<0,01=**; p<0,001=*** 
 
The linear regressions in Table 3 show that the strongest correlations are 
not between the DI and the GPI, but between the inequality adjusted DI 
and the GPI. In the next section I further test these results.  
3.5.3 Can Other Data Confirm Tendencies?  
In light of the above findings the next step was to see if patriarchal atti-
tudes to homosexuality are interacting with the inequality adjusted HDI. 
As it can be argued that the interaction goes both ways - that patriarchal 
attitudes influence human development and that human development in-
fluences patriarchal attitudes – I investigated this moderation both ways. 
A regression was made in order to check if and how the inequality adjusted 
HDI moderated attitudes to homosexuality (using violence against gay 
men as a proxy) and vice versa, in their relation to different kinds of vio-
lence (using the GPI and its 22 sub-categories). Since the violence against 
gay men variable and the GPI variables all are coded so that the higher the 
value the more violence, the HDI variable was reversed to facilitate the 
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interpretation. The HDI and the violence against gay men variables were 
then multiplied to form a combined variable. 23 regressions were then 
made with the inequality adjusted HDI, physical assault and the combined 
variable as independent variables, and the different GPI variables as de-
pendent variables (see Table 3.4; only showing GPI variables that were 
significantly correlated to the combined variable).  
Table 3.4. 
The moderating effect of human development on assault against gay men in 
relation to violence 
 B inequality ad-
justed HDI reversed 
/ Std. error 
B assault against 
gay men / Std. er-
ror 
B inequality ad-
justed HDI re-
versed*assault 
against gay men / 
Std. error 
GPI 2,890***/,504 ,023***/,006 -,038**/,012 
Perception of crim-
inality 
4,378***/1,147 ,027*/,014 -,053*/,027 
Incarceration rates 3,222**/1,018 ,048***/,012 -,101***/,024 
Access to weapons 7,328***/,990 ,060***/,012 -,107***/,023 
Violent demonstra-
tions 
4,674***/1,150 ,035*/,014 -,058*/,027 
Political instability 6,497***/,967 ,057***/,012 -,097***/,023 
Political terror 6,750***/1,107 ,045**/,013 -,081**/,026 
Terrorism impact -16,210**/5,748 -,161**/,069 ,468**/,135 
Neighboring coun-
tries relations 
4,337**/1,376 ,051**/,017 -,084*/,032 
p<0,05=*; p<0,01=**; p<0,001=*** 
 
The inequality adjusted HDI moderated the relationship between violence 
against homosexuals and the GPI aggregate and eight of its 22 subcatego-
ries (perception of criminality; incarceration rates; access to weapons; vio-
lent demonstrations; political instability; political terror; terrorism impact 
and neighboring countries relations). This means that in these nine in-
stances (i.e. the eight listed above plus the GPI aggregate) the level of hu-
man development has an effect on how violence against homosexuals is 
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correlated to other forms of violence and vice versa. Why not all of the 
GPI categories are correlated is unknown, and need further research. 
Despite the inequality adjusted HDI and the levels of violence against 
gay men not having a moderating effect on all the GPI categories the re-
sults still show the relevance of patriarchal attitudes: when violence against 
gay men increases it reduces the positive influence human development 
has on levels of violence as measured by the GPI; when human develop-
ment decreases (a higher HDI score thus as it is reversed) it not only in-
creases levels of many types of violence on its own accord: it also enhances 
the negative effect that violence against gay men has on other forms of 
violence thus further increasing levels of violence.  
The outlier here is terrorism impact that seems to have totally opposite 
relationships with human development and patriarchal attitudes than the 
other GPI variables, i.e. leading to a higher terrorism impact when human 
development is high and violence against gay men is low. The possible 
reasons for this lie in the way that the GPI classifies and collects data on 
terrorism as will be discussed below. 
In short, these results appear to bring more questions than answers. 
Low levels of acceptance of homosexuality are correlated to high levels of 
general violence in a society, as well as to the engagement of the countries 
in violent conflict, but only in those cases where violent conflict is fought 
at home, thus partially confirming the two hypotheses. The hypotheses are 
not confirmed for countries not having wars at home but sending troops 
abroad. In those cases high tolerance of homosexuality and high level of 
peace internally coexist with engaging in violent conflict abroad. This is 
contrary to earlier research indicating that higher levels of gender equality 
at home lead to less participation in conflicts abroad (Caprioli, 2000; Me-
lander, 2005). This surprising and problematic result will be addressed fur-
ther in the text.   
3.6. Discussion and conclusion 
 
While the correlations do not equal causations, the findings that the coun-
tries the most tolerant of homosexuality, with highest democracy and HDI 
levels, and with the best relation with their neighbors are also among the 
countries that engage in most weapons exports and wars abroad is as 
counter-intuitive as it is worrying. One would expect more tolerant, devel-
oped and democratic societies to be more peaceful not only internally, but 
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also towards other countries. But according to the data, this is certainly 
not the case. So how are we to understand these correlations and what 
they mean for the starting hypothesis: that high acceptance of homosexu-
ality will be indicative of low levels of most types of violence including 
armed conflict?  
There are several directions we can take in interpreting the findings. 
One is methodological, or rather epistemological, some of which has al-
ready been addressed in the Introduction. It demands that we question the 
quality of data from the large data sets (UCDB, WVS, GPI, etc.) and ask 
how they are assembled, what kind of knowledge informs their assemblage 
and what kind of picture they produce. Another direction is to take the 
most disturbing result – that democratic, tolerant and equal societies 
spread violence elsewhere – as a starting point, and see what the theoreti-
cal and political implications of such findings are and what they tell us 
about the relationships between acceptance of homosexuality, violent con-
flict and the Western democracies.     
Comparing the first data indicating that the homosexuality variable is 
not correlated to the presence of internal conflicts, but rather to their in-
tensity, with the second data showing that most homophobia is present in 
countries with conflicts at home points to methodological issues. The GPI 
places a lot of weight on the duration of the conflict when measuring both 
intra- and inter-state conflict, and the role of the intervening country when 
measuring inter-state conflict. The second data set  - i.e. the UCDB - only 
takes participation in armed conflict into account and thus gives us a differ-
ent perspective.   
Another issue with the data can be seen in the fact that the terrorism 
impact is not correlated to the homosexuality variables which is somewhat 
surprising given the large number of terrorist attacks in the Middle East 
and other places with low acceptance of homosexuality. We can look at 
how the GPI terrorist variable is calculated and in particular which attacks 
are counted as terrorist and which are not. Also, a factor weighed into the 
GPI terrorism variable is the cost of material damage due to the terrorist 
attack. Such costs appear to be higher in the West than in other regions, 
possibly giving attacks in the West a bigger weight despite being fewer in 
numbers as compared to other regions.   
The questions about the data are thus very much questions of the con-
ceptualization and interpretation of reality that influence decisions about 
the unit of measurement and the methods of data collection. Large data 
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sets are often based on general assumptions about causes and dynamics of 
very different conflicts (Eck, 2012), and have been criticized for using sta-
tistical modeling that simplifies complex realities of violence (Sousa, 2014). 
In addition, there are big differences between countries in the same cate-
gory. For instance, both the US and Western European countries are wag-
ing wars abroad. But, in general, Western European countries have higher 
acceptance of homosexuality and lower levels of violence than the US. 
Further research in the form of comparative case studies could explore in 
more detail how acceptance of homosexuality and levels of violence are 
related.  
All of these limitations related to data and data sets apply to this re-
search. But the safeguard taken in this case is, as noted earlier, the use of 
several different data sets and several different methods, with different 
dependent and independent variables. When it comes to the correlation 
between high acceptance of homosexuality and developed, democratic, 
peaceful countries sending troops abroad, all the results point in the same 
direction notwithstanding the choice of data or methods. And this war-
rants further reflections.  
Already during the First Gulf War in 1991 feminists have pointed out 
that gender discourses have served as justification (despite not necessarily 
being the actual motivation) for the US war on Iraq (Farmanfarmaian, 
1992). After the “humanitarian intervention” and “just war” rhetoric in-
troduced by UK Prime Minister Blair in regard to the intervention in Bos-
nia in the 1990s, the US inauguration of “war on terror” in 2001 and then 
adoption of the UN principle of Responsibility to Protect in 2005, further 
questions were asked about justifications used by Western democracies to 
wage wars on non-Western countries and the role of gender therein 
(Hutchings, 2011; Zarkov, 2014). Gender equality has long been a marker 
that separated the West from the Rest, in Western eyes. Depicting non-
Western countries through images of subjugated and violated women and 
despotic, patriarchal, violent men has been a steady strategy for justifying 
occupations and bombings (Dauphinee, 2007; again, despite not neces-
sarily being the actual motivation for these occupations and bombings). 
Thus, while the research shows that gender inequality goes hand in hand 
with high levels of general violence in a society, and may be a predictor of 
violent conflict, there seems to be a need for a caveat – gender equality and 
lower levels of general violence are not predictors that a country will not 
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engage in the conflict in general, but only offers a high probability that it 
will not wage war on its own territory and with its neighbors.  
Something similar may be the case with patriarchal attitudes towards 
homosexuality. Many European countries have high level of tolerance and 
legal equality for non-heteronormative sexualities. But some of them have 
started using norms and attitudes regarding homosexuality in their immi-
gration policies. The Netherlands is in the forefront: prospective new cit-
izens are given photos of gay men kissing and asked what they think about 
it24. Expressing disagreement with same-sex behavior largely means rejec-
tion of citizenship. In addition, homonationalism is on the rise in Europe 
(Sörberg, 2017). Migrants, especially with a Muslim background, are not 
only seen as threatening achievements of women’s emancipation in the 
West, but also of the achievements of gay struggles for legal and social 
equality (Dudink, 2011).  
As noted, there is a growing body of research on intolerance of homo-
sexuality in the literature on patriarchal and hegemonic norms of and atti-
tudes to masculinity, but it is rarely related to armed conflict. Whether in 
academia, among policymakers, international organizations or activists, 
the concepts of patriarchal and hegemonic norms of and attitudes to mas-
culinity are almost always linked to male dominance over women, violence 
against women and gender inequality. While these are important, we need 
to expand our thinking on patriarchal and hegemonic norms and attitudes 
to include intolerance of homosexuality, not only to improve the lives of 
many people, but also to better understand and address various other types 
of violence, their dynamics and their relationships. This research has ad-
dressed some of those issues in order to test theoretical assumptions 
though the existing quantitative data, and came up with mixed – and prob-
lematic - results. So far no violent intervention into another country has 
been justified by appealing to gay rights (as it has been by appealing to 
women’s rights). But it is worth thinking about what these results mean 
for the struggles for gender equality and equality of the LGBT communi-
ties if such struggles are not cognizant of larger geo-political dynamics, 
and the ways these dynamics play both at home and abroad. 
                                                 
24 http://workpermit.com/news/new-dutch-immigration-test-under-attack-
20060406 
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4 
Young Men and Gender Trainings:  
What Happens to Attitudes to Violence 
when Attitudes to Patriarchal Norms 
on Masculinity Change? 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
While norms are strong beliefs on what is right or wrong (Scott and 
Marshall, 2009) and are seen as (in)formal guidelines for accepted and ex-
pected behaviour (Feldman, 1984), how individuals and collectivities relate 
to norms – do they accept them or not – is a matter of attitudes. Attitudes 
are individual and collective positions towards norms, ideas or behaviour 
(Eagly and Chaiken, 1998), telling whether we approve or disapprove of 
something. It is thus interesting to investigate what happens when atti-
tudes change. 
According to Pease and Flood (2008, p. 557) attitudes are shaped by 
the social consensus within specific settings and groups. Institutions such 
as schools, workplaces, or churches shape their participants’ attitudes 
through both formal policies and structures and informal norms. There-
fore, to change the individuals’ attitudes, the dominant norms within those 
settings and groups in which those individuals are situated also need to be 
challenged (Pease and Flood, 2008). While this study examines change in 
individuals’ attitudes it is important to keep the societal dimension in 
mind.  
Many studies find strong correlations between high levels of ac-
ceptance of patriarchal gender norms and tolerant or even positive atti-
tudes to various types of violence, such as violence against women (Flood 
and Pease, 2009), violence between men (Jones, 2009), homophobic vio-
lence (Kimmel and Mahler, 2003) and armed conflict (Hudson et al., 
2012). Many of these studies assume that there is a causal link between 
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attitudes approving of patriarchal gender norms and attitudes approving 
of violence. Flood and Pease (2009) suggest that patriarchal attitudes have 
a fundamental and causal relationship with violence against women; that 
there is a consistent relationship between men’s adherence to sexist and 
patriarchal attitudes and their use of violence against women. While cau-
sality is difficult to prove, such assumptions are further fed by research 
showing that countries with positive attitudes to gender equality (Ekvall, 
2013) have low levels of violence.  
 The ambition of this study is to investigate the causal relationships be-
tween attitudes to patriarchal gender norms and attitudes to violence. The 
hypothesis is that a decrease in patriarchal gender norms leads to attitudes 
less accepting and approving of violence not only against women and ho-
mosexual men but also of other forms of violence, including state-level 
violence. The interaction of patriarchal norms and other influencing fac-
tors in society being very complex, it has so far been impossible to isolate 
changes in attitudes towards gender and violence to see if a change in the 
former causes a change in the latter. I therefore use a quasi-experimental 
setting, a training for men on masculinity by a non-governmental organi-
zation. 
 Over the past 10 to15 years, interventions, mainly gender trainings, in-
volving men and boys have become a common tool for institutions and 
organizations around the world striving to change patriarchal attitudes to 
gender and sometimes violence (mainly against women) (Jewkes, Flood 
and Lang, 2014). The goals of many gender trainings are to challenge pa-
triarchal, gender-biased and discriminatory behaviors, structures and so-
cially constructed inequalities (Lyytikäinen, 2007).   
 As the large majority of violence in the world is perpetrated by men I 
chose to focus on a gender training for men to investigate if and how their 
attitudes to gender, sexuality and violence are related. 
I start by discussing attitudes to gender and violence and subsequently 
move on to gender trainings. I then describe the organization that con-
ducted the gender training studied here: Men Against Violence and Abuse 
(MAVA) in Mumbai, India, before moving on to the data and method. 
Finally I discuss the findings and how they might contribute to the field 
of studies on gender and violence. 
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4.2 Why working on attitudes? 
As already noted, social norms indicate strong beliefs on what is right or 
wrong (Scott and Marshall, 2009) and are seen as (in)formal guidelines for 
accepted and expected behavior (Feldman, 1984). However, how individ-
uals and collectivities relate to norms – accepting them or not – is a matter 
of attitudes. Attitudes are individual positions towards norms, ideas or be-
haviors (Eagly and Chaiken, 1998), showing our beliefs and feelings, ap-
proval or disapproval of ideas, actions and persons. Attitudes are an effi-
cient way to size up the world: when we have to respond to something, 
the way we feel about it can guide how we react (Myers, 2008). 
It thus seems reasonable to ask whether a decrease in patriarchal gender 
norms and attitudes leads to attitudes less accepting and approving of vi-
olence not only against women and homosexuals but also of other forms 
of violence, including state-level violence. It hence seems rather relevant 
to want to influence these patriarchal gender norms, making them more 
egalitarian, if one wants to reduce levels of multiple types of violence. But 
what do we really mean with gender norms? 
4.3 Gender Norms 
Norms on gender are culturally embedded ideological phenomena telling 
us what is “right” and “normal” behavior for men and women and what 
is “feminine” and “masculine” (Reeser, 2010). Whitehead (2002) clustered 
norms on masculinity in two groups: patriarchal and egalitarian. Patriar-
chal norms on masculinity involve male dominance over both women and 
other men (Connell, 1995) and the idea that violence is the best way to 
settle a conflict (Kimmel, 2008).  
Connell’s concept of hegemonic masculinities helps explain how ideals 
of masculinity operate (Connell, 1995, 2001). She stresses relevance of 
both heteronormativity and gender hierarchies for relationships between 
men and women, as well as among men. While the concept of hegemonic 
masculinity can be seen as simplifying reality (Chisholm and Tidy, 2017) it 
is still a relevant analytical tool. The main aspects of hegemonic masculin-
ity – power hierarchies systematically placing women and homosexuals 
below heterosexual men – are supported by structural and institutional 
arrangements of inequality and their justificatory ideologies (Connell, 
2001).  
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Vandello et al. (2008) argue that manhood – what a “real man” should 
be like – is a precarious state requiring continuous social proof and vali-
dation. A man not proving himself according to the dominant norms risks 
to be seen as not a “real man”. Vandello et al. (2008) suggest that the 
cultural scripts for manhood implicitly and explicitly prescribe physical ag-
gression to demonstrate masculine status to themselves and others, par-
ticularly when men’s social status or heterosexuality are threatened. 
The hegemonic masculinity framework fails to describe and explain al-
ternative masculinities however, i.e. the masculinities that actively distance 
themselves from hegemonic expectations, yet at the same time use hege-
monic masculinity as the antithesis to their own stance (Buschmeyer and 
Lengersdorf, 2016). These alternative masculinities overlap with the theo-
rizing of inclusive masculinities (Anderson, 2009) that describes an in-
creasing number of social spaces where men are free to break away from 
the patriarchal hypermasculinity. This again would overlap to a large ex-
tent with what others are calling egalitarian masculinities, generally re-
ferred to as opposite to patriarchal manhood. A few attempts to define 
such masculinities have been made though: egalitarian men negotiate their 
masculinities in their relationships (Schneider, 2007), thereby creating new 
norms thriving on mutual benefits. Egalitarian masculinities also involve 
emotional expressiveness, high levels of family involvement (Pyke, 1996), 
non-violence and absence of generalized gender roles (Rankhota, 2002). 
Recently a large number of studies have come out using the Gender-Eq-
uitable Men Scale25, measuring men’s attitudes to a multitude of things 
such as condom use, partner violence, sexual relationships, doing house-
hold work and much more. 
There is thus evidence that attitudes to, (some aspects of) gender 
(in)equality are strongly associated with attitudinal support for violence 
against women and with actual perpetration of violence.  
4.4 Violence, Gender and Sexuality Norms and Attitudes 
Based on the work cited above, this study assumes that the most important 
features of patriarchal norms are: a) domination over women; b) heter-
onormativity and c) the use of violence as the preferred means to settle 
                                                 
25 https://www.c-changeprogram.org/content/gender-scales-compen-
dium/about.html 
78 CHAPTER 4 
 
conflicts. These three patriarchal norms are then presumed to be linked to 
each other. 
Domination over women has been linked to multiple forms of violence 
against women in much research (Hearn, 1998; Yodanis, 2004). High lev-
els of and attitudes favorable to gender inequality are strongly correlated 
to many forms of violence (Ekvall, 2013) including armed conflict (Hud-
son et al., 2012). Patriarchal values on masculine toughness and honor 
have been found to be a driver of political violence (Bjarnegård et al., 
2017). Male domination in politics correlates to armed conflict and states’ 
violence against their own population (Caprioli, 2005; Melander, 2005). 
What we do not know is if and how changes in attitudes to domination 
over women and homosexual men co-vary with changes in attitudes to 
violence. 
Several studies show strong correlations between homophobic norms 
and attitudes approving of violence against gay men (Plummer, 2001; 
Kimmel and Mahler, 2003). Kimmel (2008) describes the “Guy Code”: the 
collection of attitudes, values and traits composing what it means to be a 
man, including constantly proving one’s masculinity and heterosexuality 
and the rejection of anything seen as feminine. The Guy Code encourages 
the use of violence to avenge any perceived offense as the ultimate way 
for young men to prove that they are “real” men and not gay.  
The use of violence as the preferred means to settle conflicts is a norm 
that influences violence at all levels (Flood et al., 2009; Vandello et al., 
2008). At the same time, violence supportive attitudes trivialize violence 
and its impacts; attribute blame to victims; deny that violence has occurred 
and justify or excuse violence. Moreover, perpetrators of one type of vio-
lence are more likely to perpetrate other types of violence as well (Fleming 
et al., 2015). 
While most violence in the world is perpetrated by men, many men are 
not violent. Nevertheless, Connell (1995, 2002) argues that most men are 
complicit with the gender order that privileges men over women. There-
fore, even non-violent men may be seen as complicit and contributing to 
the culture of violence by not challenging it.  
Using gender trainings for men, where input is given on masculinity, 
heteronormativity, patriarchal norms and attitudes, gender equality and vi-
olence against women and gay men then seems like a reasonable thing to 
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do in order to make men start questioning and challenging patriarchal gen-
der and sexuality order.  
 
4.5 Gender trainings  
 
As noted in the introduction, gender trainings are currently very common 
tool used by international and national organizations to change attitudes 
to gender and sexuality norms. While this global use of gender trainings 
surely means that many people have faith in them as a method for change, 
many authors have also argued that gender trainings present an emotional 
challenge, being about beliefs, values, practices, expectations and attitudes 
at the core of our personal identities. “Long-held assumptions are likely to 
be challenged, issues of power and control confronted, and a demand 
made to look at the world from a different perspective” (Mackay, 2003, p. 
220). This makes gender trainings potentially threatening to the identity of 
individuals, organizations and communities and can generate a backlash, 
where the individual participant can become even more attached to patri-
archal norms as a result of having his (or hers) whole worldview threat-
ened. In order to facilitate changes and to prevent backlashes as far as 
possible efforts to address violence supportive attitudes should also pro-
vide an alternative set of norms and values centered on nonviolence, gen-
der and sexuality equality, and social justice (Flood et al., 2009, p. 191). 
Moreover, interventions should address not only individual attitudes 
overtly accepting or condoning violence, but also attitudes related to gen-
der and sexuality in normalizing and justifying this violence (Mackay, 
2003). Mackay (2003) also argues that the process of changing attitudes 
should be part of a larger project to challenge and change familial, organ-
izational, community and wider societal norms that support gendered and 
heteronormative power relations, including the use of violence, in order 
to be sustainable. Despite their shortcomings gender trainings still repre-
sent a good opportunity to isolate and study changes in attitudes which is 
why one such training for young men has been sought out to be used in 
this study. 
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4.6 Method and data  
The Men Engage Network26 is a large worldwide network of non-governmen-
tal organizations working on masculinities. For this particular research I 
have contacted a large number of organizations in this network to identify 
those planning trainings on masculinity and inquired whether they would 
like to participate in the experiment. One such organization was Men 
Against Violence and Abuse (MAVA)27 in Mumbai, India. MAVA con-
ducted a training on masculinities with 25 male college students during a 
four-day camp, from 11th to 15th August 2016 in Devlali, India. While 
MAVA works on violence, this particular training focused on masculini-
ties, not violence, and violence against women was the only type of violence 
addressed. 
MAVA is an organization that did not came into being through an ini-
tiation by an international intervention. Rather, it was created by a local 
initiative in response to a small advertisement by journalist C.Y. Gopinath, 
in the “Indian Express” daily and its sister publications, in September 
1991. The advertisement called for men "who feel that wives are not for 
battering and they could do something to stop or prevent it"28. 205 men 
from different backgrounds responded. The initiative led to the creation 
of MAVA in 1993. Since then MAVA has worked on a multitude of pro-
jects: trainings; workshops; film festivals; hotlines for distressed youths 
wanting to discuss sexuality and relationships; different forms of commu-
nity interventions, and more. They have struggled to get funding and the 
activities are dependent on volunteer work. All methods, including the 
trainings, have been developed by the men at MAVA themselves in order 
to be context-appropriate. Thus MAVA does not fit in a neo-colonialist 
narrative where Western engagements, ideas, norms, and methods are 
forced upon non-Western organizations and communities. At the same 
time, the men at MAVA have read Western literature on gender, mascu-
linities and violence and use some of it, but always put it in a local context, 
intersecting with caste, class, religion and education, in addition to using 
locally produced literature. The training used in this study was informed 
by the works of Connell, Kimmel, Pease and Flood, adapted to the local 
                                                 
26 http://menengage.org/ 
27 http://www.mavaindia.org/ 
28 http://www.mavaindia.org/Genesis.html 
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context as explained above. It was interactive, with discussions and various 
activities including films and lectures. The participants were not given 
handouts or reading material but took notes during the sessions.  
My participation at the training, as a Western, white, and female re-
searcher of course did not go unnoticed and many participants were inter-
ested in talking to me about a multitude of subjects during breaks and in 
the evenings. I had an interpreter all the time as many of the participants 
had little knowledge of the English language. During the training hours, 
however, I was sitting at the back of the room as an observer, getting the 
content of the discussions translated to English for me as they took place 
in a mix of Hindi and Marathi. My translator, who also served as my assis-
tant, was a MAVA volunteer who had done this training himself a few 
years earlier. He distributed and collected the surveys for this research. 
This allowed me to interfere as little as possible with the participants dur-
ing the actual training sessions. While my presence of course could have 
had an influence on the participants’ answers to the survey questions, the 
fact that the surveys were anonymized hopefully provided some safe-
guards.    
During the training many topics related to patriarchal norms on mas-
culinity were raised: the difference between sex and gender; gender hier-
archies as power relations; homosexuality; intersectionality between patri-
archal norms of gender, cast, education, religion and class; privilege; what 
“real men” should be like; transmission of gender norms through family, 
religion and – important in the Indian context – Bollywood films.  
Violence was addressed only in the cases of violence against women 
(intimate partner violence, rape, sexual harassment, and honor killings). 
Other forms of violence, such as state level violence and violence against 
homosexuals, were not addressed.  
The students came from 10 colleges in Mumbai, from various discipli-
nary backgrounds, and were part of a Volunteer for National Service 
Scheme (NSS) crediting students volunteering for social projects. The par-
ticipants came from mixed social backgrounds: wealthy; middle-class; 
poor; dalit; families with long traditions of higher education and first gen-
eration graduates. All colleges begin their enrolment of NSS students in 
July every year. Each volunteer has to complete a minimum of 120 hours 
per year. Around 100-120 first year students (18-19 years old) usually en-
roll. The students attend an orientation session about the different projects 
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they can participate in, MAVA being one of the options. Interested stu-
dents enroll and approximately three male students per college were se-
lected for the MAVA training in August. This selection is done through 
interviews, examining students’ interest in gender, willingness to reach out 
to others and to dedicate time and energy in MAVA’s activities. In some 
colleges participants were selected by professors, rather than enrolling vol-
untarily. In the case of MAVA gender training there were three such stu-
dents. 
A pre-training survey, S1, took place the evening before the training 
started and a post-training survey, S2, the last evening. Very short inter-
views about how the participants had come to attend the training were 
conducted during the breaks and in the evenings. Six months later, a fol-
low-up survey, S3, took place and six of the young men from the training 
were interviewed.  
The logic of this research was to follow the links between the change 
in attitudes towards gender, sexuality and violence. I measured the change 
by comparing the participants’ attitudes to masculinity, gender equality, 
gay men and different types of violence before and after the training, using 
a matched samples design. S1 was a baseline measurement, S2 measured 
immediate changes in attitudes. If similar differences in attitudes to gen-
der, sexuality and violence were found in S2 compared to S1, I considered 
there to be a causal relation between attitudes to masculinity and attitudes 
to violence. Six months after the training the participants were invited to 
take S3 and 17 out of 25 original participants did so. The purpose of S3 
was to further analyze whether changes in some attitudes were more sus-
tainable than in others.  
As noted earlier, MAVA’s training addressed attitudes to masculinity 
and several forms of violence against women as part of those attitudes. 
But the training did not address other forms of violence, such as state (mil-
itary or police) violence, or communal violence. The survey however did 
ask questions about those types of violence, precisely because I wanted to 
see if changes in the patriarchal attitudes to masculinity would affect 
changes in attitudes towards various types of violence.  
The survey collected background information on the respondents: so-
cio-economic status; family composition; fear of ‘others’ and religiosity. 
The survey was developed relying mainly on scales and questions from 
existing – and thus previously tested - surveys, such as the Conformity to 
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Masculinity Norms Inventory (Mahalik et al., 2003); norms and belief as-
sessments by the World Health Organization (2009); the Center for Dis-
ease Control and Prevention’s compendium of assessment tools (Dahl-
berg et al., 2005); and the Gender-Equitable Men Scale (Men and Gender 
Equality Policy Project, 2011). The survey consisted of 80 short, one sen-
tence statements that were supposed to help me asses participants’ atti-
tudes to masculinity and various forms of violence. The responses were 
coded on a Likert scale from 1 to 5 equaling: where 1 indicates very much 
agree, following: agree, neutral, don’t agree, and don’t agree at all (indi-
cated by 5).   
Thirteen norms on masculinity and seven types of violence were inves-
tigated.29 Four statements were proposed about each of them. Two were 
framed positively and two negatively to avoid a bias in participants’ pref-
erences. The survey was pre-tested and translated into the local language, 
Marathi. 
Four major challenges were related to the methodology: 1) the relatively 
low number of participants: 25 in S1 and S2 and 17 in S3. This being an 
exploratory study, findings based on a small number of participants were 
deemed acceptable. 2) The participants’ self-selection. As the study set out 
to see how changes in some attitudes might influence changes in other 
attitudes, the participants’ initial level of interest in gender was not con-
sidered relevant. 3) The possibility that the participants responded in a 
“desirable” way. While this is a common problem to any survey, the total 
anonymity of the participants hopefully prevented that from happening, 
or minimized it. 4) The quality of the data: The selection of this training 
was done very carefully to make sure that it focused on norms on mascu-
linity and sexuality, and not on violence itself, in order for the quasi-exper-
imental setting to provide valid data. MAVA’s training satisfied this re-
quirement. 
                                                 
29 Thirteen norms on masculinity: dominance over women; domination over 
subordinate and marginalized men; need for power over other men; emotional 
control; need for respect; need to provide for family; competitiveness; pursuit 
of status; self-reliance; primacy of work; virility; risk-taking; the use of violence 
as preferred means to settle conflicts. Seven types of violence: against women; 
between men; homophobic violence; violence to get respect and/or to re-estab-
lish honour; state violence against the own population; political violence; mili-
tary violence. 
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The data was put in a spreadsheet to get an overview of possible indi-
vidual changes. While all of the data have been analyzed, only seven of the 
survey’s 80 statements were chosen for this particular analysis, having the 
strongest theoretical links to the issue central to this study: relationships 
between patriarchal attitudes to masculinity and sexuality and various 
types of violence. These seven statements address domination over and 
violence against women; disdain towards and violence against homosexual 
men; and state/military/political violence.30  
The goal of the experiment was to investigate: 1) whether the answers 
to any of the seven statements changed from patriarchal to egalitarian after 
the training, 2) how these changes related to each other and 3) especially 
whether the changes in attitudes towards women and gay men could be 
related to changes in attitudes towards the state/military/political vio-
lence.  
In the short informal interviews with the participants conducted just 
before and during the training, all but three mentioned the high levels of 
rape and sexual assault in India as motivation to learn more about gender 
and masculinities. Three participants who did not bring this up as their 
motivation had not chosen to attend the training themselves but were sent 
by their professors. More than half of the participants cited the going away 
on a camp as a major motivation for participation as most had never been 
away from home and parents before. When asked if they would use their 
new knowledge when back from the training, all responded that they 
would talk to friends and family about it. Some responded that they 
wanted to organize events together with MAVA at their colleges. The ma-
jority of participants thus had similar levels of interest and motivation to 
learn about masculinities.  
                                                 
30 Questions on domination over women (“In general, men should control the 
women in their life”); violence against women (“A man has the right to correct 
or discipline female behaviour”); heteronormativity (“I would be furious if 
someone thought I was gay”); violence against homosexuals (“It is ok to beat 
up a gay person”); state violence against the own population (“Torture is an ac-
ceptable method to get valuable information in some cases”); political violence 
(“People of another political / ideological, caste, ethnic or religious affiliation 
deserve the violence they get”), and military violence/militarism (“a soldier is 
the archetype of a real man”) 
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4.7 Findings 
The answers of the three surveys and whether the ensuing changes in at-
titudes were supported by family and friends after the training are pre-
sented in Table 4.1. 
Table 4.1 
The answers to S1, S2 and S3 and levels of support per participant  
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1 2/5/5 5/5/2 2/4/5 5/5/5 1/2/2 5/5/5 2/4/4 n/a 
2 2/5/5 2/2/5 4/2/5 4/5/5 5/3/1 3/4/5 2/2/5 n/a 
3 2/5/1 4/5/3 5/1/4 5/5/2 4/5/1 5/5/2 3/5/3 n/a 
4 5/5/5 2/4/5 1/5/5 5/5/5 1/5/5 3/5/4 3/5/5 
Family 
yes. 
5 4/4/- 4/4/- 2/5/- 5/5/- 1/1/- 5/5/- 5/5/- n/a 
6 2/5/4 4/5/3 3/1/5 5/5/5 1/5/2 5/5/3 1/5/2 n/a 
7 5/5/5 5/5/5 3/5/5 5/5/5 5/5/1 5/5/5 4/5/5 Yes.31 
8 4/5/3 5/2/1 3/5/2 4/5/4 1/3/1 4/5/5 3/5/1 No. 
9 4/5/5 2/1/5 2/5/5 5/5/5 2/5/5 4/5/5 4/1/5 n/a 
10 1/5/5 5/5/5 3/5/5 5/5/5 4/5/5 5/5/5 5/5/5 
Family 
yes. 
11 3/5/- 1/4/- 1/5/- -/5/- 3/5/- 3/5/- 1/4/- n/a 
12 2/1/1 1/1/2 1/1/1 3/3/2 3/3/3 2/2/4 1/1/2 n/a 
13 5/5/1 1/1/1 1/1/1 5/5/1 5/5/1 5/1/5 5/5/5 n/a 
14 5/5/3 1/5/5 1/1/2 5/5/1 5/5/2 5/1/5 5/5/5 n/a 
15 3/1/- 2/1/- 1/1/- 5/5/- 2/5/- 4/5/- 4/4/- n/a 
16 4/1/- 2/5/- 1/2/- 5/5/- 4/3/- 4/5/- 1/5/- n/a 
17 5/5/5 2/3/2 2/5/3 5/5/5 2/2/3 4/5/5 4/5/2 n/a 
18 5/5/2 1/1/3 1/1/2 5/5/5 1/1/5 5/5/3 1/1/2 n/a 
19 5/5/- 5/5/- 1/5/- 5/5/- 5/5/- 5/5/- 1/4/- n/a 
20 3/3- 2/3/- 1/1/- 5/5/- 2/2/- 4/4/- 4/4/- n/a 
21 4/2/- 4/3/- 2/4/- 5/5/- 4/2/- 4/4/- 1/4/- n/a 
                                                 
31 ‘Yes’  here means support by both family and friends. 
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22 4/2/- 2/3/- 2/4/- 5/5/- 2/2/- 4/4/- 4/4/- n/a 
23 5/5/5 5/5/5 5/5/5 5/5/5 1/-/1 5/-/5 5/5/3 Yes. 
24 5/5/5 3/4/4 3/2/1 3/4/4 -/4/4 3/4/4 3/4/4 n/a 
25 4/5/4 2/5/2 3/4/3 5/5/4 2/2/2 5/5/5 1/5/1 Yes. 
 
4.7.1 Domination over and violence against women 
The first statement, ‘In general, men should control the women in their 
life’, got a varied response in S1. The change from S1 to S2 shows in-
creases in extreme positions, i.e. small number of participants taking more 
patriarchal attitude in S2 than in S1, i.e. agreeing more with the statement 
in S2 than they did in S1, although the change towards total rejection of 
patriarchal norms predominates32.  
The statement “A man has the right to correct or discipline female be-
havior” was taken as a proxy of male violence against women. Even 
though it does not explicitly mention violence it left open the possibility 
of various forms of disciplining that include violence (psychological, eco-
nomic, physical, etc.). This statement initially received more responses re-
flecting patriarchal attitudes than the statement on men dominating 
women.33 Nevertheless, the changes from S1 to S2 indicate a growing re-
jection of disciplining women, accompanying the shift towards more egal-
itarian norms in the statement on men’s domination over women. As 
Flood and Pease (2009) show, holding sexist and patriarchal norms and 
attitudes towards women is strongly associated with violence against 
women. Thus, it makes sense that a change in the attitudes to women re-
sults in a change in attitudes to ‘disciplining’ as a proxy for violence.  
The other changes on these two questions are worth mentioning. Three 
participants changed in a more patriarchal direction on the statement on 
discipline. These negative changes could be a result of a backlash, i.e. feel-
ing that their identity was under attack (Mackay, 2003), or that the method 
was not appropriate for these participants. Important here, however, is 
that the average changes of attitudes towards domination of women and 
violence against women from S1 to S2 did go in the direction of more 
                                                 
32 Overall the changes were in the egalitarian direction. The average response 
changed from 3,72 in S1 to 4,16 in S2, thus a change of 0,44. 
33 The average changed from 2,80 in S1 to 3,52 in S2, a change with 0,72. 
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egalitarian attitudes for the majority of participants. In other words, while 
it is important to research why after a gender training some participants 
hold even more patriarchal attitudes, the overall directions of change in 
attitudes towards gender equality and violence against women was the 
same. 
4.7.2 Heteronormativity and violence against homosexuals 
The second set of statements was related to disdain of and violence against 
homosexual men. The statement “I would be furious if someone thought 
I was gay” got more patriarchal responses than the statement on control-
ling women, both in S1 and S2 although it became slightly more egalitarian 
in S2. The change in average was rather high, from 2,24 in S1 to 3,16 in 
S2.  
Being thought of as gay was clearly perceived as much worse for the 
participants than not controlling women. The training changed these re-
sults even though it did not achieve the same level of egalitarian attitudes 
as the statements regarding women. The answers in S2 were divided to-
wards the top and bottom of the scale, with the six neutral answers from 
S1 disappearing. While more than half of the participants changed in a 
more egalitarian direction, four changed in a more patriarchal way. In S1 
three quarters of the participants held more patriarchal attitudes towards 
homosexuality than towards domination over women, and in S2 one third 
still did. To accept homosexuality was thus more difficult than accepting 
gender equality for the large majority of participants. This is in line with 
Connell’s (1995) work on hegemonic masculinities and the ways gay men 
disrupt the heteronormative gender order, as well as Vandello et al.’s 
(2008) argument that homosexual men are not seen as “real” men. 
The statement “It is ok to beat up a gay person” got a strong rejection 
already in S1: 20 of the 25 participants strongly disagreed; nobody gave an 
answer lower than 3, (“neutral”), with the average answer 4,7534, thus close 
to the maximum 5, meaning that it is never acceptable to beat up a gay 
person. In S2 only two participants answered lower than 5, leading to an 
average of 4,88. Nobody changed in a more violent direction. Only one 
respondent did not change, answering 3 both times. He also answered 
                                                 
34 One person did not answer this question in the S1 but did so in S2. 
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“very much agree” in both S1 and S2 on the statement on becoming furi-
ous if thought gay and on the statement on men’s right to correct or dis-
cipline female behavior, but moved in a more patriarchal direction on the 
statement on men dominating women. This person thus accepts patriar-
chal norms on women, homosexuals and violence against women, but has 
ambivalent attitudes towards violence against homosexuals.  
These results raise the question about relationship between homopho-
bia and violence against gay men. Clearly, the relationship is not straight 
forward, because despite the relatively high levels of homophobic attitudes 
expressed in acceptance of the first statement in S1, the same survey shows 
that there was also high rejection of violence against gay men. The atti-
tudes towards gender equality and violence against women were more 
aligned than the attitudes towards homosexuality. It could be that if the 
statement on disciplining women had been differently formulated, for in-
stance as “It is a husband’s right to beat up a woman”, we would have had 
a higher discrepancy there as well. I will return to this issue later.  
4.7.3 State and political violence  
As the training did not address issues of state violence nor violence inspired 
by political or ideological reasons the survey offered an exceptional op-
portunity to see whether there was any correlation between attitudes to 
those types of violence and attitudes to gender equality and heteronorma-
tivity. Presence of such correlations would be of highest importance for 
our understanding of the relations between gender, sexuality and violence. 
A relatively “mild” statement “Torture is an acceptable method to get 
valuable information in some cases” was selected as a proxy for state vio-
lence and had a varied response. The average response in S1 was a rather 
low levels of rejection, 2,75, while the S2 score increased to 3,63 indicating 
an increased rejection of torture, but with half of the participants still find-
ing torture acceptable.35 Two participants changed in a way more accepting 
of torture, though. These two respondents also changed to more patriar-
chal attitudes on the statement of men’s domination over women. Almost 
all of the fifteen participants who responded approvingly or neutrally to 
the statement of torture in S1 had responded in a patriarchal or neutral 
way on the statement of being furious if thought of as gay, and eleven of 
                                                 
35 One participant did not answer in S1 and another one in S2. 
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fifteen responded in a patriarchal or neutral way to the statement on men’s 
right to correct and discipline women. This suggests that people thinking 
that torture is acceptable are also more likely to adhere to patriarchal gen-
der and sexuality attitudes.  
Regarding political violence, not many people agreed with the state-
ment “People of another political / ideological, caste, ethnic or religious 
affiliation deserve the violence they get” in either S1 or S2. The already 
high level of rejection average increased from 4,24 to 4,33.36 One person 
who responded “agree” in both S1 and S2 also showed patriarchal atti-
tudes to gender and sexuality. While this person was very consistent in his 
replies, two others were more surprising. They fully rejected political vio-
lence in S1 but fully accepted it in S2. They had also answered approvingly 
on the statements about being furious if thought gay and having the right 
to correct and discipline women.  
The final statement addressing acceptance of military – “a soldier is the 
archetype of a real man”- got a very mixed response in S1 with answers 
averaging 2,92. In S2 the average increased to a high disapproving levels, 
to 4,08, thus providing a change of 1,16 – the biggest change of all the 
statements in the survey. This big change was quite remarkable as the top-
ics of soldiering, militarization and state violence were not discussed dur-
ing the training at all. In S2 one person changed in a more patriarchal di-
rection though, from “disagree” to “strongly agree”. He had changed in a 
patriarchal direction already on the statement on correcting and disciplin-
ing women. Three people didn’t change their patriarchal attitudes at all.  
Discussions about norms on masculinity during this training thus lead 
to changes in attitudes to various forms of violence, including the state 
violence and militarism. As noted, the issues of torture, political violence 
and soldiering had not been mentioned at all during the training, yet there 
was a significant change in attitudes towards rejecting torture and disap-
proving that soldiers are as the model of “real” men, after the training. 
This is hugely significant result, in line with the overall assumptions of this 
research about the links between gender, sexuality and violence. Durie-
smith (2017) argued that patriarchal norms on masculinity are one of the 
causes of armed conflict and that changing these norms would have an 
                                                 
36 One participant did not respond in S2. 
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impact on state level violence. While the causes cannot be confirmed, the 
survey results certainly point to the very close links.  
Figure 4.1 
Difference in average number of patriarchal and violence approving atti-
tudes among those answering 1 or 5 
 
 
Figure 4.1 shows how many patriarchal and violence approving attitudes 
were held by people who answered at the two extremes of the scale (1= 
strongly agree, 5 = strongly disagree). We can see that those who re-
sponded “strongly agree” to the statements supporting patriarchal norms 
on gender, sexuality and violence had consistently responded in similar 
manner on more than one statement. Those who held egalitarian or vio-
lence disapproving attitudes to one statement were less likely to hold pa-
triarchal or violence approving attitudes to other statements. In S2, after 
the training, the number of patriarchal responses by those participants 
who had egalitarian answers on some statement decreased in all seven 
cases, regardless of whether it was a statement on gender, sexuality or vi-
olence, thus lowering the overall acceptance of patriarchal norms. These 
results correspond with the findings that levels of acceptance of gender 
equality and of homosexuality (as indicators of levels of patriarchal norms 
and attitudes) relate to levels of various types of violence, including state 
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violence, ideological violence and militarization (Ekvall, 2013; Hudson et 
al., 2012; Hutchings, 2008).  
Multiple studies in the field of masculinities state that one important 
patriarchal norm is that violence is the best way to settle a dispute, to gain 
or regain respect, and to keep dominant structures of hegemonic mascu-
linity in place (Connell, 2002; Fleming et al, 2015; Kimmel, 2008; Reeser, 
2010). Given the arguments elaborated in the introduction - that norms in 
general are related to structural and institutional arrangements as well as 
collective and individual identities, believes and expectations - it is reason-
able to assume that attitudes accepting such patriarchal norms on violence 
are related to attitudes towards other spheres of life as well. This study has 
shown that in this controlled setting, changes in attitudes towards gender 
equality and homosexuality – i.e. the main focus of the training - in most 
cases were directly related to changes in attitudes to various types of vio-
lence, and that the direction of post-training change – in both sets of atti-
tudes - is mostly towards egalitarianism and non-violence. While this is a 
very valuable insight, this study, nevertheless, also showed some surprising 
results needing further reflections and research. 
4.8 Sustainability of changes 
The last survey, S3, which took place six months after the training and 
involved 17 of the original 25 participants, was conducted in order to test 
the sustainability of the changes, and whether change in some attitudes 
was more sustainable than in others. Nine of the 17 respondents had either 
not changed at all or changed slightly in a patriarchal direction from S2 to 
S3. The remaining eight participants had changed in a patriarchal direction 
on three to six statements compared to S2. The changes of these eight 
participants in patriarchal direction from S1 to S2, occurred in all state-
ments, with no overrepresentation of attitudes to a particular type of 
norm. There thus seems to be no difference in sustainability of changes 
between different types of norms and attitudes. It is rather that the 
changes found in some individuals are more sustainable than in the case 
of others.  
While the results show that, in this particular group of young men, at-
titudes towards gender and sexuality and attitudes towards violence are 
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related, the research also brings up important questions on how the indi-
vidual is linked to the social, and what the conditionalities and contingen-
cies of change are.  
I contacted all participants at the time of S3 but only six of them agreed 
to be interviewed at the time. Though very small, the sample of interviews 
still suggests some factors influencing sustainability. When asked if they 
had been supported by family and friends after the training, three of the 
interviewees answered that they had received positive reactions from both 
family and friends, two said that they had received positive reaction from 
the family but been laughed at by friends, and one said that he had had 
negative reactions both from family and friends. Four of those reporting 
positive reactions had very egalitarian scores and no or few changes from 
S2 to S3. One respondent without support had moved back to a patriar-
chal attitude on six statements out of seven. One person had received pos-
itive reactions from family and friends and still reverted back to more pa-
triarchal and violence-approving norms in five out of seven statements. 
Interestingly, this respondent was very positive towards gender equality 
and the training during the interview, telling how he had tried to transmit 
egalitarian attitudes both at home and at school with, according to him, 
positive reactions. For the moment I have no explanation for this.  
The sustainability of the changes in five out of six cases thus seemed 
to relate to what reaction participants got from family and friends. This 
corresponds to Risse and Sikkink’s (1999) statement that people follow 
norms dominant in their surrounding because they want others to think 
well of them and to think well of themselves; the ability to think well about 
ourselves being influenced by the norms of the people and society around 
us. In this case having positive reactions and support from the family 
seemed crucial and even seemed to carry more weight than the reactions 
from peers for one of the participants.  
The weight carried by the influence of different groups and institutions 
such as family, peers, school and media is most probably different in dif-
ferent societies. Kimmel (2008) describes a different setting in the US 
where peer influence carries a heavy weight in forming young men’s norms 
and attitudes to masculinity and violence. This brings us back to the ques-
tion of method. Gender trainings for individuals, the current favorite tool 
by the international community (Lyytikäinen, 2007), is clearly not suffi-
cient in itself to change patriarchal norms and attitudes on gender and 
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violence on a large scale and in a sustainable way. While this is not a sur-
prise to many feminist scholars (it would be more surprising if such fun-
damental changes in society could take place through such relatively small 
and easy interventions), it seems this message still needs to be highlighted 
even though the effectiveness of gender trainings was not the topic of this 
study. As argued by Mackay (2003) and Pease and Flood (2008) attitude 
change should be part of a larger project challenging and changing familial, 
organizational, community and wider patriarchal societal norms support-
ing gendered power relations, including the use of violence.  
4.9 Puzzles and Ambiguities 
Besides confirming some of the assumptions, the survey also offered some 
ambiguous results and puzzles. Among them is the surprising rejection of 
violence against gay men – considerably higher than rejection of violence 
against women. This result is difficult to understand given the negative 
attitudes towards male homosexuality and the high levels of violence 
against homosexuals in parts of the world where intolerance of homosex-
uality also is high (Planet Romeo, 2015). What could be the reasons for 
this result? First, the statement on beating up gay men is very direct (com-
pared to the statement on “disciplining” and “correcting” women) and it 
is possible that a less direct statement would have yielded different an-
swers. It is also possible that a combination of such a direct question and 
political correctness influenced the answers. Then, as Fleming et al. (2015) 
argue, men perpetrate violence to gain, maintain, or avoid losing status 
and power. Is it possible that gay men can be despised without being con-
sidered a threat to the other man’s status and power so that there is no 
status to gain from beating them up? To fully understand this result further 
research is needed. 
Another puzzle is the direction of change towards patriarchal attitudes 
after the training. While a majority of the participants changed their atti-
tudes in an egalitarian direction and non-approving of violence during the 
training, some did not change at all and some changed in a patriarchal 
direction. However, only two of the twelve individuals who had a change 
in a more patriarchal direction on one or two statements ended up having 
their average change turn more patriarchal. The other ten compensated 
for their change to patriarchal attitudes in one statement by having 
changes towards egalitarian attitudes on other statements. While non-
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change can be explained by strong beliefs and values that the training failed 
to challenge, change in a more patriarchal direction is harder to explain. It 
could be that the training method provoked backlash in some individuals 
as proposed by Mackay (2003). Backlashes after violence prevention pro-
grams have been documented before (Edwards and Hinsz, 2014) making 
it imperative to further scrutinize and develop gender training methods.  
Finally, demographic variables did not influence the attitudes in any 
significant way. The background information of the 25 participants was 
contrasted to the seven statements, but no statistically relevant patterns 
were found. It is important to note that the purpose of the study was to 
see whether and how attitudes to patriarchal gender norms and attitudes 
to violence are related, not to see how attitudes are linked to the social 
background of the participants. However, the absence of any correlation 
is at odds with the expectation that the participants with less educated 
parents; with mothers who had their first child before the age of 18; those 
afraid of (ethnic, religious or ideological) others; were from households 
where only girls did household duties and who were more religious, would 
have a more patriarchal outlook on life (Contreras and Plaza, 2010; 
Klingorová and Havlíèek, 2015; Ridgeway, 2011). The survey results 
showed that it didn’t matter what social background the participants had 
when it came to what types of attitudes they held. While this is probably 
due to the very small sample size, the result also goes against stereotypes 
of upper-class, well-educated people being more liberal and progressive 
than low-educated, lower classes. This is important as social change pro-
grams are often based on the assumption that this difference exists be-
tween the classes, mostly targeting the lower classes while ignoring the 
middle and upper classes37. While different methods probably are needed 
for programs targeting people with different levels of education and other 
social differences, the need for such programs seems equally distributed 
in society.  
                                                 
37 A lot of interventions, especially against gender-based violence, are “commu-
nity based” within poorer communities; see for instance http://healthpolicy-
project.com/pubs/382_GenderBasedViolence.pdf.  
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4.10 Conclusion 
This study is limited in scope as it only shows us the changes in attitudes 
in a particular setting with a particular group of young, male college stu-
dents. Nevertheless, it still furthers our understanding of attitudes to dif-
ferent types of violence, and in particular the links between patriarchal 
attitudes to gender and homosexuality and attitudes to interpersonal, col-
lective and state violence. Further research can test whether these links 
and the changes established in this experiment can be confirmed else-
where. Even without the confirmation, this research offers some im-
portant insights. Inter-personal, collective and state violence involve high 
human and financial costs and preoccupy policy makers and civil society 
actors around the globe. This study thus provides new insights into the 
possible links between various types of gender, sexuality and various types 
of violence, which might be relevant for social engagements. Thus it con-
tributes not only to theory building but also to the practices of activists, 
practitioners and policy makers working on gender equality and violence 
prevention. Working with men to change norms and attitudes on gender, 
sexuality and violence seems crucial. However, the question of what kind 
of work and what conditions yield the most sustainable results remains.  
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5 Conclusion 
 
 
5.1 Initial questions, assumptions, studies and results 
This thesis is born out of observations from the field where, in various 
post-conflict and conflict settings, during more than ten years of develop-
ment work, I could not help but wonder why it seemed that the more 
gender inequality there was in a society, the more violence there also was, 
and not only violence against women, but violence of all kinds, including 
armed conflict. This led me to want to do a PhD in order to investigate 
how gender and sexuality inequalities, including violence against and op-
pression of women and homosexuals, are related to various other forms 
of violence, and specifically to violent conflict. Following an assumption 
that patriarchal norms on gender and sexuality, and attitudes towards 
them, are inter-related with support of violence, I wondered if gender 
equality and acceptance of homosexuality would change this. Previous re-
search had established that the level of gender inequality was the best predic-
tor of armed conflict within a society, better than earlier explanatory vari-
ables such as democracy levels, economic development and presence / 
absence of Islam (Hudson et al., 2012). Other scholars had also established 
links between different aspects of gender inequality and violence against 
women as well as other types of violence, making the correlation robust. 
But where did this correlation come from? Many scholars working on the 
topic had hypothesized that underlying norms and attitudes towards gen-
der (in)equality were linked to norms and attitudes towards the use of vi-
olence, as both gender norms and norms on violence are influenced by 
patriarchal norms. I thus decided to see if and how patriarchal norms and 
attitudes to gender and sexuality were related to different types of violence. 
This led me to three specific sub-questions that were dealt with in the three 
articles above. 
The first question, in the article “Gender Equality, Attitudes to Gender 
Equality, and Conflict”, was whether the findings from earlier research, 
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i.e. a strong correlation between levels of gender inequality and levels of vio-
lence, could be reproduced using different data sets than the previous 
studies. The underlying idea was that re-confirming this correlation with 
different data sets would strengthen the current findings and inspire fur-
ther research. I used the Global Gender Gap Index (GGGI) (Ricardo  
Hausmann, Tyson and Zahidi, 2011; World Economic Forum, 2014b) in-
stead of the WomanStat Database (WomanStats Project, 2012) to measure 
levels of gender inequality. And I relied on the Uppsala Conflict Data Base 
(UCDB) (Pettersson and Wallensteen, 2015) to control for armed conflict. 
The correlation turned out to be strong and statistically significant. I then 
analyzed the aggregated Global Peace Index (GPI) (Institute for Econom-
ics & Peace, 2014) together with the GGGI in order to specify general 
levels of violence, including armed conflict. The results showed that high 
levels of gender equality were positively correlated with low levels of gen-
eral levels of violence. However, as this study only analyses the aggregated 
GPI, it left unanswered question about the relationship between gender 
equality and specific types of violence, besides armed conflict. 
The outcome of this first analysis lead to my second question, dealt 
with in the same article, namely if attitudes to gender (in)equality were cor-
related to a) levels of gender (in)equality and b) levels of violence. Thus I was 
not relating (only) the actual levels of (in)equality with levels of violence, but 
rather attitudes to (in)equality with levels of violence.  
I used the World Values Survey (WVS) (World Values Survey 
Association, 2015) to get data on attitudes to gender equality and contin-
ued to use the GGGI, the UCDB and the GPI. The results showed strong 
and significant correlations first of all between levels of gender equality and 
attitudes to gender equality. The more positive the attitudes, the higher the 
levels of gender equality were in the countries. Furthermore, attitudes to 
gender equality were also strongly and significantly correlated to existence 
of armed conflicts (UCDB) and general levels of violence (GPI). This 
means that the more positive attitudes to gender equality were in a coun-
try, the less armed conflict and lower general levels of violence there were. 
As this study relied on data sets that were constituted fairly recently no 
analysis across time could be conducted. We thus do not know if an in-
crease in levels of gender equality leads to an increase in attitudes approv-
ing of gender equality, vice versa or both. 
These results, in combination with theoretical discussions on gender 
and violence set out in the first article, made it seem very plausible that 
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not only actual levels of gender equality, but also attitudes towards and 
norms on gender equality go hand in hand with levels of several different 
types of violence. In particular it seemed that attitudes to patriarchal 
norms on gender - especially on masculinities – were related to levels of 
violence. In fact it seemed like patriarchal norms were the underlying 
causes of both gender inequality and various forms of violence. However, 
the literature had made it very clear that patriarchal norms not only con-
cern gender and violence but also sexuality. Heteronormativity and hom-
ophobia are an important part of patriarchal and hegemonic norms on 
masculinity, which have become an important theme in conflict studies 
quite recently. But there is still a long way to go for them to become a 
common theme in the research on various forms of violence, save for in-
ter-personal violence against gay men. This missing link inspired the sec-
ond article and its question.  
The second article, “Don’t be Gay: Homophobia, Violence and Con-
flict”, dealt with the question: are intolerant attitudes to homosexuality 
linked to levels of violence in the same way as intolerance of gender ine-
quality is? The data on intolerance of homosexuality came from the World 
Values Survey (WVS), the Gay Happiness Index (GHI) (Planet Romeo, 
2015) and included the data on violence against homosexuals (Carroll and 
Itaborahy, 2015). The data on other types of violence again came from the 
GPI and the UCDB. The control variables included gender equality levels 
(GGGI); socio-economic inequality levels using the GINI index (World 
Bank, 2014b); GDP/capita (World Bank, 2014a); democracy levels using 
the Democracy Index, (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2014); and the 
inequality adjusted Human Development Index (HDI) (United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP), 2015).  
The first analysis looked at attitudes to homosexuality and levels of vio-
lence, using the WVS and the GPI. It found that attitudes to homosexu-
ality are strongly related to levels of general violence (aggregated GPI), 
meaning that societies with high intolerance of homosexuality tend to have 
higher levels of violence in general and vice versa. The second result is 
that when many people think that homosexuality is always justified there 
are low levels of violent crime and people perceive the level of criminality 
in their society to be low. When many people think that homosexuality is 
never justified there are high levels of violent crime and people perceive 
the level of criminality to be high. The third result is that attitudes to ho-
mosexuality are correlated to levels of specific forms of societal violence, 
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namely access to weapons and political instability. Acceptance and some-
times even just neutral attitudes towards homosexuality are associated with 
lower levels of political instability and low access to weapons, while high 
levels of intolerance of homosexuality go hand in hand with high levels of 
political instability and high access to weapons. The fourth result is that 
attitudes to homosexuality are correlated to militarization, levels of mili-
tary expenditure to be precise. Countries with high intolerance of homo-
sexuality spend a larger percentage of their GDP on their military than 
countries with neutral and accepting attitudes to homosexuality. 
These results were expected as they fall within specific theoretical dis-
cussions that rest on the conceptualization of hegemonic masculinity as 
heteronormative and homophobic, and as constructed through images of 
physical strength, wherein soldiering and military stand as specific positive 
symbols of “proper manhood”. Thus it is reasonable to assume that the 
less militarized a society is, the more scope there will be for non-hege-
monic masculinities, including non-heteronormative, non-militarized and 
non-violent masculinities. Thus it is not surprising that high social ac-
ceptance of homosexuality goes hand in hand with lower militarization 
and lower social (and inter-personal) violence. Other results were not ex-
pected. Although violent crime was correlated to attitudes to homosexu-
ality, homicide was not despite it being a type of violent crime. Nor was 
the number of security officers, police, incarceration rates and weapons 
import.  
The big surprise however was that a high level of acceptance of homo-
sexuality is correlated to high levels of weapons export and vice versa. The 
highest acceptance of homosexuality, according to the data sets, is regis-
tered in most developed countries, and these are also the countries that 
are the biggest exporters of weapons. This finding, along a few others that 
will be addressed below, bring up some troubling questions and indicate 
directions for further research, that I will address later.  
Equally surprising was the fact that attitudes to homosexuality were 
only slightly linked to armed conflict, both internal and external. The only 
variables related to armed conflict that were correlated to attitudes to ho-
mosexuality were the intensity of internal conflict and neighboring coun-
tries relations, where intolerance of homosexuality was correlated to high 
intensity of internal conflicts and poor neighboring countries relations and 
acceptance of homosexuality with low intensity and good relations. As 
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previous research had found strong correlations between gender inequal-
ity and presence/absence of armed conflict, and as gender inequality and 
low acceptance of homosexuality tend to go hand in hand, this was indeed 
a puzzling finding.  
These unexpected findings prompted a second analysis, further looking 
into the relationship between armed conflict and intolerance of homosex-
uality. This time I looked at different data sets, focusing on the UCDB 
and, in order to nuance the simple question of “presence/absence” of 
armed conflict (that is used in previous data sets), I divided all countries 
in the world in three groups: countries with armed conflict on their own 
territory; countries participating in armed conflict on other countries’ ter-
ritories, and countries not participating in any armed conflict at all. Atti-
tudes to homosexuality were measured using data on LGBT legislations 
(SSH); public behavior against homosexuals (GHI); physical assault 
against homosexuals (GHI), and intolerant attitudes toward homosexuals 
(WVS). In this analysis several control variables were used: attitudes to-
ward gender equality (WVS); levels of gender equality (GGGI); levels of 
socio-economic inequality (GINI); GDP / capita; the inequality adjusted 
HDI; democracy levels (DI), and general levels of violence (GPI). The 
results showed that the relationship between attitudes to homosexuality 
and violent conflict is more complex than previous data indicated. The 
new analysis showed that the countries with armed conflict on their own 
territory are among the most intolerant when it comes to homosexuality. 
These countries are also among the least gender equal; the most unequal; 
the poorest; with the lowest levels of human development and democra-
tization as well as the highest levels of violence. The countries sending 
troops to fight on other countries’ territories are among the most accept-
ing of homosexuality; among those having the highest levels of gender 
equality; are also among the least unequal; the richest; with the highest 
levels of human development and democratization and the lowest levels 
of violence. The countries not participating in any armed conflict had a 
median score in-between these first two categories. Noteworthy is that 
countries that did not participate in any armed conflict still had higher 
median levels of general violence in their own societies according to the 
GPI (where armed conflict is taken into account) than the countries send-
ing troops to other countries. This means that those who send troops 
abroad have very low levels of violence at home.  
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 These findings fit with the theorization on the liberal/democratic 
peace, suggesting that liberal democracies – which are not just among the 
most developed and richest, but also among the most accepting of homo-
sexuality and gender equality - are the least likely to experience internal 
conflict and do not wage war on each other, but do tend to get involved 
in armed conflict with non-democracies. This finding has opened a whole 
new set of questions that I will come to later. 
A third analysis, using control variables, showed that the level of human 
development (HDI) is even more strongly correlated to armed conflict 
than the level of democratization. This led to conducting a fourth analysis 
in order to see if human development and acceptance of homosexuality, 
using violence against gay men as indicator, moderate each other in their 
influence on violence. The answer is yes: when violence against gay men 
increases it reduces the positive influence human development has on lev-
els of violence as measured by the GPI; when human development de-
creases (a higher HDI score thus as it is reversed) it not only increases 
levels of violence on its own accord: it also enhances the negative effect 
that violence against gay men has on other forms of violence, thus further 
increasing levels of violence. This was the case for seven sub-categories of 
violence in the GPI: perception of criminality; incarceration rates; access 
to weapons; violent demonstrations; political instability; political terror, 
and neighboring countries relations. Why it was not the case for the other 
sub-categories such as homicide, internal conflicts fought or external con-
flicts fought needs further research. For one GPI sub-category, terrorism 
impact, human development and patriarchal attitudes seemed to have an 
opposite moderating influence than for the other sub-categories, namely 
leading to higher terrorism impact when human development is high and 
violence against gay men is low. The possible reasons for this will be dis-
cussed below.  
Since attitudes to gender equality and to homosexuality are found to 
play a role in levels of violence the fourth question was if and how the 
attitudes to gender equality and homosexuality are related to attitudes to 
violence. They way to investigate this was to see if changes to these atti-
tudes co-varied: if there are changes in one set of attitudes will there be 
changes in the other sets too? Can a change in attitudes to norms on gen-
der and homosexuality, from patriarchal to egalitarian, be related to a 
change in attitudes to violence, from accepting and approving to less so? 
Since causes of changes in attitudes are almost impossible to isolate in 
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society due to the multitude of influences that can be found in a society, a 
gender training for young men in India was used as a quasi-experiment, 
for an exploratory study. The study is described in the third article, “Young 
Men and Gender Trainings: What Happens to Attitudes to Violence when 
Attitudes to Patriarchal Norms on Masculinity Change?”  
The first result of this study is that when attitudes to men’s domination 
over women change, becoming less patriarchal and more egalitarian, the 
attitudes to violence against women changed as well for most of the par-
ticipants, becoming less accepting. The second result is that being thought 
of as gay was perceived as much worse for the participants than not being 
able to control women. But a change in attitudes towards homosexuals, 
from more patriarchal to more egalitarian, did not lead to a big change in 
attitudes to violence against homosexuals, mainly because most of the par-
ticipants fully rejected violence against homosexuals already before the 
training. The third result is that, despite the fact that this training on gen-
der and patriarchal norms did not cover societal and state-level violence in 
any way, attitudes to these types of violence became less accepting after 
the training. This was true for the acceptance of torture; thinking that peo-
ple of another political / ideological, caste, ethnic or religious affiliation 
“deserve the violence they get”; and the idea that a soldier is the archetype 
of a “real man”. The fourth finding is that those participants who held 
very patriarchal attitudes to one of the seven statements in the survey had 
responded in a similar manner to more than one statement. Those who 
held egalitarian or violence disapproving attitudes to one statement were 
less likely to hold patriarchal or violence approving attitudes to other state-
ments. After the training the same pattern was to be found although with 
fewer participants holding very patriarchal and violence approving atti-
tudes and more participants finding themselves at the other end of the 
spectrum, with egalitarian and violence disapproving attitudes. However, 
while most participants changed their attitudes in a more egalitarian and 
violence disapproving way after the training some did not change at all 
and a few even changed in a (more) patriarchal and violence approving 
direction.  
A question that rose after these findings was if the changes were sus-
tainable and if changes in attitudes to some norms were more sustainable 
than changes in attitudes to other norms. Six months after the training a 
last survey was done showing that some of the participants had sustained 
their changes in attitudes while others had completely reverted to their 
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pre-training attitudes. There was no difference in sustainability of changes 
between different types of norms and attitudes (i.e. those towards gender 
equality, homosexuality or violence). It is rather that the changes in one 
individual are more sustainable than in another. Interviews with some of 
the participants suggest that external factors might have influenced the 
level of sustainability of changes. Most of the participants who sustained 
their changes said that their family and friends had reacted positively to 
their changes, while those reverting to their pre-training attitudes mostly 
indicated they had had negative reactions from family and friends. Since 
only a few of the participants agreed to meet for an interview at the time 
this evidence is but anecdotal. Nevertheless it offers us a suggestion of the 
mechanisms needed to engineer large scales changes in social norms.   
These three studies have shown in multiple ways that patriarchal norms 
on gender and sexuality are correlated to both levels of and attitudes toward 
violence of different kinds, including violent conflict. The implications of 
these findings will now be discussed.  
5.2 What does it all mean? The implications of the findings: 
theory, policy and practice 
5.2.1 Theoretical implications 
The analyses in the first article confirmed the hypothesis based on pre-
vious research that levels of gender inequality are related to many types of 
violence, including armed conflict and violence against women. Enloe 
(1987, 1993, 2007) has long made the link between patriarchal gender 
norms and militarism. Others have worked on the issue on gender and 
armed conflict, with perhaps the strongest finding made by Hudson et al. 
in 2012, showing that levels of gender equality, measured in women’s 
physical insecurity, unequal family law and polygyny, are the strongest pre-
dictors of internal armed conflict, stronger than mainstream IR explana-
tions such as democratization and GDP per capita. On an interpersonal 
level much work has been done linking gender inequality with violence 
against women, for instance by Flood and Pease (2009). The findings from 
my studies strongly confirm and strengthen these earlier findings on the 
links between gender inequality and violence against women, and between 
gender inequality and armed conflict and militarism. This means that we 
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have strong reasons to base future research and theorizing on these rela-
tionships. 
The first new contribution of my research to the existing body of 
knowledge in the field of gender is that attitudes to gender equality are 
strongly correlated to levels of gender equality. While the literature has sug-
gested this link for a long time (Connell and Messerschmidt, 2005), and it 
might seem obvious at a first glance, it had actually not been tested before 
the way I tested it here. The next new finding is that not only levels of 
gender equality are correlated to levels of violence, as shown in previous 
research and reconfirmed by me, but that attitudes to gender equality also are 
correlated to levels of violence. In countries where the population has positive 
attitudes toward gender equality the levels of violence are lower than in 
countries where the population has negative attitudes toward gender 
equality. And this concerns not only armed conflict but all other types of 
violence. Previous research had focused on interpersonal violence, mainly 
violence against women and gay men, and on armed conflict. My study 
found that both levels of gender equality and attitudes to gender equality 
were correlated to many more types of social and political violence, meas-
ured through the Global Peace Index. Furthermore, my finding that peo-
ple thinking torture is acceptable are likely to accept patriarchal gender and 
sexuality norms is strengthening Melander ’s (2005) arguments that high 
levels of political gender equality (percentage of women in parliament) 
leads to less human rights abuse at home. That not only levels of gender 
equality but also attitudes to gender equality and heteronormativity are cor-
related to human rights abuse, of which torture is an example, strengthen 
and revive this rather forgotten finding of Melander. This in turn strength-
ens and broadens feminist theorization around patriarchal norms on gen-
der, sexuality and violence.  
While correlation does not equal causation, this research strongly calls 
for a look at gender inequality and the underlying patriarchal norms and 
attitudes towards it, when investigating causes of violence. The third study 
specifically focuses on how attitudes to norms on gender equality, homo-
sexuality and violence are related to each other and how change in these 
attitudes might co-vary, using a gender training for young Indian men as a 
quasi-experimental way to investigate this question,.  
The finding that a change in attitudes to gender norms also can change 
attitudes to militarization, and this to a rather large extent, exemplifies one 
of the possible direction of causality and has huge theoretical implications. 
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It is not only in line with earlier research on gender inequality and milita-
rization by Enloe. It also strengthens Duriesmith’s (2017) findings from 
studies in Sierra Leone and Sudan that patriarchal norms on masculinity 
can be causal in relation to armed conflict and that changing these norms 
would have an impact on state level violence. Secondly, this finding 
strengthens the arguments of Nayak and Suchland (2006) that the hege-
monic projects of states are constituted through gender violence. They 
define gender violence as “the acts and practices that systematically target 
a person, group or community in order to dictate what “men” and 
“women” are supposed to be and to discipline marginalized communities 
or any other perceived threats to dominant political structures and prac-
tices” (Nayak and Suchland, 2006, p. 469). Nayak and Suchland under-
stand hegemonic projects to be constituted through systematic power hi-
erarchies and exclusions. The findings of my studies suggest that in states 
where a large number of people oppose gender equality it would be easier 
to create power relationships that privilege certain ways of knowing, being 
and acting that give voice to only certain people’s experiences and agendas 
(divided by ethnic, religious etc fault-lines), than in states where many peo-
ple are in favor of gender equality. The hegemonic projects of states in-
clude nationalism, militarism and globalization which feed on and “pro-
vide continuity to the principle of patriarchy and privilege, especially 
during times of threat and conflict” (Chenoy, 2004, p. 27). This kind of 
politics has a structural impact on society because it is dependent on tra-
ditional gender roles and “places people in binary categories like ‘with us’ 
or ‘against us’, ‘civilized’ and ‘uncivilized’, ‘warriors’ or ‘weaklings’. The 
militarist discourse marginalizes opposition, diversity and difference, and 
with this the value of force as part of power is privileged, and militant 
nationalism exaggerated” (Chenoy, 2004, p. 27). With this in mind, the 
findings showing that when attitudes to gender equality became more egal-
itarian attitudes to the military can become less accepting, suggests that 
gender equality can also influence and reduce acceptance of the militariza-
tion of daily life, for instance when “states promote and develop military 
apparatuses as the solution for stability, security and development” (Nayak 
and Suchland, 2006, p. 471). More people approving of gender equality 
and less people thinking that an ideal of a  “real man” is a soldier, thus, 
affects how gender is used to legitimize the operations of hegemonic pro-
jects, for instance the use of “gendered conceptions” of protecting women 
and children (at home and abroad) to “promote military operations or the 
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gender hierarchy that grounds, enables or cements the separation of public 
and private spheres” (Peterson and Runyan, 1998 in Nayak and Suchland, 
2006, p. 471). Attitudes to gender and especially masculinity, thinking – or 
not - that a prototype of the “real man” is a soldier, always imagined as 
heterosexual, are linked to approval of military activities. International se-
curity then cannot be understood without thinking about gender and sex-
uality, and the many ways they influence behavior, access, opportunities 
and power relations.  
The finding  from the third study - that the students considered that 
being thought of as gay was worse than not being able to control the 
women in their lives - is in line with some masculinities studies theories, 
where homosexual masculinities are perceived to be the lowest on the hi-
erarchical ladder of masculinities (Connell, 1995; Kimmel, 2008). This 
finding, while not being new, still strengthens the need to look at gender 
equality and heteronormativity together and to incorporate heteronorma-
tivity and homophobia in feminist theorizing to a much larger extent when 
analyzing a variety of power relations, as it would help highlighting the 
complexities of the social dynamics.  
Linking attitudes to homosexuality as well as violence against gay men 
to a variety of types of violence, including armed conflict, through the use 
of the large data sets, is an important innovative aspect of this research 
that has yielded some valuable, albeit mixed, findings. First of all, different 
data sets produce different result, indicating the need for understanding 
epistemological limitations of large data sets. But next to this, it is clear 
that some correlations are there, even if, for the time being, we cannot 
explain them. So, for example, attitudes to homosexuality analyzed in the 
second study correlate to the aggregated Global Peace Index in a similar 
way as attitudes to gender equality analyzed in the first study. This indi-
cates that there is a close relationship between patriarchal norms on gen-
der and patriarchal norms on sexuality. However, the first study on atti-
tudes to gender equality only uses the aggregated GPI while the second 
study on attitudes to homosexuality looks at both the aggregate value of 
GPI and the 23 sub-categories of the GPI. It is therefore impossible to 
compare the exact relationships between attitudes to gender equality and 
attitudes to homosexuality. In addition, the analysis using the GPI and its 
sub-categories as dependent variable did not show a correlation between 
attitudes to homosexuality and armed conflict, while the analysis using the 
UCDB clearly did so. All of this point to the issues around how indicators 
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are defined and weighted in the big data sets, which will be discussed fur-
ther down.  
Despite all of this, my studies clearly show that societies with high lev-
els of intolerance of homosexuality tend to have higher levels of many 
types of violence (not only violence against gay men!) while societies with 
low levels of intolerance of homosexuality tend to have low levels of the 
same types of violence. Again, while correlation does not mean causation, 
it does show a need to look at levels of (non)acceptance of homosexuality 
when investigating various types of violence. In addition, these findings 
point to the necessity of analyzing violent conflict through the prism of 
the concept of heteronormativity. While the results here are mixed, as 
some variables seem to be correlated while others not, those that are send 
us a strong signal that there is a relation worth analyzing. Much more re-
search is needed however in order to understand links between specific 
types of violence and attitudes towards male homosexuality, as well as het-
eronormativity in general.    
The finding that the countries with the lowest levels of tolerance of 
homosexuality and gender equality are also the poorest, the least demo-
cratic, with the lowest levels of human development and those that have 
armed conflict on their own territory, is in line with the findings of other 
scholars. However, the finding that it is the countries with the highest lev-
els of tolerance of homosexuality and gender equality, the richest, the most 
democratic and with the highest levels of human development who send 
troops to fight on other countries’ territories, thus exporting violence, led 
to more questions than answers. I already noted that this finding is in line 
with the literature on liberal/democratic peace (Hegre, 2014) showing that 
democracies don’t wage war on each other while still entering military con-
flicts with non-democracies. Nevertheless, this finding adds important di-
mensions to understanding how the liberal/democratic peace is concep-
tualized. Gender has clearly become one of the indicators of peace, 
democracy and progress of countries around the world – as the data sets 
I used in this research show. Gender equality has become a by-word of 
democracy and human rights. And, not surprisingly, gender issues have 
been called upon to justify international military interventions, from the 
war in Iraq to the fight against ISIS. But it is a troubling finding that liberal 
democracies uphold gender equality and acceptance of homosexuality at 
home, while sending weapons and troops abroad. In order to understand 
these findings better we need to look more closely at liberal democracies 
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and their – heavily intertwined – socio-political and economic order. First 
of all, today’s liberal democracies developed very much because of colo-
nialism and the exploitation of others (Jahn, 1999). The use of force or 
coercive power is thus inherent in liberalism and has played a role in cre-
ating the problems to which they supposedly offer solutions (Jahn, 2012a). 
The dominant belief among (Western) liberal democracies is that non-lib-
eral countries have to become liberal market democracies in order for them 
to ensure the values of equality and human rights seen as core values 
among liberals (Jahn, 2012a_; 2018). The fact that liberal states go to war 
with non-liberal states is thus seen as being due to the backwardness and 
resistance of states in which people “are forced to live in unrepresentative 
political systems” (Fukuyama, 1989, p.15). It is also argued that the “po-
litical survival of liberal democracies, precisely because they have become 
democracies, requires the constant reproduction of the economic founda-
tions of that regime – that is, of economic growth and benefits to its own 
population – liberal democracies cannot help but engage in international 
power politics with the aim to shape the international economic and po-
litical order in their favor.” (Jahn, 2012b, p. 704). Such power politics then 
includes the use of force.  
One can therefore say that for liberal democracies the goal – a liberal 
world order (presumably including human rights and equality for all, thus 
including gender equality and acceptance of non-heteronormative sexual-
ities) justifies the means to attain it. While one can argue at length that a 
liberal world order would not provide equality for all (Jahn, 2012a) the 
current world order is changing and many liberal states become less and 
less so with protectionism and anti-multilateralism on the rise (Jahn, 2018) 
with wide-ranging consequences for foreign policy. Not all military inter-
ventions abroad are overtly labeled invasions or war waging. What has 
been labeled “humanitarian interventions” counts for many countries’ 
sending of troops abroad. The term humanitarian intervention provides 
legitimacy for interventions that until recently would have been seen as 
illegal, because the liberal world order is supposed to respect the sover-
eignty and the right of non-intervention. It can thus be used to hide the 
political nature of these interventions and also to hinder the search for 
solutions to concrete “humanitarian” problems by delegitimizing potential 
political solutions (de Waal, 2007; Jahn, 2012c). The current world order, 
including the use of force by liberal democracies towards non-liberal 
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states, is firmly entrenched. It is possible that it is so entrenched that egal-
itarian norms and attitudes at home are not able to influence it to any great 
extent while they are still able to influence levels of violence at the domes-
tic level. This finding still needs further research in order to find out how 
norms and attitudes that encourage non-violence at home do not encour-
age a non-violent foreign policy.  
Moreover, the finding that it is the human development level rather 
than the democracy level that correlates the most with different types of 
violence also questions the liberal peace theory in that it indicates that 
more than formal democracy is needed to lower levels of violence in a 
society. High levels of education, long life expectancies (i.e. health) and 
low levels of inequality, i.e. human development according to the UNDP 
definition, must thus also be taken into account when understanding so-
cieties that are peaceful at home but might wage war with other countries. 
That the inequality adjusted human development index and the levels of 
violence against homosexual men moderate each others’ relationship with 
the Global Peace Index and several of its sub-categories further shows the 
need to look at patriarchal norms on sexuality when studying violence. 
This is not really surprising as intolerance of homosexuality and gender 
inequality tend to go hand in hand, while gender inequality has been shown 
to have an impact on educational levels, health and other societal inequal-
ities. 
The finding that the change in attitude to one patriarchal norm corre-
sponds with change in attitudes to other patriarchal norms is in line with 
feminist theorizing of patriarchal and hegemonic norms, though linking 
them together in a new way. It builds a strong case for the need to not see 
different patriarchal norms - on gender, sexuality and violence - as separate 
phenomena. It also strengthens the theorizing of the interconnectedness 
between three pillars of patriarchal and hegemonic norms: domination 
over women, heteronormativity and the use of violence as preferred 
means to settle conflicts and disputes and to gain or regain respect and 
honor (Connell, 1995). Thus, that patriarchal attitudes include attitudes 
approving of many different types of violence cannot be stressed enough. 
Finally, my research shows the usefulness of the, slightly unfashionable, 
concept of patriarchy and patriarchal norms and of the, much criticized, 
concept of hegemonic masculinities. Patriarchal, hegemonic norms on 
masculinity influence the vast majority of cultures around the world. With-
out using the concept of patriarchy as an overarching system, influencing 
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all spheres of lives, it is hard to understand how we can interlink gender, 
sexuality and violence. Today many see the concept of patriarchy as old-
fashioned and overly politicized and it is rather rare to see it used in the 
feminist conflict and security studies, except in the works of Cynthia En-
loe. This is a shame as refraining from using the concept of patriarchy to 
analyze gender norms, sexuality and violence leads to the puzzle lacking 
the crucial bits that show their interrelatedness. The use of Connell’s con-
cept of hegemonic masculinities in connection to patriarchal norms fur-
ther helps clearing the picture of the interrelationships of gender, sexuality 
and violence. While the concept has been criticized (and reformulated by 
Connell and Messerschmidt in 2005) it remains a very useful tool and is 
being used by many feminist scholars, including in the fields of conflict 
and security studies and in the IR. Using the concept of hegemonic mas-
culinities without combining it with the concept of patriarchal norms does 
make it less powerful though. While it is possible to imagine a social and 
cultural change leading to masculinities no longer being patriarchal but 
egalitarian and empathic, it is definitely not the case today and it is im-
portant to point out that today’s hegemonic masculinities are very much 
patriarchal. Thus, both concepts have been very useful in this research.  
To conclude, patriarchal, and hegemonic, norms are here understood 
to be based on three pillars: men’s domination over women; heteronor-
mativity; and the use of violence as preferred means to settle a dispute and 
to (re)gain power, respect and honor. These three pillars interact with each 
other: when there is a change in attitudes to and levels of gender equality 
and acceptance of homosexuals there is also a change in attitudes to and 
levels of different kinds of violence (at home, in society and at state levels).   
In this respect it is also important to examine gender inequality and 
homophobia together as gender equality alone is not enough for under-
standing the interconnectedness between patriarchal norms and levels of 
violence.  
The large outlier here is interstate armed conflict. How the same values, 
norms and mechanisms that encourage non-violence at home can co-exist 
with an export of violence to other countries is still very much unclear 
even though the nature of liberal democracies and the world order they 
pursue provide some explanation as seen above. This finding challenges 
earlier studies that political gender equality leads to less inter-state conflicts 
(Caprioli, 2000. These contradictory findings dispute the previous theories 
around the international peace promoting aspects of gender equality.  
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In connection to this troubling finding - that the more gender and sex-
uality equal countries are, the more they export violence - it is good to 
consider Kelly’s (2000) notification that the industrialized Western coun-
tries (here meaning Europe and North America) understand peace as 
something that happens at home, even if there is “wartime” (with the help 
of their troops) elsewhere.  
Moreover, the finding that the “democratic peace” seems to be more 
of a “human development peace” shows a need to rethink theorizing 
around democracy and peace. Also, as the Human Development Index 
and violence against gay men enforce each other on the violence variables 
there is a need to link patriarchal norms with human development.  
A theoretical/methodological issue in relation to the “democratic 
peace” is that considering the findings linking high democracy levels to 
gender equality, tolerance of homosexuals and high levels of domestic 
peace it might be time to rethink how we define and measure democracy. 
According to Inglehart and Welzel (2005) gender equality is crucial to the 
quality of democracy as democracy aims at empowering people as if soci-
eties were made through a social contract between equals. Could a country 
really be considered democratic if different categories of citizens (male/fe-
male, heterosexual/homosexual etc.) do not have the same possibilities? 
Moreover, Bjarnegård and Melander (2011) have found that democracy 
only has an impact on levels of civil conflict if they have a minimum level 
of gender equality, further linking democracy with gender equality. Fur-
thermore, as today’s liberal democracies are linked to a very specific, liberal 
capitalist economic system (Jahn, 2012b) it would be interesting to disen-
tangle democracy from the liberal economic system to see how egalitarian 
norms could operate politically with different types of economic systems 
and what consequences that might have for foreign policy. 
Re-defining democracy would have to lead to re-designing the democ-
racy indexes and measurements, to include the levels of equality of all the 
citizens, regardless of gender, sexual orientation (and possibly other fac-
tors). As my research has shown that not only levels, but also attitudes to 
gender, sexuality and violence – and their relations - are relevant, it is 
worth thinking whether those attitudes should also be taken into account 
when theorizing and measuring democracy. This brings up another set of 
theoretical/methodological issues: the difference between law/official 
policy and practice. A country might have laws requiring all children, in-
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cluding girls, to go to school while a large part of its population disap-
proves of girls being educated. A country might also have laws saying that 
homosexuals should not be discriminated against while a large part of its 
population disapproves of homosexuals. The misogyny, sexism and hom-
ophobia that accompany populism in some of the liberal democracies of 
the West today is a case in point. Looking at both attitudes and actual 
levels of equality and acceptance thus gives us complementary infor-
mation, necessary to better understand the mechanisms of patriarchal 
norms and the interconnectedness of its three pillars. 
The use of large, existing data sets, indexes and scales has provided 
interesting results. However, as discussed in the introduction, these data 
sets are limited through the ways they were assembled, and their variables 
defined. There is also a lot of data one wishes to have but doesn’t. The 
existing data are also not always comparable, different data sets giving sim-
ilar indicators a different weight, and selecting indicators for similar varia-
bles in very different ways. There is thus great need to look closer at how 
big data sets are assembled when using them. I found that a way to over-
come the problem with these differences is to use several data sets and 
several methods for the same study. If several analyses based on different 
data sets point in the same direction we can feel confident that we are on 
the right track.  
5.2.2 Unanswered questions and needs for further research 
Some results did not confirm the hypotheses and assumptions and 
some even contradicted them. To start with, a causal link between patriar-
chal norms on gender and homosexuality, on the one hand, and violence, 
on the other hand, has not been proved statistically, although strong cor-
relations are found. However, theoretical assumptions, a number of pre-
vious studies, and my findings taken together do make a causal link very 
probable. It is very difficult to prove causal links for complex phenomena 
in social sciences and those who, for different reasons, do not want to 
consider patriarchal norms in relation to violence will be quick to point 
out the lack of a definitive proof. This lack of proof should not be a de-
terrent though, as theorizing and evidence very strongly point in the same 
direction.  
The direction of causality is also not proven; it can be argued that the 
relationship between attitudes to gender and sexuality, on the one hand, 
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and attitudes to violence, on the other hand, goes both ways. However, 
there is no proof that low levels of violence would automatically lead to 
high levels of gender equality and acceptance of homosexuals, certainly 
not on their own, as both the women’s movement and the LGBT move-
ment have worked hard for a very long time to advance equality and ac-
ceptance. One could of course argue that the work of these movements 
was made possible due to the already existing relatively low levels of vio-
lence in the societies it took place in. Further research, for instance in the 
form of case studies able to look into specific relations more deeply, could 
investigate whether there are exceptions to the assumed causal direction 
of these relationships.  
The aggregated GPI correlated with attitudes to homosexuality in only 
ten of the 2238 sub-categories (UN peacekeeping funding excluded). Why 
this was not the case for the other sub-categories needs further research. 
It could be that some types of violence depend on specific  underlying 
mechanisms and societal structures more than others. It could also be re-
lated to the ways the data on these categories were defined and weighed. 
For instance, why “homicide” – a type of violent crime – did not correlate 
with attitudes to homosexuality while the category “violent crime” did, 
could very well be due to definitions and weighing of indicators. That the 
number of security officers and police as well as incarceration rates did 
not correlate to attitudes to homosexuality might be due to the type of 
governance in the country. For instance, authoritarian regimes might en-
force policies that do not necessarily reflect the attitudes of the general 
population. Moreover, while military expenditure did correlate with atti-
tudes to homosexuality there are clearly many different ways of spending 
a budget, here shown by the fact that there was no correlation with num-
bers of armed service personnel, weapons import and nuclear and heavy 
weapons. Also, most countries around the world do import weapons of 
some kind which could explain the absence of correlation for this sub-
                                                 
38 These 10 are: Perception of criminality; violent crime; political terror; access 
to weapons; violent demonstrations; political instability; intensity of internal 
conflict; weapons export; military expenditure and neighbouring countries rela-
tions. Others are: homicide; number of security officers and police; incarcera-
tion rates; deaths from internal conflict; internal conflicts fought; displaced peo-
ple; terrorism impact; weapons import; armed service personnel; nuclear and 
heavy weapons; external conflicts fought and deaths from external conflicts 
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category. Moreover nuclear and heavy weapons (sophisticated air force, 
warships, aircraft carriers and combat helicopters) are only owned by rel-
atively few countries in the world, countries with very different types of 
regime, and some of these weapons were acquired a rather long time ago, 
prior to the measuring of attitudes to homosexuality (2014) and are there-
fore difficult to relate and analyze.  
Why only the intensity of internal armed conflict was correlated to at-
titudes to homosexuality and not numbers of internal conflict and the 
number of dead and displaced people when using the GPI is quite puz-
zling since the correlation between internal conflict and attitudes to ho-
mosexuality turned out to be strong when using the UCDB. The same 
goes for external conflict where only neighboring countries relations were 
correlating in the GPI while the correlation between attitudes to homo-
sexuality and external conflict were very strong using the UCDB. This 
probably has to do with the way the GPI defines and measures its indica-
tors while the UCDB is very straight forward, just measuring absence and 
presence of internal and external armed conflict ( if a country was sending 
troops abroad within the frames of, for instance, NATO or the UN, it is 
counted as participating in external conflict). This means that one has to 
be very careful when selecting data sets and to be very aware of the fact 
that an indicator/category that appears to be the same can have very dif-
ferent definitions in different data sets. It would be useful to further try to 
disentangle these complex relationships through for instance in-depth case 
studies.  
The fact that the most equal and accepting societies are the ones send-
ing troops abroad has already been addressed in the previous section. 
However, the finding that the countries who did not participate in any 
armed conflict, be it internal or external, found themselves in between the 
countries with internal conflict and the countries with external conflict on 
all measurements regarding homosexuality, gender equality, democracy, 
wealth and human development while still having rather high levels of vi-
olence in their societies further adds to the puzzle. Not having the lowest 
measures on these variables seems to protect them from internal conflict 
while not having the highest measures still seems to ensure that they have 
rather high levels of other types of societal violence. It would be interest-
ing to develop this further, to see if there are breaking points and where 
the breaking points are, how accepting and equal a society has to be in 
order to be protected from internal armed conflict, and how accepting and 
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equal it has to be to achieve low levels of societal violence? Such research 
would contribute an important piece to our understanding of these mech-
anisms.  
When it comes to the moderating effect of human development on 
attitudes to homosexuality in relation to violence only the aggregated GPI 
and eight sub-categories were correlated.39 Why the other sub-categories 
did not show any moderating effect is not clear although part of the ex-
planation could be the ways the categories are defined and measured. For 
one GPI sub-category though - terrorism impact - human development 
and patriarchal attitudes seemed to have an opposite moderating influence 
than for the other sub-categories, namely leading to higher terrorism im-
pact when human development is high and violence against gay men is 
low. Terrorism impact was furthermore not correlated to attitudes to ho-
mosexuality. These findings do not seem to make sense given the large 
number of terrorist attacks in the Middle East and other places with very 
low acceptance of homosexuality. This likely depends on how the GPI 
defines a terrorist attack – which attacks counts or not. Moreover, one of 
the indicators weighed into the terrorism variable is the financial cost of 
material damage due to the attack, costs that may be higher in Western 
countries than in other regions despite terrorist attacks being fewer in 
numbers in the West than in other regions, thus contributing to a possibly 
skewed result. It would be interesting to make further research on terrorist 
attacks and attitudes to homosexuality and gender equality, using only the 
numbers of terrorist attacks in order to clarify the relationship.  
The third study showed that attitudes to violence against homosexuals 
are not always on par with levels of homophobia, and this relationship  
seems to be different in different countries (Planet Romeo, 2015). This is 
a new and puzzling insight as previous research on homophobia has 
tended to link levels of violence against homosexuals with levels of hom-
ophobia (Kimmel and Mahler, 2003). These differences in approval of vi-
olence against homosexuals make it difficult to generalize the findings, so 
further research is needed to see what makes homophobic people in one 
setting approve of violence against homosexuals, and homophobic people 
in another setting disapprove it. Such research could help identify the 
                                                 
39 These are: perception of criminality; incarceration rates; access to weapons; 
violent demonstrations; political instability, political terror, terrorism impact 
and neighbouring countries relations 
 Conclusion 119 
mechanisms behind violence against homosexuals. Furthermore, the find-
ing that attitudes to violence against homosexuals are not corresponding 
to attitudes to violence against women also merits further research in order 
to unpack the relationships between homophobia, sexism and violence 
against homosexuals and women.  
The third study also shows that a gender training can lead to changes 
of attitudes in an egalitarian direction, but also to a lack of change, and 
sometimes to change in a patriarchal direction (backlash). This confirms 
earlier work on gender trainings (Lyytikäinen, 2007; Mackay, 2003). While 
non-change can be explained by strong beliefs and values that the training 
failed to challenge, change in a more patriarchal direction is harder to ex-
plain. It could be that the training method provoked backlash in some 
individuals as proposed by Mackay (2003). If so, gender training methods 
definitely need further scrutiny. Also, further research could investigate 
why certain persons experience a backlash when others don’t, what the 
triggers are. That would be an important contribution to our understand-
ing on how norms and attitudes change.  
The findings that patriarchal norms include attitudes approving of vio-
lence is strengthening theorizing of the three pillars of patriarchal and heg-
emonic norms: domination over women, heteronormativity, use of vio-
lence as preferred means to settle a dispute and to (re)gain respect and 
honor (Connell, 1995). This should also lead to new research linking these 
three pillars and understanding their relationships. This approach could be 
useful in the study of many forms of violence, from interpersonal violence 
to armed conflict. Using these patriarchal hegemonic norms as analytical 
framework when investigating different forms of international relations 
would also lead to a clearer understanding of the global interactions and 
their consequences, for instance foreign policies, arms trade, military in-
terventions but also decisions to locate and relocate productions of con-
sumer goods and products to certain locations rather than others. Further-
more, if we are using gender inequality as a justification to intervene 
militarily abroad, what does that say about our understanding on how gen-
der equality is achieved? Is it about putting as many women as men at all 
levels of systems, organizations and institutions that are created based on 
patriarchal norms (the infamous “add women and stir” approach), or is it 
about changing these systems, organizations and institutions, making new 
ones, based on egalitarian norms? Can violence at a macro level (i.e. armed 
conflict) succeed in installing gender equality? And while there have not 
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yet been any interventions using gay rights as justification, could it hap-
pen? The countries intervening abroad are not always similar in their levels 
of gender equality and acceptance of homosexuality. The difference is big 
between the US and Western Europe, with the Western European coun-
tries being more accepting of both gender equality and homosexuality than 
the US. There is also a great difference between countries contributing 
troops to the UN peacekeeping forces. Their levels of violence at home 
and participation in violence abroad are also different. Would that mean 
that Western European countries could be quicker to use the protection 
of homosexuals as justification for military interventions than the US? 
Comparative case studies could help exploring these relations.  
That the demographic variables were not significant in the study on 
changing attitudes in India was probably related to the fact that it was such 
a small sample. However, it is worth noting that patriarchal norms can be 
found at all levels in society, albeit probably in different shapes, and more 
research is needed to understand what makes some communities and so-
cieties more patriarchal than others, and how different factors such as ed-
ucation, religiosity, cast, class etc. affect patriarchal norms. It is also worth 
noting that the purpose of this study was not to investigate patriarchal 
norms in India but to see if attitudes to norms on gender equality, homo-
sexuality and violence co-vary. These co-variances – while confirmed – 
certainly need further research. 
At the end, my research on gender (in)equality and violence, while rest-
ing on, as well as strengthening earlier work, goes further than these earlier 
studies in that it links gender inequality and its underlying patriarchal 
norms and attitudes to various types of violence, not just violence against 
women. It also goes further in that it combines the findings on gender 
equality, violence and heteronormativity, indicating that there is the need 
for a holistic approach to both research of and interventions into norms 
on gender, sexuality and violence, as they are interconnected. There is a 
need to break down academic and practitioner silos that are treating these 
topics separately. While feminist studies do connect gender norms and 
violence, including armed conflict and militarization, the links between 
sexuality and violence (other than violence against LGBTQI people) are 
rather rarely studied,  and research addressing both gender and sexuality 
with violence are all too rare. Moreover, mainstream political science, IR 
and conflict studies are still largely resistant to addressing patriarchal 
norms as an explanatory factor when analyzing violence and conflict. My 
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research then provides an additional argument for the inclusion of patri-
archal norms in more mainstream studies. 
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 Appendices 
 
Appendix 1 
Questionnaire for the gender training 
Questionnaire ID No:___________ 
 
In general, men should control the women in their life. 
 
1 
I strongly agree 
 2  3  4  5 
I strongly disagree 
I think men are better decision makers than women. 
 
1 
I strongly agree 
 2  3  4  5 
I strongly disagree 
I think women can be just as good politicians as men. 
 
1 
I strongly agree 
 2  3  4  5 
I strongly disagree 
I would want to make important decision together with my wife. 
 
1 
I strongly agree 
 2  3  4  5 
I strongly disagree 
I would be furious if someone thought I was gay. 
 
1  2  3  4  5 
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I strongly agree I strongly disagree 
Gay people should be able to live their lives as they wish. 
 
1 
I strongly agree 
 2  3  4  5 
I strongly disagree 
Gay men are actually not real men. 
 
1 
I strongly agree 
 2  3  4  5 
I strongly disagree 
I would not mind if a friend told me he was gay. 
 
1 
I strongly agree 
 2  3  4  5 
I strongly disagree 
In general, I must get my way when arguing with other men. 
 
1 
I strongly agree 
 2  3  4  5 
I strongly disagree 
Being stronger than other men is important to me. 
 
1 
I strongly agree 
 2  3  4  5 
I strongly disagree 
I don’t feel a need to be in charge of other guys around me around me. 
  
1 
I strongly agree 
 2  3  4  5 
I strongly disagree 
I don’t strive to always make decisions for other guys around me. 
 
1 
I strongly agree 
 2  3  4  5 
I strongly disagree 
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I tend to keep my feelings to myself. 
 
1 
I strongly agree 
 2  3  4  5 
I strongly disagree 
I like to talk about my feelings. 
 
1 
I strongly agree 
 2  3  4  5 
I strongly disagree 
I have difficulties telling others I care about them. 
  
1 
I strongly agree 
 2  3  4  5 
I strongly disagree 
I often express my feelings to my close ones. 
  
1 
I strongly agree 
 2  3  4  5 
I strongly disagree 
It’s important for a man to have high status. 
 
1 
I strongly agree 
 2  3  4  5 
I strongly disagree 
How other members in my family behave, including the women, does not affect 
my honour. 
 
1 
I strongly agree 
 2  3  4  5 
I strongly disagree 
Being seen as a man of honour by others is very important to me. 
 
1 
I strongly agree 
 2  3  4  5 
I strongly disagree 
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I don’t really care what others think of me. 
  
1 
I strongly agree 
 2  3  4  5 
I strongly disagree 
Proper men provide for their family economically. 
  
1 
I strongly agree 
 2  3  4  5 
I strongly disagree 
Making money is part of my idea of being a real man. 
 
1 
I strongly agree 
 2  3  4  5 
I strongly disagree 
It would be no problem if a woman earns more than her husband. 
 
1 
I strongly agree 
 2  3  4  5 
I strongly disagree 
Husband’s and wife’s contributions to the family’s economy are equally im-
portant. 
 
1 
I strongly agree 
 2  3  4  5 
I strongly disagree 
In general I will do anything to win. 
 
1 
I strongly agree 
 2  3  4  5 
I strongly disagree 
Winning is not so important. 
 
1 
I strongly agree 
 2  3  4  5 
I strongly disagree 
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Winning is a measure of my value and personal worth. 
 
1 
I strongly agree 
 2  3  4  5 
I strongly disagree 
Competing with others is not a good way to succeed. 
 
1 
I strongly agree 
 2  3  4  5 
I strongly disagree 
It feels good to be important. 
 
1 
I strongly agree 
 2  3  4  5 
I strongly disagree 
I strive to be more successful than others. 
 
1 
I strongly agree 
 2  3  4  5 
I strongly disagree 
I don’t care if people around me earn more money than I do. 
 
1 
I strongly agree 
 2  3  4  5 
I strongly disagree 
I don’t think it’s important that my clothes, watch, phone, car and other things 
are expensive and luxurious. 
 
1 
I strongly agree 
 2  3  4  5 
I strongly disagree 
I hate asking for help. 
 
1 
I strongly agree 
 2  3  4  5 
I strongly disagree 
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I have no problem admitting that I don’t manage to do something on my own. 
 
1 
I strongly agree 
 2  3  4  5 
I strongly disagree 
It’s important for men to be able to do things on their own, rather than to ask for 
help. 
 
1 
I strongly agree 
 2  3  4  5 
I strongly disagree 
Cooperation should be important part of both private and professional life. 
  
1 
I strongly agree 
 2  3  4  5 
I strongly disagree 
My work is the most important part of my life. 
 
1 
I strongly agree 
 2  3  4  5 
I strongly disagree 
Finding time to relax is difficult for me. 
 
1 
I strongly agree 
 2  3  4  5 
I strongly disagree 
It is more important for a man to work and earn money than to spend time with 
the family. 
 
1 
I strongly agree 
 2  3  4  5 
I strongly disagree 
Only paid work is worthy of a man. 
 
1 
I strongly agree 
 2  3  4  5 
I strongly disagree 
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If I could, I would frequently change sexual partners. 
 
1 
I strongly agree 
 2  3  4  5 
I strongly disagree 
I think it’s best to have only one sexual partner in life, the wife. 
 
1 
I strongly agree 
 2  3  4  5 
I strongly disagree 
I admire men who have many mistresses. 
 
1 
I strongly agree 
 2  3  4  5 
I strongly disagree 
I think it’s wrong to cheat on your wife. 
 
1 
I strongly agree 
 2  3  4  5 
I strongly disagree 
I frequently put myself in risky situations. 
 
1 
I strongly agree 
 2  3  4  5 
I strongly disagree 
I like to do things that are safe. 
 
1 
I strongly agree 
 2  3  4  5 
I strongly disagree 
I admire people who take risks. 
 
1 
I strongly agree 
 2  3  4  5 
I strongly disagree 
I think it’s stupid to take risks. 
 
1  2  3  4  5 
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I strongly agree I strongly disagree 
Sometimes violent action is necessary. 
  
1 
I strongly agree 
 2  3  4  5 
I strongly disagree 
Violence should never be used. 
 
1 
I strongly agree 
 2  3  4  5 
I strongly disagree 
Some situations can only be solved by violence. 
 
1 
I strongly agree 
 2  3  4  5 
I strongly disagree 
Violence should only be used as a last resort, when everything else fails. 
 
1 
I strongly agree 
 2  3  4  5 
I strongly disagree 
A man has the right to correct or discipline female behaviour. 
  
1 
I strongly agree 
 2  3  4  5 
I strongly disagree 
Sex is a man’s right in marriage so it’s ok for him to force himself on his wife even 
if she doesn’t want to. 
 
1 
I strongly agree 
 2  3  4  5 
I strongly disagree 
Physical violence in an intimate relationship is never ok. 
 
1 
I strongly agree 
 2  3  4  5 
I strongly disagree 
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Violence in the home should be reported to authorities. 
 
1 
I strongly agree 
 2  3  4  5 
I strongly disagree 
It makes you feel big and tough when you push someone around. 
 
1 
I strongly agree 
 2  3  4  5 
I strongly disagree 
There are better ways of solving problems than fighting. 
 
1 
I strongly agree 
 2  3  4  5 
I strongly disagree 
It is ok for me to hit someone to get them to do what I want. 
 
1 
I strongly agree 
 2  3  4  5 
I strongly disagree 
It is not ok to hit someone even if you go crazy with anger. 
 
1 
I strongly agree 
 2  3  4  5 
I strongly disagree 
I would hit someone who would tease me suggesting I were gay. 
 
1 
I strongly agree 
 2  3  4  5 
I strongly disagree 
 It is ok to beat up a gay person. 
 
1 
I strongly agree 
 2  3  4  5 
I strongly disagree 
If my friends would beat someone who they think is gay I would try to stop them. 
 
1  2  3  4  5 
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I strongly agree I strongly disagree 
It is not justifiable to beat up a gay person for being gay. 
 
1 
I strongly agree 
 2  3  4  5 
I strongly disagree 
A man who doesn’t fight back when other men push him around will lose respect. 
 
1 
I strongly agree 
 2  3  4  5 
I strongly disagree 
It’s justifiable to use violence against someone who insults me or my family. 
 
1 
I strongly agree 
 2  3  4  5 
I strongly disagree 
I would not be violent against the women in my family even if they do something I 
consider dishonoring. 
  
1 
I strongly agree 
 2  3  4  5 
I strongly disagree 
Violence is not a way to gain respect. 
  
1 
I strongly agree 
 2  3  4  5 
I strongly disagree 
The police should be allowed to use violence to suppress demonstration, even if 
these demonstrations are peaceful. 
 
1 
I strongly agree 
 2  3  4  5 
I strongly disagree 
The police should never use violence against citizens, except if they fear for their 
lives. 
 
1 
I strongly agree 
 2  3  4  5 
I strongly disagree 
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Torture is an acceptable method to get valuable information in some cases. 
 
1 
I strongly agree 
 2  3  4  5 
I strongly disagree 
The state should never be allowed to abuse human rights. 
 
1 
I strongly agree 
 2  3  4  5 
I strongly disagree 
 It is ok to use kill people who have different political/ideological, ethnic, caste or 
religious background. 
 
1 
I strongly agree 
 2  3  4  5 
I strongly disagree 
I would never use violence for political/ideological or religious reasons. 
 
1 
I strongly agree 
 2  3  4  5 
I strongly disagree 
People of another political/ideological, caste, ethnic or religious affiliation de-
serve the violence they get. 
  
1 
I strongly agree 
 2  3  4  5 
I strongly disagree 
No political/ideological or religious conflicts should ever be solved by violence. 
 
1 
I strongly agree 
 2  3  4  5 
I strongly disagree 
A soldier is the archetype of a real man. 
 
1 
I strongly agree 
 2  3  4  5 
I strongly disagree 
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Military violence should only be used as a defense, if we are attacked first. 
 
1 
I strongly agree 
 2  3  4  5 
I strongly disagree 
We should have more weapons than our enemies. 
 
1 
I strongly agree 
 2  3  4  5 
I strongly disagree 
Conflict should be solved through mediation and negotiation, not by military 
means. 
 
1 
I strongly agree 
 2  3  4  5 
I strongly disagree 
 
 
